Linking social class inequalities, labor market status, and fertility: An empirical investigation of second births

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Abstract

I outline a theoretical background for interpreting the effects of social class on fertility, based on social class and welfare regime theory. Social class differentials lead to different levels of economic wellbeing and security, compatibility of employment and childcare roles, and of gender equality. I hypothesize that class-specific combinations of these variables result in different incentives for and constraints on family formation, and thus different fertility levels. I use the Spanish sample of the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions for the years 2004–2015 and event history analysis techniques to analyze second-birth probabilities. A substantial positive effect of social class on second birth probabilities was found. The results also indicated that the mechanisms concerning the effects of class do not work in a monotonic way, and that specific combinations of mechanisms are relevant for each social group. Overall, the analyses showed that social class is not only key to understand intracountry differentials in fertility but also useful to understand the functioning of the welfare regime and its relationship to overall levels of fertility.

Keywords: fertility, social class, life course, economic security, role compatibility, gender equality, welfare regime.

Introduction

A large part of the literature on the socioeconomic differentials in fertility takes education or income as key variables. A different strand of literature analyzes the labor market situation of individuals and their effects on fertility, focusing on variables such as employment, unemployment, or job instability. This paper aims to complement and connect these two kinds of literature by focusing on a comparatively neglected concept: social class. In principle, the rationale for investigating the effect of class on fertility can be the same as for other variables that capture social stratification, such as education, income, or ethnicity. It can be argued, however, that in market economies it is market position, and especially the position in the occupational division of labor, i.e., social class, that is fundamental to the generation of social inequalities (Breen and Rottman 1995; Goldthorpe 2007). Social class refers to categories of individuals who share similar positions in labor markets and in employment relations (Goldthorpe 2007; Weber 1978). The "class analysis" approach emphasizes the importance of the individuals' position in society rather than their personal attributes, and by doing so it also provides a link between the way a society is organized (i.e. its institutional configuration, including the social class structure) and the individuals' patterns of behavior in different domains.

Thus, it has been shown that class position leads to inequalities in domains such as health (Wilkinson 2005), education (Breen et al. 2009; Erikson et al. 2005), unemployment risks (Layte et al. 2000), poverty and income trajectories (Bernardi & Garrido, 2008; Gallie, 2007), and inter- and intragenerational social mobility (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). It is surprising, therefore, that few studies have explored the empirical association between social class and fertility (for exceptions see Barbieri, Bozzon, Scherer, Grotti, & Lugo, 2015; Dalla-Zuanna, 2007; Skirbekk, 2008),[1] and that none of these studies have paid a detailed attention to the mechanisms connecting these variables in contemporary postindustrial societies. This lack of studies on the social class–fertility relationship for contemporary societies contrasts with the substantial literature generated by historical demographers (Dribe and Scalone 2014; Szreter 2015; Wrong 1958). The aim here is both, to empirically "discover" (Billari 2015) if there is a relationship between social class

[1] Many studies do not clearly differentiate between the concepts of social status and social class. While the former refers to stratification in terms of "community," honor, and style of life (e.g., ethnic groups, occupational groups), the latter is founded on economic relationships (Weber 1978).

and fertility in a low fertility country[2], and to propose a theoretical account that explains that relationship (Hedström and Swedberg 1998). Moreover, some of the proposed mechanisms linking social class and second births are empirically explored in this paper, in particular those related to economic insecurity. As will be explained below, individuals' social class positions strongly influence their levels of economic wellbeing and security, employment-parenthood role compatibility, and gender equality. Class is seen as a main driving force of these intermediate variables, which in turn are key in the explanation of fertility in contemporary postindustrial societies. It can then be hypothesized that different combinations of these variables for each social class lead to class-specific fertility patterns.

Of course, the analyses should not be narrowly based on how individuals' positions in the labor markets, and the market mechanisms implied by them, impact fertility decisions. To start with, the very labor market relations and the inequalities they generate are largely shaped by social institutions, the welfare state in particular (Esping-Andersen 1993, 2015; Kohli 2007). The institutional configuration of a society, i.e., its welfare regime, strongly influences the level of economic wellbeing and security, role compatibility, and gender equality enjoyed by each social group. Labor market regulations on work schedules, parental leave, childcare organization, and the family itself are crucial to understand fertility (Hoem, Neyer, and Andersson 2006; McDonald 2000; McNicoll 1994; Rindfuss and Brewster 1996). In this respect, social class is a useful concept to study fertility from a life-course perspective, since it allows one to link individuals' roles and life chances with institutional characteristics. It provides a suitable perspective to study key issues in life-course research, such as the inequalities in the distribution of resources and risks over the course of individuals' lives, employment-fertility interactions, and how institutions shape people's lives (Huinink and Kohli 2014; Mayer 2001). Previous studies with an institutional perspective mostly focused on society-level differentials in fertility, often assuming that institutional features (including policies) have a homogeneous effect on the population, an assumption that is questioned in the present paper. This leaves intrasociety differentials unexplained, or otherwise these differentials are interpreted in terms of individual attributes and the associated neoclassical microeconomic mechanisms, such as income effects and opportunity costs (Baizan, Arpino, and Delclòs 2016; McDonald

[2] Although the empirical sections of the paper focus on Spain, the proposed explanations are believed to have a wider applicability to low fertility settings.

2013). These explanations, based on human capital as a key variable, naturally use education and (potential) income as indicators.[3] While education is an important attribute that individuals bring to the market, it is actual participation in the labor market, and the class positions it entails, that determines the distribution of resources that form the basis for material inequality (Müller and Gangl 2003).

In this paper, first I explore the mechanisms that link social class and fertility, on the basis of social class theory and institutional perspectives. This perspective is intended to be applicable to contemporary advanced societies. Given the scarcity of previous research on the topic, this is necessarily a preliminary effort to construct a theoretical framework and derive hypotheses. Second, this perspective is empirically investigated by documenting class differentials in second-birth probabilities in Spain during the period 2004–2015, using individual-level data from the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions. While the general theoretical arguments developed are relevant for all parities, I focus the hypotheses and the analyses on second births, for space reasons and because this parity is what brings about the difference between "moderately low" and "lowest-low" fertility levels (Billari & Kohler, 2004). The fact that the Spanish institutional setting of recent decades has been conducive to very low fertility levels makes it a particularly relevant object of study (Adserà 2004; Baizan 2016). Consistent with the theoretical expectations, I found substantial differentials between social classes, wherein the high socioeconomic groups showed higher probabilities of a second child.

2. Theoretical background and hypotheses

2.1. How does social class affect fertility?

My argument starts out from Goldthorpe's theory of social class, which is based on a long sociological tradition and is widely accepted as a basis for empirical research (Goldthorpe 2007; Rose & Harrison 2007; Weber 1978). From this perspective, class positions are

[3] Income is often volatile over one's life course, and education does not closely correspond to occupational attainment (Bernardi and Ballarino 2012; Müller and Shavit 1998) nor to income (Blau and Kahn 2017). This is specially the case in countries such as Spain, where fast educational expansion and the increase in "overeducation" has been particularly conspicuous (Ortiz and Rodriguez-Menés 2016). Remarkably, there is a strong heterogeneity in the fertility levels of women with the same educational level (Martin-Garcia and Baizan 2006; Neyer, Hoem, and Andersson 2015). Education is also considered to be closely associated with value orientations by some researchers (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 2012; Neels, Karel and Perelli-Harris 2013).

seen as deriving from social relations in economic life or, more specifically, from employment relations. A first differentiation is made between employers, the self-employed, and employees. But as in modern societies a majority of the active population are employees, a further differentiation is needed among them. This is achieved by referring to the form of the employment contract typical of each occupational class, taking into account both the explicit and implicit features of it. Two dimensions are seen as crucial to determine the form of regulation of employment contracts, which differ by occupation. First, employers face the problem of monitoring the work of employees, i.e., measuring its amount and supervising and controlling its quality. And a second problem is related to the degree of specificity of the skills, experience, and knowledge held by the employee, and how specific and valuable they are for the employer. A "service" relationship arises between employers and employees when monitoring is difficult and the specificity of human assets is high, involving long-term employment prospects and a high degree of work autonomy. This employment regulation is typical for higher-grade professionals and managers. At the other end of the spectrum, in routine manual occupations such as cleaners, laborers, or machine operators, labor contracts exist wherein work is paid for either by the piece or by time, and wherein a short-term time perspective prevails. Both the quality and quantity of work are easily monitored, and employees are easily replaced without serious loss of productive value. Between these two extremes, modified versions of the labor contract are found, typical of classes such as "routine nonmanual employees" or "supervisors and lower-level technicians" (Goldthorpe 2007).[4]

An important issue is whether we should consider individual's class positions or household's class positions (Erikson 1984; Rose & Harrison 2007). The focus on life chances and consumption standards, as well as the fact that fertility decisions are generally made by couples, would imply a focus on the household's (or couple's) class as the unit of analysis. But this may lead to neglect the particular job conditions experienced by individuals, including the degree of autonomy, work schedules, and job security, that are crucial for role compatibility and for labor force attachment, especially

[4] Employment relations can also be assumed to involve distributive conflict between employers and employees (Korpi 2006). Work conditions and employees' rewards can then be seen as the outcome of a bargaining process, in which actors engage two basic types of power resources: economic assets and labor power, or human capital. In addition, the bargaining process is influenced by collective action as well as state regulations and provisions. Firms' organizational requirements, including the "contractual hazard" for employers (Goldthorpe 2007), are matched in this process to the employees' interests and constraints.

for women. Therefore, the analyses should consider both perspectives, since they are potentially relevant to fertility.

The above arguments imply that each social class has specific levels and types of resources and risks over the life course, as well as particular work conditions. My contention is that these class situations hold implications for fertility.

Economic security

A key point highlighted by much of the literature is that the employment relations associated with each occupational class hold strong implications for inequalities in terms of several dimensions of individuals' economic security, including employment security (i.e., risk of job loss and difficulty in finding employment), income stability (short-term fluctuations in earnings), and the level of earnings and its evolution over the life course (Goldthorpe and McKnight 2006). In particular, the mechanisms outlined above mean that lower classes are highly vulnerable to unemployment, poverty, and even chronic exclusion from the labor market. Thus, it can be assumed that *economic security is positively associated with social class.*

As a substantial body of literature has shown, economic security, and especially employment security, is an important determinant of family formation (Blossfeld et al. 2005; Oppenheimer 1988). In principle, this should lead to higher fertility levels for higher social classes. Nevertheless, unemployment, which is more prevalent among lower social classes, lowers the opportunity costs of parenthood (Özcan, Mayer, and Luedicke 2010). Persistent employment precariousness and labor market exclusion can render motherhood attractive, as no other valued social role is available and the jobs within reach provide little in terms of valued social identity (Friedman, Hechter, and Kanazawa 1994; Morgan 2015).

A further implication of the differential regulation of labor contracts is the income levels and their evolution over the life course typical of each class. While professional occupations lead to predictable and steep income profiles that generally peak beyond childbearing age, manual occupations show little income progression and lead to a basically flat pattern beyond age 30 (Goldthorpe and McKnight 2006; Sigle-Rushton and Waldfogel 2007). Maternity-related labor market interruptions are severely penalized for high-level occupations, as women lose experience and tenure, providing a strong

incentive to be established in the labor market before motherhood and to stay attached to it after each birth (England et al. 2016). This effect is intensified with the existence of internal labor markets and wage increases linked to career progression (Osterman and Burton 2004). These considerations also apply to intermediate occupations, albeit to a lower extent. The penalty is much reduced for basic occupations, for which it is easier to reenter to an equivalent job, since often the jobs involve little progression in terms of income and training.

Employment-parenthood role compatibility

The two dimensions of employment regulation outlined above, the degree of difficulty of job monitoring, and human assets specificity have straightforward implications for the pattern of class differentials in earnings.[5] Other benefits, both from public sources or at the company level, are also positively linked to class and the stability of employment relationships, such as access to parental and sick leave, unemployment benefits, etc., and their length and wage replacement. For instance, maternity leave rights often depend on social security payments during the preceding years, linking them to the level of earnings and employment stability. All these variables are crucial to allow role compatibility between labor market participation and childcare. In particular, paid childcare is more easily afforded by high social classes (Ermisch 1989), who generally also enjoy higher access and derive higher earnings from maternity and paternity leave. Role compatibility is influenced by several other variables linked to social class, according to the type of contract regulation outlined above, including the degree of autonomy (control over the pace and organization of work, and the degree of supervision), job variety, skills development, job strain (including time pressure and the discretion available to the employee to meet the employer's demands), and time flexibility (whether the employee can decide when to start and finish work, the possibility to take a day off for family reasons, and the ability to reduce work hours and return to full-time work at will and without penalty) (León 2015; Präg and Mills 2014; Schieman, Glavin, and Milkie 2009; Swanberg, Pitt-Catsouphes, and Drescher-Burke 2005). As shown by this literature work-family options are more often available to higher class employees with firm-specific skills, since employers have weak incentives to provide these benefits to low skilled

[5] The class pattern in earnings is different from the general degree of earnings inequality between different classes, including employment-related earnings. For instance, during the last two decades, class inequalities in income have increased significantly in Spain, leaving the class pattern of earnings basically unaffected.

employees, because employee replacement costs and their bargaining power are lower. Although relatively little research exists on the impact of these variables on fertility, several analyses point to significant effects, which are not always linear with respect to class (Begall and Mills 2011). For example, some managerial jobs may involve inflexible timetables. Part-time is more often available among low-class jobs, but it may not be a voluntarily chosen option and it involves penalizations in terms of career progression (OECD 2010), and generally it is not conducive to gender equality (Lyonette and Crompton 2015; Pfau-Effinger 2005). The schedules for part-time jobs are not necessarily more flexible and usually are set by the needs of employers rather than to facilitate work-family reconciliation. Overall, the above arguments and empirical evidence support the proposition that *employment-parenthood role compatibility is positively related to social class*.

Gender equality

The mechanisms just discussed are closely linked to gender relations, and help explain why *gender equality is positively associated with the social class.* Both time-use surveys and labor market indicators show a pattern in which gender role specialization is negatively linked to social class (Baizan, Domínguez, and González 2014; Plantin 2007; Raley, Bianchi, and Wang 2012). Clearly, inequalities inside the household and in the labor market are interrelated. The gender culture prevalent in each society and specific class constraints lead to a diversity of household work organization models in connection to childbirth (Crompton 1999; Pfau-Effinger 2005). First, gender equality is greatly facilitated by the compatibility between the roles of mother and worker, as it allows women to stay in the labor market and reduce employment and income penalties. Job precariousness and a lower penalty derived from employment interruptions can lead (low-class) women to opt for (temporary or/and part-time) housewifery as the most feasible or only way to make motherhood possible. Limited participation in the labor market is likely to reinforce women's segregation in particular occupations and constrain their class mobility. Moreover, lower classes' higher probability of discontinuous or part-time employment creates disincentives for employers to invest in women's skills. The higher probability of employment interruptions is also likely to lead to employer's (statistical) discrimination in hiring and promotion decisions. These mechanisms reinforce each other, weakening the bargaining power vis-à-vis her partner with respect to decisions on who should do household tasks and perform childcare. The combination of several factors, therefore, provides an explanation for the differences in the decision-making of

women in different class positions. The higher degree of gender equality that prevails among higher social classes, both in the labor market and in the household, potentially facilitates fertility (Bernhardt and Goldscheider 2008; Brodmann, Esping-Andersen, and Güell 2007; Mills et al. 2008; Torr and Short 2004).

2.2. The Spanish welfare regime

While in the previous section the focus has been on how social class positions influence key determinants of fertility, leading to systematic class inequalities, it is clear that social institutions heavily mediate this relationship. The way welfare is produced and allocated between the market, the state, and the family powerfully shapes the degree of economic security, employment-childcare compatibility, and gender equality across social classes. It can be argued, therefore, that the link between social class and family behavior depends on the gender and welfare regimes existing in each society. An overview of some features of the Spanish welfare model can help illustrate this point.

From the mid-1990s to the beginning of the Great Recession, the Spanish occupational structure underwent a process that simultaneously produced occupational upgrading and polarization of the available class positions. High-paid professional and managerial jobs and low-paid personal service jobs greatly expanded, whereas employment in average-paid production and office jobs declined in relative terms (Bernardi & Garrido, 2008; Oesch & Rodríguez-Menés, 2011; Requena, Radl, & Salazar, 2011). These authors suggest that this evolution resulted not only from economic growth and technological change but also from a set of institutions that produced a high level of wage inequality, thus favoring the expansion of low-skill service jobs.[6] These studies also show that women's occupational class structure is still strikingly disadvantaged with respect to men, despite that women have substantially higher levels of education[7]. Women's labor force participation has greatly expanded during recent decades, leading the dual full-time-earner family model to become the norm. Thus, among women of the main childrearing age (25–49), labor force participation reached 84% in 2013, albeit with significant differentials by level of education and class (León and Migliavacca 2013; Requena et al.

[6] Spain displays medium-high levels of wage and income inequality among OECD countries. For instance, in 2015 the relative income poverty was 15.3% and the Gini coefficient was 0.34, i.e., levels similar to those found in the United Kingdom (10.9% and 0.36, respectively) and Portugal (13.5% and 0.34), and substantially higher than those in Germany (9.5% and 0.29) or France (8.2% and 0.30) (OECD 2017).
[7] Data from the EU-SILC also show these patterns (see Table 1).

2011). These processes have taken place in parallel to a partial deregulation of the labor market. This flexibilization has mainly been achieved through the growth of the secondary labor market, in particular fixed-term jobs, and more recently part-time jobs, while the protection of "core" jobs has been less affected.[8] Atypical contracts often involve low pay and a high risk of termination of the work relationship, generally leading to unemployment, especially in case of a recession. This labor market precariousness involves a high feeling of economic insecurity, which is strongly patterned by social class, although it is by no means confined to low classes (Polavieja 2005). Furthermore, several studies have shown that women and men who are unemployed or who are holding a fixed-term contract have substantially lower fertility than the full–time employed and the individuals with a stable contract (Baizan 2007; de la Rica and Iza 2005).

Mothers are entitled to a maternity leave from their jobs of 16 weeks, with compensation of 100% of the previous wage, up to a fairly high ceiling, for employees[9]. In order to claim leave rights, a worker must have made a minimum amount of contributions to social security. As a consequence, the leave system excludes some groups of women with an insufficient record of contributions, most notably many unemployed women, women working in the underground economy or even with part-time jobs. To the extent that lower classes are most affected by these situations, they also have reduced access to social security benefits.

The rapid increase in women's labor market participation has not been matched by a similar increase in men's unpaid work, although according to time-use surveys, some changes in that direction have occurred (Amigot-Loache et al. 2015). Moreover, these surveys show that fathers' involvement in childcare is directly related to class, both in the amount of time spent and relative to their partners. They also show that women's time spent in paid work increases with women's education and household class (Baizan et al. 2014; Domínguez Folgueras 2012). These processes have weakened the ability of households to provide care and have created a demand for both state intervention and market solutions. The resulting care gap has been partially filled by the expansion of the formal childcare system. By the late 1990s, nearly all children aged 3–5 were enrolled in

[8] Subcontracting to other firms and to the self-employed has also been important (Bernardi & Garrido, 2008).

[9] Self-employed mothers also have the right to a 16 week leave. This leave was unpaid until 2006, when it started to be partially compensated. Full equality with employees was achieved in 2014.

pre-primary schools, and by 2012–2013, 44% of children under three were enrolled in some kind of center-based care, which is partially state-subsidized (Ministerio de Educación 2015). Formal childcare has become a crucial means to enable the compatibility of childrearing with paid work for an increasing proportion of parents, yet important gaps in care for children under three persist. These are especially serious in the case of children under one, since maternity/paternity leave from employment is very short. Children of mothers with little education are also less likely to be enrolled in formal childcare than children of more educated mothers (Van Lancker and Ghysels 2016; León 2015). Overall, the welfare model involves limited state support for parenthood, either in terms of time to care, affordable childcare options outside the household, or direct economic help in the form of child benefits or tax deductions, paired to class-stratified support.

2.3. Hypotheses

The framework just outlined suggests that social class, together with welfare regime institutions, should have a substantial impact on the levels of economic security, role compatibility, and gender equality, resulting in differentials in fertility levels. Put differently, class inequalities in resources and constraints translate into predictable fertility outcomes. The general theoretical mechanisms discussed above are seen as relevant to class differentials for all birth orders in contemporary advanced societies. The formulation of hypotheses, however, needs to take into account the specific situation of each parity and institutional setting. Here I propose a set of hypotheses about the levels of second-birth probabilities for each social class, considering the Spanish context during the period 2004–2015.

A *positive relationship between class and second-birth probabilities* can be expected, in which higher classes enjoying a "service" labor relationship have higher probabilities of bearing a second child than lower classes (*Hypothesis 1*). This applies to both the household's class and the individual class. The positive relationship follows from the discussion in the previous sections in a straightforward way. Since the levels of economic security, role compatibility, and gender equality are positively related to social class, this should lead to a generally positive effect of class on fertility. A strategy based on the simultaneous combination of parenthood and employment should be more feasible the higher the occupational class, linked to a higher access to maternity/paternity leave, higher flexibility in employment schedules, and a higher affordability of nonhousehold

care. Increased class-related costs of employment interruptions also point toward this strategy, which in addition is likely to involve a faster timing of second births. Given this situation, a household work organization based on a "*dual breadwinner/market or state carer*" model (Crompton 1999; Pfau-Effinger 2005) in connection to childbirth is more likely for higher social groups (i.e. higher and lower professionals; see below for details on the social class classification applied) than for lower ones. In this model, women have an essentially equivalent attachment to the labor market as men over the life course. Full gender equality both in employment and care, i.e. a *dual breadwinner/dual carer* model of household organization, should be exceptional in a context with long and often inflexible workdays and persisting gender inequality inside and outside the households (Amigot-Loache et al. 2015; González 2006).

Women in intermediate class positions, such as higher grade white collar workers and the self-employed, are likely to have fewer opportunities to combine motherhood with full-time employment, as well as lower gender equality, than those in higher classes. They also should have greater opportunities and incentives to stay in the labor market (and avoid becoming housewives) than low-class women, leading to relatively low fertility. An inflexible labor market with a low probability of reentry after childbirth, few opportunities for part-time work, and widespread precariousness and insecurity is also likely to inhibit the fertility of these groups.

Individuals and households belonging to the lower social classes (including lower grade white-collar workers, skilled workers, and semi- and nonskilled workers) are confronted with few opportunities to combine employment and childcare, resulting from lower access to maternity/paternity leave, unaffordable formal childcare costs, and inflexible work schedules. Little institutional and normative support for active fathering and men's participation in household tasks makes a "conciliation" strategy very burdensome for women. Moreover, lower social groups confront high job instability, which in some cases leads to a persistent exclusion from the labor market or to long term unemployment. At the same time, a temporary retreat from the labor market or part-time employment involve low penalization in terms of career prospects for women, and a lower impact of women's employment income on their household's total income involves lower costs of such a reduction of paid work relative to higher social groups. As a result, low opportunity costs of fertility can be expected. Thus, a household work organization based on a "male breadwinner/female carer" model in connection to childbirth is also possible for lower

social groups, especially if the male partner holds a good economic position (for instance is a skilled worker with a stable job). It remains *a priori* unclear, however, to what extent the relatively low (opportunity) costs of such an option can counterbalance the negative effects on fertility of economic uncertainty and low gender equality. Overall, these trade-offs could lead to either very low second birth probabilities if the woman remains in the labor market (that should appear in the models by adopting a woman's class perspective), or to a relatively high fertility level if the women leave the labor market in connection to motherhood. In this last case a U-shaped class-fertility relationship with relatively high fertility levels for both the lowest and the highest social classes could be found (when the class is measured with a household perspective).

The general shape of the class-fertility relationship is likely to reflect compositional effects associated with class, such as the higher prevalence of housewives among low classes and higher labor force participation among higher-class women. But beyond these effects, women's labor market status can result in different fertility levels for each class. This can be tested by comparing second birth probabilities for specific combinations of categories for social class and labor market situations[10]. For instance, it can be expected that *second-birth probabilities are higher for full-time employed women belonging to higher classes, with respect to full-time employed women belonging to a lower class* (*Hypothesis 2*). Since being employed is assumed to be more compatible with childcare for higher social classes, and career interruptions are more costly for them, this should result in higher fertility. Also a positive social gradient should apply for gender equality, and on income and income prospects, as explained above.

Conversely, I expect that *being a housewife, versus being full-time employed, increases the probability of second births for lower classes, but not for higher classes* (*Hypothesis 3*). These differential effects of being a housewife for each class position should result from the lower costs of prolonging the interruption of participation in the labor market derived from having a child for women who can only access low-level occupations, as explained above.

The effects on fertility of the combinations of class with other labor force situations are a priori more speculative. Thus, consistently with the framework presented above and with

[10] This is substantively equivalent to introducing interaction terms in the model.

empirical data, being unemployed reflects more often a chronic precarious situation in the labor market for low social classes, while for higher classes unemployment is of shorter duration but involve higher opportunity costs (Bernardi and Garrido 2008; Polavieja 2005; Requena et al. 2011). Moreover, women from lower social classes are likely to know about their high risk of being long-term unemployed once they lose their job, so the motherhood/housewife role can be an attractive alternative in terms of social identity, as mentioned above. Women from higher social classes, in contrast, strive to get a new job (which is more likely as compared to lower-class women) instead of having a second child. As a result, *being unemployed, versus being full-time employed, decreases more strongly second birth probabilities for the higher classes than for the lower classes* (*Hypothesis 4*).

3. Data and methods

3.1. The European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EUSILC)

The data come from the Spanish longitudinal sample of the EUSILC for the years 2004–2015 (EUROSTAT 2015, 2016). Each household included in this sample responded to the survey for at least two waves and for up to four waves. Apart from the panel years, there is some additional retrospective information on each respondent, including their detailed labor market situation and income for the year preceding each wave, the last job performed, and their labor force experience. The main advantage of this panel is the availability of detailed occupational and labor market activity information for the woman and their partners (when they have one). And the main drawback is the short time window available for each individual. The EUSILC provides the date of birth of each child resident in the household; therefore, the data do not include deceased children or children no longer living with their mothers. The dependent variable in the analyses is the probability of bearing a second child in a given year. All women aged 15–42 who already had a first birth, and up to the year when they had a second birth, were included in the analytical sample, which comprises 9086 person-years, 5117 women and 1029 second births.

3.2. The European Socio-economic Classification

I have operationalized the concept of class by using the European Socio-economic Classification (ESeC), which conceptualizes class as discrete groups of labor market

positions (Rose and Harrison 2007). This is an updated version of the original Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero schema [11](Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992). In the formation of the class schema, ESeC uses employment status (employer, self-employed, employee, etc.) and occupation as proxies for employment relations. As explained above, it is supposed that individuals with similar employment status and occupation are likely to be subject to similar forms of employment regulation and thus to have similar class positions (Goldthorpe 2007). The measurement of occupations is based on the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO)[12]. The EUSILC database provides the ISCO code of the jobs held by the individuals at each wave of the survey (or *last occupation* if the individual has no job at survey time). This information, together with the information on employment status, allows attributing a particular class to each individual, according to the ESeC rules, at each wave of the survey. The resulting social class variable is time changing. Unfortunately, in EUSILC only a two-digit ISCO codification of occupations is available and, as a consequence, some occupations may be misclassified. This is likely to result in some underestimation of the fertility differentials between classes. The ESeC has rules to include the whole adult population into ten classes (the frequencies of each class are presented in Table 1). Note that the ESeC includes a class for the individuals who never worked (class 10). The classes are as follows (Rose and Harrison 2007):

1. Large employers, higher-grade professional, administrative, and managerial occupations (the "higher salariat"). This class is characterized by a "service" relationship.
2. Lower-grade professional, administrative, and managerial occupations and higher-grade technician and supervisory occupations (the "lower salariat"). These have a modified "service" relationship.
3. Intermediate occupations ("higher-grade white-collar workers"). These have a mixed relationship.
4. Small employers and self-employed occupations, excluding agriculture ("petit bourgeoisie or independents").

[11] The classification proposed by Olin Wright (2015), although based in a Marxist perspective, is very similar to the one developed by Erikson and Goldthorpe.

[12] According to the International Labor Organization, which is responsible for producing it, the ISCO is "a tool for organizing jobs into a clearly defined set of groups according to the tasks and duties undertaken in the job" (International Labor Organization 2018). In the EUSILC database jobs are classified into the ISCO version of 1988 until 2010. Since 2011 the version of ISCO used is that of 2008.

5. Self-employed occupations in agriculture ("petit bourgeoisie or independents"). This class has been merged with class 4 in the analyses, due to the small number of observations in the sample and their similarities.

6. Lower supervisory and lower technician occupations ("higher-grade blue-collar workers"). These have a mixed relationship. This class cannot be distinguished in the analyses, since the longitudinal sample of SILC does not provide information on supervisory status.

7. Lower services, sales and clerical occupations ("lower-grade white-collar workers"). These have a "modified labor contract".

8. Lower technical occupations ("skilled workers"). These have a "modified labor contract".

9. Routine occupations ("semi- and nonskilled workers"). These have a "basic labor contract".

10. Never worked and long-term unemployed. This class has a weak or no relationship with the labor market. The operationalization of this class includes only individuals who have never been employed, since information on the duration of unemployment is not available in the survey.

The characterization of social class as a *household position* is indicated by the highest occupation held by the members of a couple (Erikson 1984; Rose & Harrison 2007). This is done on the basis of a hierarchical ordering of occupational categories, in which categories with higher qualification dominate those with lower qualification, and nonmanual categories dominate manual ones. Women without a partner are also included in the analyses, obviously with their own class.

3.3. **Other variables included in the analyses**

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables in the models. These variables include the number of years since first birth (which is the baseline for the event history models), and the woman's age. The educational level is measured according to the International Standard Classification of Education. The "activity status" variable is measured in March of the year before the interview (i.e. 9 months before the start of the interview's year), to avoid reverse causality with the dependent variable. It measures the self-reported main activity performed by the woman, giving priority to economic activity over educational enrolment and over inactivity. If a person had a job, but was temporarily absent because of maternity leave, injury or temporary disability, slack work for technical

or economic reasons, is considered as employed. The EU-SILC distinguishes between part-time and full-time work on the basis of the spontaneous answer given by the respondent (in Spain full-time work usually starts at 35 hours). Among employees, a distinction is made between those with a contract of unlimited duration ("long-term") and those with a work contract of limited duration ("temporary").

The possible endogeneity between labor force participation and fertility is modeled with the inclusion of a "work attachment" variable. This variable is computed as the proportion of time spent employed since leaving education.

The "household income quintiles" refer to the relative position of the household in the population income distribution, from the lowest quintile (1^{st}) to the upper quintile (5^{th}). This measure is based on the income from all sources earned by household members during the year prior to the survey, minus the taxes, social insurance, and regular inter-household cash transfer paid. The income is "equivalized" to take into account household size. This achieved by dividing the disposable income by the equivalized household size (EUROSTAT 2015)[13].

The "partnership status" distinguishes between married, cohabiting and single women. The married category includes non co-residential legally married couples. The "single" category refers to women who are not living in a co-residential partnership, including divorced, separated, and unmarried living apart together relationships, as well as never partnered women.

[13] The equivalized household size (EHS) is defined as: $EHS = 1 + 0.5 * (HM_{14+} - 1) + 0.3 * HM_{13}$, where HM_{14+} is the number of household members aged 14 and over, and HM_{13-} is the number of household members aged 13 or less.

Table 1. Sample's descriptive statistics: proportion or mean values of the variables

	Proportion or mean	Standard error
Age (mean)	34.163	0.075
Women's educational level		
Primary	0.092	0.004
Lower secondary	0.277	0.006
Higher secondary	0.257	0.006
University	0.374	0.007
Partnered men's educational level		
Primary	0.110	0.005
Lower secondary	0.321	0.007
Higher secondary	0.253	0.007
University	0.316	0.007
Partnership status		
Married	0.711	0.006
Cohabiting	0.112	0.004
Single	0.177	0.005
Activity		
Student	0.007	0.001
Full-time employed	0.472	0.007
Part-time employed	0.155	0.007
Unemployed	0.196	0.006
Other inactive (housewives)	0.167	0.005
Temporary job	0.149	0.005
Self-employed	0.056	0.003
Work attachment (mean)	55.377	0.526
ESeC (household)		
Higher salariat	0.124	0.005
Lower salariat	0.122	0.005
Higher-grade white-collar	0.152	0.005
Self employed	0.077	0.004
Lower-grade white-collar	0.217	0.006
Skilled workers	0.126	0.005
Semi- and nonskilled	0.107	0.004
Never worked	0.064	0.003
Not available	0.011	0.001
ESeC (women)		
Higher salariat	0.073	0.004
Lower salariat	0.083	0.004
Higher-grade white-collar	0.138	0.005
Self employed	0.038	0.003
Lower-grade white-collar	0.256	0.006
Skilled workers	0.035	0.003
Semi- and nonskilled	0.155	0.005
Never worked	0.192	0.006
Not available	0.029	0.002
ESeC (partnered men)		
Higher salariat	0.248	0.006
Lower salariat	0.075	0.004
Higher-grade white-collar	0.092	0.004
Self employed	0.073	0.004
Lower-grade white-collar	0.075	0.004
Skilled workers	0.230	0.006
Semi- and nonskilled	0.110	0.005
Never worked	0.070	0.004
Not available	0.027	0.002
Household income quintiles: 1st quintile	0.176	0.005
2nd quintile	0.201	0.006
3rd quintile	0.206	0.006
4th quintile	0.216	0.006
5th quintile	0.202	0.006
Person-years	9,086	
No. of women	5,117	
No. of births	1029	

Source: EU-SILC (EUROSTAT 2016). Unweighted data. The values of variables reported were measured at the episode's last observed year for each woman.

3.4. The statistical model

Discrete-time event history analyses are used to model factors associated with the conditional annual probability of experiencing a second birth. A logistic specification is used, which can be viewed as a latent-response model (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012). Underlying the observed dichotomous behavior y_{ij} (whether or not an individual *i* has a child over duration *j*), there is an unobserved or latent continuous response y_{ij}^* representing the propensity to bear a child. If the latent response is greater than 0, then the observed response is 1; otherwise it is 0. A linear regression model is specified for the latent response y_{ij}^*

$$Y_{ij}^* = \beta_0 + \beta_1' X_{ij} + \beta_2' X_{ij} + \upsilon_{ij}$$

where β_0 is the baseline hazard function (years since first birth), x_{ij} are vectors of covariates, with β_1 denoting the value of the estimated coefficients of class, and β_2 denoting the value of the estimated coefficients of the model for other covariates; the random term υ_{ij} is assumed to follow a logistic distribution. The application of discrete-time event history models involves the construction of a person-year file.[14] In order to avoid reverse causality, I use the information on labor market activity, occupation, education, income, and partnership status referring to the year preceding each wave.

Two sets of models are presented, one adopting a household class perspective (Tables 2 and 4), and another for woman's class (Tables 3 and 5). Preference is given to the household class models, however, since they depict the economic situation relevant to fertility decisions while avoiding the potential endogeneity between women's class attainment and fertility. Models using men's ESeC were also computed, but their results were very similar to those adopting a household class perspective (see Model 17 in annex), given that few women hold jobs belonging to a higher class than their partners.

[14] Spell starting times are known (i.e., the date of birth of the first child), and therefore left censoring is avoided. Yet, time-varying information is often not known for the whole duration of the spell, i.e., left truncation is present. This situation is handled by the conditional likelihood approach, which conditions the likelihood function on the subject's having survived to the start of the observation period (Guo 1993).

The analytical strategy involved first to compute models with social class and controls for age and duration since previous birth only, respectively for each perspective. The goal is to show the (gross) size and pattern of class differentials when education and several mediator variables between class and fertility are not included. A second step involved the inclusion of education, which powerfully influences class attainment (Models 2 and 7). In the next step, several variables characterizing women's activity situation and economic stability were introduced (Models 3 and 8)[15]. These variables act as mediators between class and fertility. In order to analyze their role in more detail, I computed two models that include combinations of categories for social class and women's labor market situation, thus allowing to test the above hypotheses about the differential impact on second births probabilities of (1) a given activity situation across social classes and (2) different activity situations within a social class (Tables 4 and 5). Household income is included in Models 5 and 10, respectively using a household perspective and a women's perspective.

The variable partnership status is included in Models 4 and 9, as a robustness check. Household class is partially the result of partnership status, although a high degree of homogamy exists. However, a woman's fertility and partnership status are likely to be strongly influenced by unmeasured common variables, such as fertility intentions, values, or partnership satisfaction. As a result, union formation and dissolution are endogenous to fertility, as shown by previous research, potentially leading to biased results (Baizan, Aassve, and Billari 2003; Upchurch, Lillard, and Panis 2002). Therefore, partnership status is not included in the other models, because this would produce an "overcontrol" bias (Elwert and Winship 2014). Nevertheless, the inclusion of a partnership status variable does not substantially alter the effect of class on fertility.

Additionally, I also present models that are computed with simultaneous equations for the first and second births. This approach, introduced by Kravdal (2001), was designed to account for self-selection into each parity and the differential fertility timing between educational groups. The specification is analogous as above, except for the introduction

[15] Controls for contextual economic conditions did not provide significant results, and therefore were not included in the models presented. Several specifications were explored, including a model with a dummy for years with negative growth rate (2009-13), and the aggregate unemployment rate, in both instances as lagged variables.

of a women-specific random heterogeneity term ε_i. The factor ε_i is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ^2.

$$Y^1{}_{ij}{}^* = \beta_0 + \beta' X_{ij} + \varepsilon_i + \upsilon_{ij}$$
$$Y^2{}_{ij}{}^* = \beta_0 + \beta' X_{ij} + \varepsilon_i + \upsilon_{ij}$$

The results from the simultaneous equation models, however, were not substantively different from the ones presented below for the variable social class (results in annex). This implies that neither timing effects (first birth postponement for higher social classes) nor selection of experiencing the first birth, alter class effects for second births.

4. Results

Figure 1 and Model 1 (Table 2) present results for a model in which only duration since first birth, women's age, and household class are included. As can be seen, a positive overall effect was found for social class, although the "skilled workers" substantially deviate from a positive pattern by showing relatively high *predicted probabilities* of second births. Thus, individuals belonging to households in the "higher salariat" had the highest annual probabilities of a second birth (about 0.15), while the "lower-grade white-collar workers" and the "semi- and nonskilled workers" showed the lowest levels (both about 0.08). As noted, the "skilled workers" displayed substantially higher levels (0.13) than other low social class groups, which were not statistically different than the salariat. When the effect of woman's education was included in the analysis (Model 2), the effect of the class changed only slightly, resulting from the different educational composition of each class. The effect of being in a "lower-grade white-collar worker" class led to an *odds ratio* of 0.58 (at $p < 0.01$), and 1.04 for "skilled workers," compared to the "higher salariat" (the reference category). Nevertheless, "semi- and nonskilled" workers and women living in households in which both members of the couple were in a "never worked" situation also showed low odds of a second child (0.58 at $p < 0.01$ and 0.7 at $p < 0.10$, respectively). The inclusion in the models of other variables related to the women's labor market activity did not substantially alter the effects of class (Model 3). Unemployment or holding a temporary job strongly reduced the odds of a second birth

(0.66 and 0.75), as expected, while holding a part-time job had a nonsignificant negative effect. Being a housewife significantly increased the odds (1.23).

The coefficients in Model 1 imply substantial differences between classes in the predicted second birth progression ratios 14 years after bearing the first child: while for "skilled workers" the progression ratio was 0.80 and for the "higher salariat" it was 0.78; for the "lower white-collar workers" it was as low as 0.61, with the remaining classes showing ratios in between these levels.

It can also be noted that relatively minor differentials between classes exist in the timing of second births, in terms of duration since first birth (Figure 2). A test of the overall interaction between the duration since first birth and (household's or woman's) class was not statistically significant. Although the "salariat" as well as "higher-grade white-collar workers" displayed an earlier timing, any pairwise comparison between classes in the marginal (log odds) predictions showed nonsignificant effects for the duration since first birth. This result highlights that the differences between classes found in the models are due to "quantum" differentials (i.e. differences between classes in the overall parity progression to second births). For instance, the 95 percent confidence intervals of the predicted probabilities for the higher salariat and the non-skilled workers (i.e. the most extreme classes in terms of fertility levels) do not overlap before the ninth year after the first birth.



Figure 1. Predicted annual probability of a second birth by household ESeC, with 95% confidence intervals. Controls include the women's age and the duration since the first birth only.

Table 2. Results of the event-history analysis for second births, Household's European Socio-economic Classification (ESeC). Odds Ratio

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Years since first birth	1.630***	1.653***	1.679***	1.717***	1.686***
Years since first birth squared	0.958***	0.958***	0.957***	0.956***	0.956***
Woman's age	1.871***	1.857***	1.845***	1.670***	1.864***
Woman's age squared	0.990***	0.990***	0.990***	0.991***	0.989***
ESeC					
Higher salariat (ref.)	1	1	1	1	1
Lower salariat	0.835	0.871	0.863	0.839	0.864
Higher-grade white-collar	0.903	1.001	1.008	1.031	1.033
Self-employed	0.673**	0.792	0.757*	0.741*	0.749*
Lower-grade white-collar	0.495***	0.580***	0.592***	0.657***	0.610***
Skilled workers	0.871	1.036	1.006	0.959	1.048
Semi- and nonskilled	0.494***	0.584***	0.596***	0.713**	0.598***
Never worked	0.611***	0.716*	0.702*	0.993	0.691*
Educational level					
Primary (ref.)		1	1	1	
Lower secondary		0.892	0.939	0.931	0.945
Upper secondary		0.811	0.854	0.872	0.872
Tertiary		1.180	1.279*	1.255	1.288*
Activity status					
Full-time employed (ref.)			1	1	1
Unemployed			0.656***	0.651***	0.643***
Student			0.548	0.629	0.553
Housewife			1.233*	1.035	1.204
Part-time employed			0.882	0.827*	0.889
Type of contract					
Long-term (ref.)			1	1	1
Temporary			0.750***	0.789**	0.748***
Work attachment			0.998	0.998*	0.998
Partnership status					
Married (ref.)				1	
Cohabiting				0.730***	
Single				0.259***	
Household income quintiles					
1st quintile (ref.)					1
2nd quintile					0.782**
3rd quintile					0.649***
4th quintile					0.862
5th quintile					0.848

Person-years	9035	9035	9022	9022	9022
No. of women	5080	5080	5067	5067	5067
Chi-Squared	356.83***	373.73***	418.84***	526.60***	434.13***

Significance: *=10%; **=5%; ***=1%.

Note: All covariates are lagged except woman's age and duration since first birth. Lagged variables are measured in the year preceding each wave. Differences between models in the number of observations are due to the existence of missing cases for some variables.



Figure 2. Predicted annual probability of a second birth by household ESeC and years since the first birth. Controls include the women's age and an interaction between the ESeC and the years since the first birth.

Table 3. Results of the event-history analysis for second births, Woman's European Socio-economic Classification (ESeC). Odds Ratio

	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
Years since first birth	1.642***	1.666***	1.689***	1.734***	1.702***
Years since first birth squared	0.957***	0.956***	0.955***	0.955***	0.955***
Woman's age	1.975***	1.941***	1.895***	1.670***	1.912***
Woman's age squared	0.989***	0.989***	0.989***	0.991***	0.989***
ESeC					
Higher salariat (ref.)	1	1	1	1	1
Lower salariat	0.898	0.935	0.938	0.874	0.943
Higher-grade white-collar	0.894	1.001	1.005	0.972	1.022
Self-employed	0.756	0.928	0.861	0.815	0.895
Lower-grade white-collar	0.549***	0.670***	0.685**	0.671***	0.712**
Skilled workers	0.396***	0.503***	0.524**	0.477***	0.543**
Semi- and nonskilled	0.538***	0.680**	0.723*	0.697**	0.757
Never worked	0.894	1.115	1.060	0.951	1.087
Educational level					
Primary (ref.)		1	1	1	1
Lower secondary		0.956	0.976	0.933	0.983
Upper secondary		0.887	0.905	0.881	0.921
Tertiary		1.322*	1.355**	1.234	1.347**
Activity status					
Full-time employed (ref.)			1	1	1
Unemployed			0.639***	0.651***	0.649***
Student			0.485	0.612	0.501
Housewife			1.125	0.966	1.142
Part-time employed			0.869	0.819*	0.886
Type of contract					
Long-term (ref.)			1	1	1
Temporary			0.803**	0.846	0.811*
Work attachment			0.999	0.998	0.999
Partnership status					
Married (ref.)				1	
Cohabiting				0.725***	
Single				0.255***	
Household income quintiles					
1st quintile (ref.)					1
2nd quintile					0.831
3rd quintile					0.693***
4th quintile					0.969
5th quintile					0.964

Person-years	8887	8887	8874	8874	8874
No. of women	4992	4992	4979	4979	4979
Chi-Squared	358.21***	376.54***	410.49***	526.67***	424.76***

Significance: *=10%; **=5%; ***=1%.

Note: All covariates are lagged except woman's age and duration since first birth. Lagged variables are measured in the year preceding each wave. Differences between models in the number of observations are due to the existence of missing cases for some variables.

A complementary perspective of the social class effects was obtained when the women's class was analyzed, instead of the household perspective (Table 3). First of all, the class composition was substantially downgraded, with lower proportions in the "salariat" and "self-employed," and including 19% of women in the category "never worked," i.e. long-term housewives (Table 1). This last category displayed relatively high odds of a second birth (0.89 and 1.12 for Models 6 and 7 respectively), not significantly different from women with "higher-salariat" occupations (the reference). Moreover, the three working-class categories ("lower-grade white-collar," "skilled workers," and "semi- and unskilled workers") uniformly showed very low odds of second births (about half, compared to the reference category in Model 6). This suggests that, once most housewives are removed from these last categories, being a working-class woman leads to a low probability of a second child. By contrast, the "higher salariat," "lower salariat," "higher-grade white-collar," and "self-employed" displayed higher and decreasing (by class order) fertility levels, that were not statistically different between them. These results do not substantially change once educational level or several variables characterizing women's activity are added to the model, although the differentials between classes narrow somewhat[16] (between Models 6, 7 and 8). Leaving apart women in the "never worked" category, there was a clear positive effect of class on second-birth probabilities, which is consistent with the argument that role compatibility, gender equality, and job characteristics are linked to both class and fertility. These results imply that the high second child probabilities obtained for the category "skilled workers" with a household perspective, was entirely due to a "male breadwinner-female housewife" household model. For this class, this model led to a relatively high fertility level (but not for the other working classes), suggesting that "skilled workers" enjoy a better economic

[16] In order to compare different models I applied the KHB method, that allows to decompose into direct and indirect effects of a variable in non linear probability models (Karlson, Holm, and Breen 2012). The difference in the coefficients of each of the classes between Models 6, 7 and 8 was not statistically significant.

situation. If men's class is included in the analysis (Model 17 in annex), the results obtained are similar to those of Model 1, which adopts a household perspective. The only exception is the category "never worked," which showed extremely low odds of a second birth, suggesting that the absence of a "male breadwinner" depresses fertility.

Overall, the above results are consistent with the expectation that a positive relationship between class and second birth probabilities would be found (*Hypothesis 1*). The results fit the idea that economic security, role compatibility, and gender equality have a positive relationship to social class, leading to a positive relationship between class and fertility. Adding controls for economic security variables did not substantially alter this result (Models 3 and 8)[17]. But the results also suggest that the lower opportunity costs of childbearing assumed for "semi- and unskilled workers" and "lower-grade white-collar workers" do not completely compensate for the negative effects on fertility of economic uncertainty, low role compatibility, and low gender equality (except in the case of "skilled workers").

Before presenting the results about the combinations of categories for the variables social class and woman's labor market activity, it may be useful to mention that the activity situation follows a marked class pattern. For instance, among the "higher salariat," 70% of women are employed full-time, while among the "skilled workers," this is the case for only 26%, with a household social class perspective. Conversely, housewives represent 7% among the "higher salariat" and 35% among the "skilled workers." The group-specific effects for the combinations of class and activity can allow an analysis of whether different mechanisms apply to each class. The resulting effects are presented in Tables 4 and 5, respectively with a household class perspective and a women's perspective. First, it can be seen that *second-birth probabilities are higher for full-time employed women belonging to higher classes, with respect to lower-class women* (*Hypothesis 2*). The odds of the "semi- and nonskilled workers" are substantially lower than the odds for the "salariat": 0.32 with a household class perspective and 0.63 with a woman's class perspective, both at $p < .01$. Once again, the "skilled workers" deviate from other working-class groups by displaying closer odds to the "salariat," (with a household social class perspective) suggesting that they are less affected by the disadvantages of other

[17] Models that included couples only yielded very similar results as the ones presented in Tables 2 and 3. Furthermore, the inclusion of men's education or even men's activity variables did not substantially alter the results, suggesting that class effects are very robust to model specification.

workers. These results indicate that only the members of the "salariat," and to a lower extent the "high-grade white-collar workers," can actually follow a successful role combination strategy.

Table 4. Results of the event-history analysis for second births: Combinations of values for the variables household ESeC and woman's labor market activity. Results with higher salariat as reference are in bold type. Results with full time employed as reference for each class are in parentheses. Odds Ratio

ESeC (grouped)	Higher salariat	Lower salariat	Higher-grade white-collar	Self-employed	Lower-grade white-collar	Skilled workers	Semi- and nonskilled workers	Never worked
Activity status								
Full-time employed	**1** *(1)*	**0.875** *(1)*	**0.988** *(1)*	**0.774** *(1)*	**0.540***** *(1)*	**0.793** *(1)*	**0.323***** *(1)*	**-** *(-)*
Part-time employed	**0.641** *(0.641)*	**0.670** *(0.766)*	**0.910** *(0.921)*	**0.538*** *(0.695)*	**0.645**** *(1.195)*	**0.751** *(0.947)*	**0.320***** *(0.991)*	**-** *(-)*
Unemployed	**0.854** *(0.854)*	**0.536*** *(0.613)*	**0.504**** *(0.511**)*	**0.563** *(0.727)*	**0.274***** *(0.507**)*	**0.744** *(0.937)*	**0.654*** *(2.024**)*	**0.519**** *(-)*
Student	**1.729** *(1.729)*	**-** **(-)**	**-** *(-)*	**-** *(-)*	**-** *(-)*	**-** *(-)*	**2.361** *(7.310**)*	**-** *(-)*
Housewife	**1.079** *(1.079)*	**0.924** *(1.056)*	**1.368** *(1.385)*	**0.922** *(1.191)*	**0.824** *(1.527*)*	**1.442*** *(1.818***)*	**0.845** *(2.615***)*	**0.881** *(-)*

Significance:*=10%;**=5%; ***=1%.
Controls for age, age squared, years since first birth, year since first birth squared, and educational level.
Person years 9022. Number of women: 5067. Chi-Squared: 434.99***.

Table 5. Results of the event-history analysis for second births: Combinations of values for the variables woman's ESeC and woman's labor market activity. Results with higher salariat as reference are in bold type. Results with full time employed as reference for each class are in parentheses. Odds Ratio

ESeC (grouped)	Higher salariat	Lower salariat	Higher-grade white-collar	Self-employed	Lower-grade white-collar	Skilled workers	Semi- and nonskilled workers	Never worked
Activity status								
Full-time employed	**1** *(1)*	**0.935** *(1)*	**0.904** *(1)*	**0.801** *(1)*	**0.601***** *(1)*	**0.385***** *(1)*	**0.632**** *(1)*	**-** *(-)*
Part-time employed	**0.508*** *(0.* **508*** *)*	**0.681** *(0.728)*	**0.882** *(0.976)*	**0.794** *(0.991)*	**0.673*** *(1.119)*	**0.529** *(1.376)*	**0.399***** *(0.632)*	**-** *(-)*
Unemployed	**0.799** *(0. 799)*	**0.452*** *(0.484)*	**0.476**** *(0.527**)*	**-** *(-)*	**0.336***** *(0.558**)*	**0.317**** *(0.824)*	**0.611**** *(0.967)*	**0.690*** *(-)*
Student	**-** *(-)*	**-** *(-)*	**0.879** *(0.973)*	**-** *(-)*	**-** *(-)*	**-** *(-)*	**1.288** *(2.038)*	**0.405** *(-)*
Housewife	**-** *(-)*	**0.511** *(0.546)*	**1.604** *(1.775*)*	**-** *(-)*	**0.801** *(1.332)*	**0.950** *(2.470)*	**0.753** *(1.191)*	**1.181** *(-)*

Significance:*=10%;**=5%; ***=1%.
Controls for age, age squared, years since first birth, year since first birth squared, and educational level.
Person years 8874. Number of women: 4979. Chi-Squared: 426.82***.

The results presented in Table 4 show that *being a housewife, versus being full-time employed, increases the probability of second births for lower classes, but not for higher classes* (*Hypothesis 3*). The odds ratio for the housewives of the "lower grade withe-collar workers", "skilled workers" and the "semi- and nonskilled workers" are considerably higher than the odds for the full-time working women of these classes (respectively 1.53, 1.82, and 2.62, $p < 0.01$), with a household class perspective. Conversely, for the higher classes no significant coefficients were found. Thus, the male breadwinner/housewife model leads to high second-birth probabilities among all the lower classes, presumably linked to women's labor market exclusion. Adopting a woman's class perspective (Table 5) leads to less clear-cut results, since the odds of housewives of the three working classes are higher than the odds for full time employed women of the same classes, but are not statistically significant.

The prevalence of unemployment follows a clear pattern by social class. For instance, the proportion of unemployed women among the "salariat" is 11%, while for "semi- and nonskilled workers" it is 26% (household class). Bearing that in mind, the results of the event history analyses presented in Tables 4 and 5 provide mixed evidence about the expectation that *being unemployed, versus being full-time employed, decreases more strongly second birth probabilities for the higher classes than for the lower classes* (*Hypothesis 4*). Unemployment somewhat reduces the odds of second birth for the "salariat" (with non statistically significant coefficients) and the "higher-grade white-collar" employees (odds ratio = 0.51, $p < 0.05$), compared to full-time-employed women of the same classes. Yet, the unemployed women belonging to the "lower-grade white-collar workers" class also show low odds (0.51, $p < 0.05$), while the "semi- and nonskilled workers" show a very high odds (2.04 , $p < 0.05$). Adopting a woman's class perspective leads to similar results, except that the odds for this last class are of the same level as to the full time-employed. With this perspective, some of the unemployed women are classified as "never worked" (presumably those women with higher difficulties in accessing the labor market and with higher second birth probabilities, as shown above).

Household income is included in Models 5 and 10, respectively using a household perspective and a women's perspective. According to the theoretical model presented above, household income is an outcome of class, which provides economic security and the resources needed for childrearing. For example, it can increase role compatibility if used to pay for childcare. It could, therefore, be expected that its inclusion in the models

would lead to a reduction of class differentials. Yet, the results of Models 5 and 10 hardly differ from Models 3 and 8, that include activity indicators but not income. The KHB method provided no significant differences in the coefficients for class (both household and woman's class), between the models with and without household income. As can be seen in Models 5 and 10 the effect of income follows a U-shape, with low and high-income earners showing higher odds of second births than women in the second and third quintile of earnings[18]. This is consistent with the analyses presented above, that showed high second birth probabilities for unskilled workers and for low-grade white-collar workers when combined with a male breadwinner-female housewife household type.

5. Conclusions

What is the contribution of social class analysis to a better understanding of fertility? Social class is a major basis for the stratification of life chances and risks in the population, but until now it has had a minor role in the explanation of fertility levels in contemporary societies. Here, I outlined a theoretical framework for interpreting the effects of social class on fertility, based on social class and welfare regime theory. Social class differentials are seen as driving individuals' levels of economic security, the compatibility between their employment and childcare roles, and gender equality. These are key variables in the explanation of fertility levels in contemporary postindustrial societies. Fertility levels, though, are explained not so much by individual variables per se but by class-specific combinations of them. The social class of individuals, therefore, can be seen as a common determinant of these variables, and ultimately, of fertility choices.

The concept of social class, by focusing on individuals' situations in the labor market, provides a link to the social structure and welfare regime of a society. This perspective highlights how a specific configuration of institutions has effects on fertility that are not homogeneous by social class.[19] The empirical analysis of second births in Spain during the years 2004–2015 has provided a novel perspective on the social stratification of fertility. The results document substantial differentials between social classes. For

[18] This U-shape is also obtained when class is not included in the models. A specification including (the logarithm of) income as a continuous variable and its square term yields nonsignificant results.
[19] An explicit measurement of the effects of institutions (beyond the social class structure) on individual behavior is left for future research.

instance, the probabilities of progression to a second child for the class with the lowest probabilities ("lower-grade white-collar workers") are 0.6, while the probabilities for the highest (the "higher salariat" and "skilled workers") are 0.8. Consistent with expectations, a positive pattern for social class was found in second-birth intensities, where the high socioeconomic groups showed higher probabilities of a second birth, while the lowest classes displayed much lower probabilities (with the exception of the "skilled workers"). Furthermore, lower classes, including "skilled workers," more often follow a "male breadwinner/female housewife" model of household, very likely as a consequence of their lower levels of economic security and ability to achieve role compatibility between employment and childcare. This has been clearly shown by contrasting a class characterization based on the household with a class characterization based on the woman's occupation, which in this last case leads to a stronger positive relationship between class and fertility. Contrasting and comparing analyses for each spouse's class is a topic that clearly merits further analysis, for both empirical and theoretical reasons. Here, a detailed analysis of different combinations of class and women's labor market activity provided evidence of how the link between labor market precariousness and gender differentials in roles leads to class fertility differentials. Given space constraints, more detailed analyses of the links between gender equality and role compatibility are left for further research.

A thorough understanding of the class-fertility relationship has both theoretical and practical implications. The present study provides new theoretical insights and empirical evidence that point to an end in the secular negative socio-economic gradient of fertility. This adds to the existing evidence that documents the emergence of a positive educational gradient of fertility during recent decades in several countries (Kravdal and Rindfuss 2008; Nitsche et al. 2018). The fertility consequences of the reversal of the gender gap in education and the changing gender structures in the labor market (Esteve et al. 2016; Goldscheider, Bernhardt, and Lappegård 2015) can be adequately analyzed by the theoretical framework presented here, that focuses on the class attainment of women and couples. Moreover, the framework conceptualizes how the changes in the class structure and in social institutions (including policies) impact fertility. For example, labor market flexibilization has had a much stronger impact on lower classes, with the corresponding depressing effects on fertility. The results presented here suggest that the "nonskilled workers" and the "lower-grade white-collar workers" classes have been particularly hit

by these policies, while the "skilled workers" seem to be relatively better protected. These class differentials are likely to be particularly pronounced in economic recession periods. The institutional context of the last few decades has also greatly changed with respect to the promotion of a greater level of role compatibility and gender equality, for instance with the implementation of policies that increase formal childcare availability or with new father leave options. In this case, higher social classes are in a better position to take advantage of these opportunities, according to the model presented above. The design of policies affecting family behavior should ideally take into account their differential impact by social class, for both efficacy and equity reasons. Indeed, policies that improve economic security, role compatibility and gender equality are particularly crucial to enhance the fertility options of lower social groups.

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ANNEX

Table 5. Panel A. Results of the event-history analysis for second births, with simultaneous equations. Odds Ratio

	Model 13 *Household's ESeC*		Model 14 *Household's ESeC*		Model 15 *Women's ESeC*		Model 16 *Women's ESeC*		Model 17 *Men's ESeC*	
Years since first birth	1.656	***	1.684	***	1.652	***	1.679	***	1.742	***
Years since first birth squared	0.951	***	0.950	***	0.951	***	0.950	***	0.950	***
Woman's age	2.143	***	2.290	***	2.303	***	2.370	***	1.803	***
Woman's age squared	0.989	***	0.988	***	0.988	***	0.987	***	0.991	***
ESeC										
Higher salariat (ref.)	1		1		1		1		1	
Lower salariat	0.832		0.834		0.901		0.925		0.792	
Higher-grade white-collar	0.949		0.984		0.949		0.989		1.018	
Self-employed	0.777		0.744		0.917		0.872		0.776	
Lower-grade white-collar	0.516	***	0.538	***	0.606	***	0.647	**	0.595	***
Skilled workers	1.025		0.945		0.410	***	0.438	***	0.734	**
Semi- and nonskilled	0.559	***	0.528	***	0.654	**	0.692	*	0.809	
Never worked	0.672	*	0.605	*	1.169		1.084		0.323	***
Educational level										
Primary (ref.)			1				1			
Lower secondary			0.783				0.852			
Upper secondary			0.611	***			0.656	**		
Tertiary			0.751				0.804			
Activity status										
Full-time employed (ref.)			1				1			
Unemployed			0.660	***			0.612	***		
Student			0.717				0.726			
Housewife			1.377	**			1.183			
Part-time employed			0.870				0.882			
Type of contract										
Long-term (ref.)			1				1			
Temporary			0.744	**			0.761	**		
Work attachment			0.998				0.999			
Partnership status										
Married (ref.)									1	
Cohabiting									0.670	***
Single									0.147	***
Person-years	9022		9022		8874		8874		8874	
No. of women	5067		5067		4979		4979		4979	

Table 5. ***Panel B. Results of the event-history analysis for first births, with simultaneous equations, Odds Ratio***

	Model 13 *Household's ESeC*		Model 14 *Household's ESeC*		Model 15 *Women's ESeC*		Model 16 *Women's ESeC*		Model 17 *Men's ESeC*	
Woman's age	1.634	***	1.648	***	1.640	***	1.648	***	1.634	***
Woman's age squared	0.994	***	0.994	***	0.994	***	0.994	***	0.994	***
Educational level										
Primary (ref.)	1		1		1		1		1	
Lower secondary	0.579	***	0.571	***	0.575	***	0.571	***	0.580	***
Upper secondary	0.381	***	0.369	***	0.376	***	0.369	***	0.382	***
Tertiary	0.208	***	0.199	***	0.204	***	0.199	***	0.209	***
Not enrolled in education (ref.)	1		1		1		1		1	
Enrolled in education	0.164	***	0.165	***	0.164	***	0.165	***	0.164	***
Birth-cohort										
1962-1969 (ref.)	1		1		1		1		1	
1970-1979	0.751	***	0.746	***	0.749	***	0.747	***	0.751	***
1980-1995	0.611	***	0.606	***	0.609	***	0.606	***	0.612	***
Person-years	387392		387392		387392		387392		387392	
No. of women	33022		33022		33022		33022		33022	
Standard deviation of the heterogeneity term ε	1.099	***	1.139	***	1.116	***	1.137	***	1.092	***

Significance: *=10%; **=5%; ***=1%.

Note: All covariates are lagged except woman's age and birth-cohort. Lagged variables are measured in the year preceding each wave.