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EU power in current politics hegemony

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Abstract

Power is a substance concept in international relations, but experts have not agreed on how to quantify it. The paper covers the gap by descriptively analysing the European Union's role in the tumultuous political scenario of the XXI century. A sole hypothesis seeks to be answered: The European Union is a *successful global smart power* (SGSP), concept created specifically for the study. By analysing qualitative data through three key policy domains, the paper sheds light on the *soft power* role that the Union has been adopting regarding its external action tools. The realisation of the study has come up against an extraordinary milestone. In May 2022, the Ukraine war forced to shift the European Union's role, making the most of its *smart power*. The paper analyses the movements through *Game Theory*, being the actors' payoffs the critical take-off of the research. Five experts in the field helped relieve the matter thanks to their significant contributions during the interviews: Ana Coelho, Andrés Ortega Klein, Xavier Mas de Xaxàs, Manuel Szapiro, and Pol Morillas. The results suggest that *success* might depend on the moment of *smart power* application, notably more helpful before the in-war context; also arguing that the European Union is an *international* actor capable of coaxing others successfully in own competency policies. Overall, the political scenario has undoubtedly changed along with EU policy, shaping the future lines of research, and will certainly not return to the *status quo ante*.

Keywords: European Union, European Integration, Game Theory, power, Ukrainian war.

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1. Introduction

Power is a fundamental characteristic of defining international relations; it is the ability to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes wanted (Nye, 2004), and given that its balance is considered the motor of world politics (Beckley, 2018), policymakers, experts and scholars have been trying to measure it for years (*inter alia* Beckley, 2018; Chang, 2004; Ingham et al., 1989). However, despite the different rankings and analyses found in the literature, there is no joint agreement regarding the measure of national power: *power* is that subjective that it cannot be quantified, neither tried to shape. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to cover this gap providing a qualitative analysis.

Among the major powers in the twenty-first-century global political scenario, the European Union lies out of shape. It is not a mere political union, neither it is a simple common market, a classical state or nation, a superstate, or a federation of states. The EU is a soundly extraordinary international actor behind which the sense of peace after the war is hidden. It is the forgiven between French and German. Also, it is the road back to freedom for Greece, Spain, and Portugal. It is a democracy, a welfare state, fundamental rights, the end of communism, the fall of the wall, and, above all, the EU are common dreams for the future. Jean Monnet (1950) put it perfectly, *European cooperation is not an end but only a stage on the road to the organized world of tomorrow*. However, some authors argue that the *Communautaire's* efforts to convince its citizens have been in vain (van Middelaar, 2013); its *unity in diversity* is commonly seen as one of its main challenges. While the EU continues to be an unidentified political object (Delors, 1985), the merger among all its configurations is fundamental to have its personality and voice *through* power in the world.

Recently, the game-changing shifts occurring in the political hegemony have led to a turbulence framework, putting the EU in the spotlight. The EU has been so far solely relying on its *soft* power. Still, now more than ever, it must learn to speak the language of power (see Appendix J) hence its decision to go further in strategic autonomy. So, the EU is currently trying to project itself in the world by defining its positions in dialogue with its natural allies and by seeking to defend its interests in significant issues on the international agenda. The present paper takes these insights, and it is presented as a fundamental work to understand the political and social moment that the EU is going through. Thus, this paper *qualitatively* analyses the role that the European Union is currently playing in the international politics field scenario and its *power*, dealing with the Ukrainian war as a case scenario to theorise through Game Theory about the optimum timing for using its *smart power*.

According to the above, this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains objectives and methodology. Section 3 outlines the literature review, where the meaning of power is analysed. Section 4 digs into the different external action policy fields considered essential when analysing the European Union (Nugent, 2017) to define which role the European Union has played until today. In Section 5, the current crucial situation arising due to the conflict of the Ukrainian crisis in 2022 is analysed under Game Theory, which clarifies the recent shift of the European Union's role in the global sphere. Finally, Section 6 discusses the conclusions and further work extension.

2. Research Objectives

2.1. Objectives of the study

The main objective of the paper is to find a response to the European Union's role in the current political hegemony conferred by the *power* of its external action tools. A sole hypothesis seeks to be answered: The European Union is a *successful global smart power* (SGSP). The concept "SGSP" has been created for this thesis. It does not correspond to the literature, nor it is an extract of the interviews conducted. It is the outcome of the reflection done after more than six months of research; it is an owned source.

Regarding *success*, an actor is considered *successful* when it can affect other players' conduct as it desires to, and thus the large-scale upshots meet its aspirations. To analyse the matter of *globality*, an actor is considered global when the respective can extend its importance and exercise persuasion to all different parts of the entire world to a desired degree. The power will be classified as *international* if its scope of actorness refers to topics and situations influencing two or more countries. For clarity, it should be considered that some scholars and experts have used the term *regionality* to refer to the same definition (*inter alia* Olivie & Gracia, 2021; Juncos et al., 2015). Last, *smart power* refers to combining hard and soft power (Nye, 2006), which is considered the primary conditioning for implementing a winning strategy. Scholars have argued that *smart power* brings together military force, display of power or actual application, and all forms of diplomacy (Crocker et al., 2007).

Several reasons motivated the selection of the European Union as the actor to matter of study. First, the European Union is the largest export and import market in the world, thus, being one of the most attractive destinations with which to trade, to invest or to create a business (European Commission, 2022). Second, the conflicts happening in near territory of the European Union will directly influence the supply chains and will shape the way of doing business in its closest scope, given that the way the world interrelates is dictated by politics. All in all, the critical question to be answered is only one, *what role does the European Union play on the global game board?*

H1: The European Union is a successful global smart power (SGSP).

Considering the large scope of the European Union external action as well as the wide variety of possible scenarios for ending the war in Ukraine, the following analysis does not pretend to be exhaustive, but rather to provide a global understanding of the situation that the European continent is currently facing. Therefore, deeper analysis of how the European Union is internally organized, the detail of the war outcomes or the concretisation of the war strategic moves is outside the scope of this research. Also, although the paper keeps an eye open on the current reality, the events analysed fall until April 2022, not considering in the case scenario any other developments that may result from the course of the war.

2.2. Methodological framework and case study selection

To identify the role that the EU plays in the political scenario, the reflection has been developed employing an analysis of three major external action policy fields said to be essential when dealing with the European Union (Nugent, 2017): the Common Trade Policy (CTP), the Development Policy and Humanitarian Action, and the Security and Foreign Policy (CFSP). The paper has relied on a different set of qualitative data to do so. First, the report uses published literature and edited books by social scientists and social analysts. Second, the paper relies on interviews with five experts, former workers in the European Institutions, analysts, journalists, and political representatives: Ana Coelho, Xavier Mas de Xaxàs, Pol Morillas, Andrés Ortega Klein, and Manuel Szapiro. They dissect the ins and outs of the EU's power with surgical precision, exposing the necessary keys to interpret and understand the current political scenario. Concrete questions regarding the paper's sought insights have been asked, rather than relying on secondary sources of information.

To analyse the shift of the EU role, the paper takes profit of the current context, which does not cease evolving. Even if its imminent and future consequences need to be lamented, the war in Ukraine has been presented as an opportunity to analyse the EU's power, so several reasons motivate the case study selection. First, the conflict is causing interferences in trade, the disruption of the supply chains, an imminent raw material crisis, slowing economic growth, and pushing prices up across the globe, impacting the markets (OECD, 2022). Thus, it is a global problem with global consequences, shaping how the world relates. Second, while the peace in the continent seemed to be forever guaranteed, the highest threat to European security has arisen in the form of armed conflict in the western frontier of the EU. Third, we are witnessing a change in the current understanding of power relations and political hegemony, which affects the modern global world. Fourth, the EU has felt directly attacked, so the war has been a triggering element and the prelude to the so-called Geopolitical EU (Appendix K), an essential milestone for analysing the CFSP. Fifth, power is a zero-sum game since it is always held concerning someone; it is relational and cannot be solely studied because if a country loses power, it would be due to another gaining it. This makes it perfect for applying Game Theory, given that each nation takes profit from its power to acquire the one missing from it.

In all, by examining the Ukrainian context scenario, the paper cannot claim whether the *smart power* of the European Union will be successful. Any certain conclusion can be drawn because the war is not over yet, nor will it end soon; a line of investigation that the paper leaves open by outlining lines for future research. The paper's essential contribution to the case study scenario is the attribution of the *payoffs* to each of the different actors when using Game Theory, which is based on assumptions thanks to the interviews conducted. Also, an essential contribution of the paper regarding the case study scenario is the theorisation about the optimum moment to implement *smart power* strategies. In the end, the report concludes theorising about the most likely end-of-conflict scenario while also making suggestions on how the gap between cooperation costs should be addressed so that the desired strategy to achieve the wanted Nash Equilibrium (N-N) could be faster elected

3. Literature Review

3.1. Power Definition in International Relations

The term *power* has a deep semantic ambiguity in many Latin languages, and there is too little agreement upon definition in the international relations context, with individual theorists proposing their own idiosyncratic terminologies of power (Bierstedt, 1950; Gallie, 1956). For the purpose of this study, power is understood to be one's ability to affect the behaviour of others to get what one wants (Nye, 2004). In all, power can liberate the one who possesses it, but it can also subdue, when it is a limit of action and will (Lamo de Espinosa, 2021). To the study, the definition of social power done by some experts (Gane, 2005) will not be considered.

It is said that there are three types of power: hard power (Smith & Nye, 1990), soft power (*idem*), and smart power (Nye, 2008). Hard power is the use of coercion and payment, focused on measurable resources. It is based on force, the threat of force (see *Paradox of Deterrence* in Section 5), military power, economic sanctions, inducements of payments and authority. It has been argued that the *carrots and sticks* approach, that Bentham drew during the industrial revolution, has been solely used in international relations by hard powers in the multilateral framework, to make other actors do what they [the *great powers*] want (Lackey, 2015). Soft power is the ability to use attraction and persuasion to obtain preferred outcomes and it is based on beliefs, ideologies, or values (Smith & Nye, 1990). A state, with its own values and image who *can make the policies that other states want by attracting them without their arms* (Haynes, 2005) would be an effective soft power. Nye has defined three soft power pillars: the political values, culture, and foreign policy. McClory (2011) defined instead five pillars: government, culture, diplomacy, education, business, and innovation. Soft power is hard to quantify, and thus it is a concept hard to which assign a number or level (Nye, 2019). Lamo de Espinosa (2021) affirmed that military power makes it possible to change regimes, but legislation makes it possible to change societies; hence affirming the key role that *soft power*, if properly used, can have.

Scholars have recognised that the world requires a modification from old premises and distinctions between 'hard' and 'soft' power since the political challenges cannot be resolved by hard power (Bound, et al., 2007). Smart power counters the misperception that soft power alone can produce an effective foreign policy. If a state can set the agenda for others or shape their preferences, it can save a lot on carrots and sticks, but rarely can it totally replace either. Thus, the need for *smart strategies* that combine the tools of both hard and soft power (Nye, 2009). Overall, power changes form or passes from one hand to another, but it is always there, very present (Baños, 2022). All in all, scholars have classified Elements of National Power into two parts; Tangible and Intangible Elements (Berenskoetter & Williams, 2007), being the first category, the ones related to soft power, and the tangible elements directly related to hard power. Regarding the ways to enforce power, there are said to be three: coercion (normally related to *hard power* since it includes sanctions), attraction or persuasion (possessed for reasons of tradition, charisma, moral ascendancy, public office, or other causes, and which is not exercised with violence, since it is accepted), and payment (Nye, 2007).

3.2. Success of the European Union

The European Commission considers the EU to be a *geopolitical power* and a *major economic power*, whose strength lies in the ability to use mechanisms to influence global power relations (2022). Also, the EU, has been defined as the *ultimate exponent of soft power*, not only based on its capacity to offer -or exclude- benefits to third countries (Manners, 2008), but also based on its normative capacity, its obsession to regulate while creating binding law (Bradford, 2021). Scholars argue the EU could be regarded as one of the best examples of *smart power* (Pallaver, 2011), while other argue that it is a *normative power* instead (Manners, 2002), or even others call it a *super state* (Hoffmann & Morgan, 2005). In all, the European Union combines economic growth generation, monetary systems based on freedom, and the welfare state; a combination rarely to found presently (see Appendix I).

The EU has redefined our understanding of the meaning of power (McCormick, 2007). It represents the world's most advanced experiment in interstate cooperation and community management of national sovereignty. The EU has fifty years of supranationalism experience when it comes to the task of getting national governments to cooperate for the common good. As John Hume (2004) put it, “the European Union is the best example, as we have learned, in the history of the world of conflict resolution”. It has often been characterized as a *sui-generis* actor (*inter alia* Phelan, 2012), *unique* (Risse-Kappen, 1996), or even *new* (Moravcsik, 2002; Wallace, 1999). It is agreed that the EU is different from any other power, going much further than any other international organization. Therefore, it possesses different elements by means of which impose its power, such as economic tools and military power. However, given that there are several decisions that must be taken unanimously, the Union has been long time classified as weak and incoherent regarding its role as an actor within international relations (McCormick, 2007), and whose politicians are in constant search of a European public to applaud their decisions (Middelhaar, 2013).

The EU is powerful relevant on those aspects in which it has own competences, setting out a clear regulatory line for MS to follow; for example, the CTP, GDPR, or the DPHA (see Appendix H). On the other hand, the EU is weaker regarding the policies in which prerogatives are shared among the MS, such as the CFSP. Therefore, it is argued the power of the EU is fragmented, but that it is still there (see Appendix H). In addition, the EU's *soft power* would be as effective, if not more so, than the *hard power* of other countries (Lamo de Espinosa, 2021). In this context, it is important to note the changing nature of the international relations environment, and the blurring of state borders. We are facing the rise of the *herbivorous powers* [such as the EU] as opposed to the *carnivorous* ones (Krastev, 2007), still represented by the threatening Cold War actors. Furthermore, other actors than nation-states can be identified as players in the game of international relations, and some experts are lately identifying NATO as a more relevant actor than the EU (Ortega, 2022; Shapiro, 2022).

4. Analysis

4.1. Common Trade Policy

The EU is the most globalized world's actor, given that it accounts for around 14% of the world's trade in goods (Eurostat, 2022). Also, it accounts for 16% of world imports and exports (European Commission, 2022), and more than 24,7% of world trade in services (see Table 5). In fact, it is the largest trading partner for more than eighty countries, and it received up to 40% of international tourism before the pandemic (European Parliament, 2021). Also, European Union GDP amounts to 25% of the world's total GDP (see Table 3). In terms of foreign direct investment, the EU is a key actor both in the incoming and outgoing flows (European Central Bank, 2022). All in all, the EU is the world's leading economy and the world's major trade power. The CTP is one of its core competences, and since the European Union speaks with one single voice when it comes to commercial relations, the challenge is a joint one and if it is successful, the EU might gain a lot (see Appendix D). As Meunier and Nicolaïdis (2006) expressed it, the EU is a formidable power not only *in* trade; but is also a power *through* trade.

The EU can shape third countries' rules and ensure that those rules are respected (Bradford, 2021) because of the success of the Single Market and the Customs Union. The attractiveness of the EU internal market has been used as a bargaining chip; thus, the CTP has become its most successful external action tool and one of the mainstays of its third countries relations. Trade used to be treated as a mere policy, but now it is used as a political mechanism. Since the end of the Doha Round, there has been an increasing overlapping between trade and non-trade objectives. Linking different policy dimensions may allow MS to arrive at a mutually advantageous exchange of concession across various issues, thus, making the EU CTP effective, depending on the trading partner and the desired policy results (Borchert et al., 2020). The EU is aware of its role *in* trade as a powerful negotiator, so it has an ambitious agenda of trade agreements in the pipeline (European Commission, 2022). However, the EU is a slave to its success. Excessive conditionalities are increasingly being settled in FTAs corresponding to high standards; and not all countries are willing to pay the price. Other countries like China are not demanding such levels, so even if they do not ensure health, labour, work, or environmental conditions, they are one step ahead in ratifying bilateral trade agreements. Values are the pennant of the European Union. Still, China advocates realism taken to the extreme, which is often more helpful for gaining trade partners, and, as an outcome, the European Union yields out on many opportunities.

Furthermore, the EU takes profit of the SAA, of which one of the most prominent examples is the *Ukraine–European Union Association Agreement* and the *Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area* (DCFTA), which demonstrates that the EU has control over Ukraine in the policy-making process by means of the conditionality principle (Brussels Summit, 2007). With these agreements, the counterpart wins preferential access to EU markets and eventually the prospect of a FTA, or even EU membership. Nevertheless, the SAAs are a double-edged sword since benefited countries may also put pressure to fasten an adhesion to the Union by taking profit from a tumultuous scenario, using them as a shortcut for the EU enlargement. Moreover, under sensitive scenarios, the EU tends to act reactive,

such as with the start of the accession study of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia under the Ukrainian crisis context (Barigazzi, 2022). However, in the Enlargement Strategy Papers, there would be no adhesion without harmonisation with the institutional structure of the EU, taking safeguards to avoid the unfavourable influence, the long transition periods, and its effects on the EU budget. This strict conditionality is the main reason why other countries such as Switzerland, Norway, Liechtenstein, Iceland, or the United Kingdom, as the leading exponent, tend to prefer the *cherry picking*, choosing among the four basic EU freedoms, and without buying the whole package at once. This diversity could be seen as a strength, allowing the EU to move forward in concentric circles: faced with the rise of increasingly Eurosceptic countries, such flexibility could allow those who want to deepen the Union to go further. On the other hand, the lack of harmonisation could also highlight one of the Union's challenges currently facing: its increasingly blurred borders and definition of what the EU itself is or what it means to be a member, which would be tantamount to the trivialization of membership.

All considered, the EU currently faces external challenges regarding its CTP (see Appendix M). First, the hyper-fragmentation of the value chains due to the globalization. Second, the consolidation of a multipolar setting. The leading economies increasingly opt for establishing regional trade blocs of exclusive trade liberalization for a selected group, which reduces the interest of the countries in multilateral liberalization. In addition, it is to consider the climate change, the sustainable development, the climate migrates or the impact on the EU economies of the pandemic, which push forward the interest in regionalization, rather than multilateralization. According to the WTO, regional trade agreements (RTAs) have become increasingly prevalent since the early 1990s and as of 1 March 2022, 354 RTAs were in force (WTO, 2022). Third, we witness the WTO deadlock as the decadency of the multilateral framework, putting bilateral agreements and preferential agreements ahead. Overall, behind the border agreements are substituting at-the border trade agreements, so that they include elements not necessarily related to trade. This opens the door to other players in international trade to include political conditionality, and to seek non-trade interests. For example, principles, values, human rights, and human security are the key terms that appear in the partnerships that the EU is seeking to consolidate in the Indo-Pacific region (see Appendix J), aware that the strength of their projection will be determined by the strength of their relationship. As a result, international trade is moving from a technical policy to a core EU politics element, and, therefore, a crucial element of its external action.

In conclusion, the EU is a successful power *in* world trade politics, able to shape the rules of the game of the actors with which negotiates trade agreements. However, it cannot be affirmed that the EU is a global power *through* trade. Instead, the EU can influence those partners with whom it has tighter relations and stronger commercial links. Therefore, the successfully global aspect of the EU regarding its Trade Policy depends on the respective cooperation and its desired outcomes. Thus, it can be affirmed that the EU has a successful *international* CTP.

4.2. Development Policy and Humanitarian Action

European development policy promotes enduring development and stability in developing countries, with the utmost intent of promoting good governance and human and economic development (European Commission, 2022). The EU is the most considerable contributor of development aid around the globe, supplying 46% of all ODA in 2020 (European Commission, 2022). Development assistance is one of the EU's external action pillars; and humanitarian assistance has become an ever-more prominent aspect of it (Orbie et al., 2014). The paradox is that, compared to the other pillars, little are the studies focused on development policy (Holland & Doidge, 2012). The EU has robust competencies of its own in the development policy, yet it is not within the community's exclusive competencies. Still, some competencies shared are with the MS, which are much more target oriented.

Nowadays, the EU relationships with the developing and LDCs are arranged under the Cotonou Agreement (2003), accounting for 79 states of the ACP countries. The agreement allows the EU to provide exceptional facilities for the ACP countries to enter the European market, and to offer general emergency and foodstuffs aid. Also, the ALA -entered into force in 2006- resembles 47 Asian, Latin America, Middle East, and South African countries. However, developing countries outside this framework found it much more difficult to access European aid (Holland & Doidge, 2012).

When analysing its success, it is mandatory to compare its desired outcomes (the integration of the binding nations into the world economy and sustainable financial and social development) with the results acquired. The comparison is ambiguous (Nugent, 2017). The EU is undoubtedly devoted to transmitting its expertise in good governance and helping developing countries battle their concerns, but the expected outcomes are sometimes not achieved. Even if the Commission is enforcing its sustainable development commitment by means of the Trade and Sustainable Development Chapters (TSDs) in trade agreements, which have a direct implication in the development policy (European Commission, 2021), the EU handling of the CTP has shown the potential to damage to its inner development objectives. Moreover, and unfortunately, development aid can become highly politicized, thus cheapening the purpose of equitable and sustainable development for developing countries. However, the increasing use of conditionality in the Cotonou system has ensured that only trustworthy actors receive development assistance (Hadfield, 2007).

All in all, the EU is an international actor able to shape the rules of the game when it comes to its Development Policy and Humanitarian Action thanks to its budget and its decisional autonomy. However, it is not a global actor, since it lacks implementing capacity and its outcomes will highly depend on the country assisted. Moreover, the inner pressures such as the seeking of the effectiveness of the public policy promote the trend towards the *bilateral* humanitarian policy. Thus, there are countries which fall off the scope of action that the EU currently manages. To sum up, the EU Humanitarian Action serves as a tool to promote values, principles, and fundamental rights it stands for, but it is not as effective on promoting its Rule of Law and values as the CTP is.

4.3. Common Foreign and Security Policy

The EU is a source of foreign policy expertise with respect for international rules and diplomatic skills (European Union, 2022), though it can exercise incentives and mediation. The CFSP is an essential branch of the Union's external action, and it is all about balance. The EU, through the implementation of its CFSP, seeks to preserve peace, strengthen international security, promote international cooperation, develop, and consolidate democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

However, it can be argued that no one has ever invaded a country or another state by appealing to the EU, which leads to the following reflections. First, the EU was created precisely to promote the opposite -the pace after the war- and the objective has been achieved: the EU is considered a positive force in the world (Diez, 2014) and a modest force for good (Barbé, 2008). Second, this can uncover an inner weakness since it can mean that the EU appeals neither to the elements that stir the conscience nor to the historical past. It is not capable of mobilizing people for a common objective. Third, the military power that exists in Europe is called NATO (see Appendix E). Overall, it is nevertheless a cause for rejoicing that the EU has not invaded any country, but very significant. Also, the EU has not been capable of imposing its priorities on other countries by using its CFSP; we decipher the causes.

First, the strength of the EU's external policies depends on the state of the Rule of Law (2021) in the EU itself. Hence, it stands out as a guiding principle of the EU's external action, committed to protecting, inspiring, and supporting democracies worldwide (European Union, 2021). The more enforced the Rule of Law inside the Union, the more likely the MS will have similar positions regarding its external interests; thus, the more consistent and powerful the CFSP will be.

Second, since Lisbon (2009), the EU has a High Representative who embodies its foreign policy, allowing Europeans to coordinate in the areas of their choice. However, it is not seen as an influential figure and does not enjoy recognition outside the Communautaire borders, bringing a picture of a fragmented EU. Furthermore, the CFSP is the complete competence of the States, subject to the rule of unanimity, which has been a frequent object of criticism (Suanzes & Bosch, 2021). Since the EU does not have a single foreign policy, each MS can choose its international position. Consequently, the ability to influence the EU strategic environment is eroded when MS are divided. Either MS unite their forces to make their voices heard, or they rely on the national level at the risk of no longer being able to influence the world around them.

Third, another cause of the Union's lack of *hard power* has been the fact of no standing a permanent military structure. This has generated tensions between the intergovernmental pole and the community since the Union relies on *ad hoc* forces contributed by MS. The EU has been a scrounger of American security since 1945, as it has always depended on a foreign army in the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Europe bet in the 1990s on the primacy of geoeconomics over geopolitics and on the EU as a model of soft power rather than military power for the world (Kagan, 2003). The main consequence is that the EU defence spending is less than half that of the United States

of America (see Table 4), and thus it does not have defence autonomy. Some authors (Lamo de Espinosa, 2021) argue that the *hard power* of the EU is eroding even at a greater speed now that the United Kingdom has exit the Union, one of the few European countries -together with France- ready for combat, a great loss for the deterrent capacity of the EU.

Overall, the disappearance of the EU's hard power is what has been coming all these previous years. Due to the lack of unity in CFSP, its coercive and sanctioning mechanisms have primarily been inexistent. In this line, the EU has been argued to be an *herbivorous power* in security and defence policy (Krastev, 2007), meaning that it does not have the means of a traditional approach and that it does not seek them. Ultimately, this has often led to the capability expectations gap (Hill, 1993; Chueca, 2018), delivering much less than what it had been promised. Some experts believe that it should take profit of its military technology to gain influence as a world power (see Appendix F).

On the other hand, the EU is highly engaged in post-conflict peace and institution-building, as demonstrated in the post-Balkans war scenario, which led to a change of thinking among European policy makers, making the CFSP a more practical tool. Years after, in December 2021, the European Commission approved an economic retaliation mechanism against coercion by third countries (de Miguel, 2021), which allows the EU to adopt retaliatory trade measures when a foreign government secretly attempts to stop a European initiative employing economic pressure. The EU had several trade defences instruments, but this is the first one that is specifically dedicated to countering coercive measures. This step clearly showed the begging of the EU power shift promoted by the EEAS, its diplomatic service, which is its motor of change and improvement. Thus, in the post-pandemic era, the Union of the now 27 Member States started questioning the utility of its power and taking measures to shift its role. This initiative was adopted after witnessing an era of strategic competition, complex security threats, conflicts, and sources of instability. Ultimately, by the Russian Federation's threats on the Ukrainian country. In March 2022, a Strategic Compass was adopted (EEAS, 2020), demonstrating, at last, that common foreign policy implies a common strategic culture.

In conclusion, to not be led by *paralysis by analysis*¹ when it comes to the execution of the CFSP, a practical optic must be adopted, and the EU is currently taking a step forward toward this purpose. Either the EU articulates itself as a unit to assume a central role in the governance of the new world, or it will be relegated to play a secondary role. The main issue with CFSP is that it has been mainly reactive and not strategic, as will be demonstrated through the case scenario. In the face of any crisis, the EU moves forward without thinking strategically, and afterward it assumes the consequences, as happened with the common currency, which should have been better analysed before implementation. Regarding the CFSP, only strategic moves will account for successful results, given that the outcomes will highly depend on the moment of the force application.

¹ Overthinking can cause no course of action is decided upon within a convenient time frame.

5. Case Study. Ukrainian War under Game Theory Scope

For years, it has been argued how to make Europe more potent and security conscious, with unity of purpose and capabilities to pursue political objectives on the world stage. Arguably, in March 2022, the EU made more progress on that path than in the previous decade; the world has witnessed the birth of the geopolitical Europe (Appendix K). For drawing the mentioned role shift, the attacks under the regime of the Kremlin will be considered as guided by a perfectly rational individual (Appendix L).

Aware that GT could be looked at under different scopes, two main actors are dealt with: the EU and Russia; this is because they are considered the most to gain -and lose- in geopolitical terms, and because of the will to highlight the *EU power in current politics hegemony*. Even so, it is known that in the quiet lane the US is playing even a more critical role than the EU, given that it does not have the energy dependence that the 27 have. So, although the country not being on the front line, it is relevant when it comes to assessing the war outcome, pulling the strings without getting directly involved.

First, the in-war scenario will be analysed, noting the relevant and rapid position adopted by the EU. Subsequently, different game-ending scenarios will be presented, discussing their probability, and deepening in the post-war scenario. The critical contribution in this section is the *payoffs* attributed to each of the actors in the game since they give a clear understanding of the recent role shift of the EU.

Game Theory Assumptions

Two end-up war scenarios have been discarded. First, the idea that countries such as Ukraine, Moldova, or Georgia could join the EU in the short term is not considered due to: (i) Enlargement fatigue (Devrim, 2009). (ii) These countries are far from fulfilling Copenhagen's criteria. (iii) Latest Josep Borrell's (2022) declarations stated that Ukraine belongs to Ukraine and that their future is European, not *communitarian*. (iv) This scenario would be tightening the rope with Russia, thus, meaning a Cold War against the whole EU. Second, the idea that NATO could absorb previously mentioned countries is also ruled out, given the risk, this would incur. However, Finland and Sweden will be highly probable soon absorbed by NATO.

5.1. Analysis of the In-War Scenario

While some thought that the EU was weak, given its position adopted in 2014; it supported Ukraine in record time in 2022, maybe because the Union was already mentally prepared for the Kremlin reaction. The 27 MS had clear in mind that if they reached any kind of agreement with Ukraine (and they did, the SAA signed in 2017), the *Russian bear* was going to get its paw out. Some experts rationally argue that the EU misbehaved, given that there was an abandonment feeling because of the non-application of stronger sanctions during the 2014 Crimean crisis to the Putin's regime. We will argue that the outcome would have been different if the EU *smart power* would have been adopted some years before, eight, concretely. Once Russia mobilised its forces, there was slight leeway to respond; and in the stalemate in which the EU was redefining its priorities, Russia was conquering territory.

European Union Threat After the Russian Invasion (see Appendix N, Figure N1)

Russia looked ahead and forecasted two clear alternatives: maintaining the Status Quo or attacking. If the Russian troops had not attacked, they would have earned any *payoff* (0, 0). However, they looked further and considered that the attack would unlikely bring them negative consequences, given that they did not believe nor expect a strong response from the EU. In all, they foresaw the loose-loose scenario (-100, -100) as very unlikely, subsequently they thought that the EU would choose the “conventional” path (see Figure N1, “Conventional”).

In all, Russia discarded following Status Quo option, since attacking would have given them payoff of 20, and not attacking 0. When a player has a dominant strategy, he must play it; Russian troops attacked Ukraine because they were not afraid of a forceful response, given that the “Nuclear Button Threat” was not enough convincing. The “Nuclear Threat Button” is used as a metaphor to express the most useful threat that could have worked. This is, the EU stop buying gas and oil from Russia, and thus presenting the *European Green Deal* way before 2019. The EU energy dependence has provided a welcome cash injection for the Kremlin, with which, experts say, they have been able to finance part of the military. However, the EU threat was not strong enough; it could not make the bluff because there was no such unity of action at the time. Russia has never wanted to have a relationship with the whole EU; it has always wanted to deal separately with each MS, such as Germany. The at that time Merkel country, despite the dependence warnings, had a crucial deal with Putin to build the NSI and II so as not to depend on any other country for energy. In this sense, it was more than expected that Germany would have been the first to stop a blunt threat, given that it would have weakened its energy link.

Concerning the Russian action, they considered that quite a few *red lines* had been crossed, considering a betrayal the NATO expansion rather than its dissolution once the Warsaw Pact dissolved. From the EU perspective, it was a complete miscalculation and a betrayal for the Ukrainians. The EU would have been *smarter* if a prominent threat had earlier come from Moscow stating that the loose-loose scenario (-100, -100) was likely. As seen, after the fact, *threats*, or *promises*² do not have relevance to avoid the conflict. Nowadays, the EU has been forced to articulate itself because of the forcefulness of Russian action. The EU has had to come quickly together and provide a strong response. Russia's action has made it possible to impose strong sanctions, but in 2014, due to the lack of EU unity of external action on security issues, this option could not be implemented.

In conclusion, which could have worked to avoid the in-war scenario would have been threatening with pressing the “Nuclear Threat Button”, which would have made Russia feel strangled and without enough economic resources to start the war. It is to recall that in 2022, Russia allocates more than the 4% of its GDP on defence spending, but which does not even reach a third party of what the 27 MS earmark. Thus, they would have perceived the *threat* as a credible one, and they would not have even thought about attacking.

² Threats and promises are truly strategic moves, whereas warnings and assurances play more of an informational role.

European Union Threat Before the Invasion. Paradox of Deterrence³ (Appendix N, Figure N2)

The threat of the EU imposing highly restrictive conditionality if the Kremlin attacked Ukraine could have worked since the choice of the *conventional* path disappears, because of the threat being sufficiently credible and prominent. Therefore, Russia needs to choose whether to have a payoff of -100, or 0. Since Status Quo maximizes utility, they would choose this option, and thus, not attack. The minimum utility for the EU (-100) when implementing the threat corresponds to the natural disasters of war, which will require the EU to spend resources and time to deal with them. In addition, the bureaucratic cost, as the EU's position in the world suffers a *shift*, seriously considering Ukraine's accession to the Union in the not-too-distant future, the entry of European countries such as Sweden or Finland into NATO, or the coordinated sending of *Communautaire* defence equipment to Ukraine.

All in all, the EU should have sought a credible deterrence to any Russian attempt to war, which could have avoided it since Russia, scared of the subsequent actions, would not have even thought about attacking. By credibly altering the Russian perception of the EU response, the EU could have changed the Russian decision. However, a commitment would have been needed to ensure credibility, since threats and promises indicate that actors' next moves will be against their interests. As previously stated, the most useful example would have been stopping the energy dependence from an early stage, and thus, threatening with pressing the "Nuclear Threat Button". However, this would also have entailed costs for the EU, which would have had to rethink its energy supply much earlier.

It is argued that the Kremlin has committed an atrocity, but the West has also made mistakes; it has not been able to devise a joint strategy that determines the nature of the relationship it wants to have with the underestimated Russian Government. The EU and USA visualise themselves as determining actors in the world scenario, but when their rules are not followed -sanctions-, the counterpart has the advantage to minimising their impact. The EU cannot press now the "Nuclear Threat Button" because it needs the gas and oil. The remaining question is, will Ukraine withstand the Russian attack until the EU decides to stop buying gas from Russia? However, the *deterrence* presented is long-term, and maybe the war will end sooner. The post-war scenario will be further developed below.

5.2. Analysis of the Post-War Scenario. Possible End-of-Conflict Outcomes

Brinkmanship (Appendix N, Figure N3)

The Russian Government is using the *salami tactic*: one slice at a time. At each point, Russian Government incremental aggression is too small to merit a drastic response from the EU or NATO, who keep constantly on redrawing the line of its tolerance. This tactic is deteriorating its enemies, since, as Lamo de Espinosa (2021) put it when talking about the *slavery dialectic*: if you're going to keep giving up your freedom, you're going to keep living like a slave. However, the Kremlin has alerted with

³ Only if an actor is willing to use power, he will be respected and, subsequently, it is quite likely that he will not need to use it. On the contrary, even if he had it, if he is perceived as weak or hesitant, he will be compelled to use it on more occasions.

unpredictable consequences, which lead to draw a scenery of brinkmanship in which neither side is backing down. Therefore, there is a chance that the situation will get out of control, with tragic consequences, unlikely to please either side (M.A.D.). In all, this scenario could be the prospect of a new nuclear arms race and, if there is such an escalation, a new crisis like the Cuban missile of 1962 could arise. *Escalation* has been conceived as a rational policy choice, but the “inadvertent escalation” is rather the unintended consequence of fighting a conventional war. As some experts have argued, there will be no security for anyone if Putin imposes; if there are no more rules, all will be in danger.

In brinkmanship, Russia gets the highest payoffs when commits to ensure credibility for threat. However, the gap between a controlled situation and M.A.D. scenario is extremely narrow. To reduce the risks that could arise because of Russia pursuing a dangerous policy to the limits of safety, the EU needs to address the problem at a more fundamentally level – the game must be changed. Thus, instead of only playing with economic sanctions and *hard power*, *smart power* needs now to be considered.

Negotiation

In Stag Hunt (Rousseau, 1755), each player decides whether to hunt a stag or a hare. However, both know that cooperating is the only way to pursue a stag. Both for Russia and the EU the *stag* is negotiating, given that the goal is to stop the war, which will account for a better economic situation for both countries. There are two Nash equilibriums in this game, both Pareto optimal and Hicks optimal: when both decide to negotiate and when both choose not to deal. The best for both players would be the first one. On the contrary, the second leads to the brinkmanship situation described before, in which it is equally easy for Russia to repeat the threat or using nuclear weapons, leading to M.A.D.

Note. Stag hunt game was selected instead of Prisoner's Dilemma because it presents two situations in which players have no incentive to change their strategy considering the other's decisions.

Table 1

Payoffs to Russian Federation and European Union in Simultaneous-Move Game.

European Union	Russian Federation	
	Negotiating	Not Negotiating
Negotiating	100, 100	0, 90
Not Negotiating	30, 0	20, 20

Note. Own source.

The risk dominant equilibrium is NN-NN, which is an optimal scenario since players would be just as likely to win the war in two scenarios in parallel dimensions. The more uncertainty they have about the other's actions, the more likely they will choose the dominant risk strategy. However, the *payoffs* assigned to NN-NN are lower than those attributed to N-N, given that this situation could

lead to the brinkmanship scenario. The EU is committed to sending arms and assuming the economic cost of the war; also, Russia is willing to continue the *hard power* war. On the other hand, the N-N scenario is payoff dominant given that both players commit to the desired outcome: stopping the war. The Kremlin has incentives to negotiate the future neutrality of Ukraine and ensure that neither NATO nor the EU will come to Kyiv. And, even if the many Member States would not admit it, they would be keen to sign such an agreement already, therefore, the resulting 100-100 *payoff*. When it comes to N-NN scenarios, it has been assumed that when one player chooses N, he stops the offensive. Given the vulnerable situation the negotiator would encounter, the player attacking has more possibilities of getting a higher *payoff*.

In Stag Hunt, coordination happens when cooperation cost is reduced, so the players are likely to choose the option which accounts for a lower payoff (Kean, 2010). Russia's cooperation cost is higher than the EU's, which would stand to lose far more by unilaterally cooperating. Concretely, suppose the EU chooses to Negotiate, and Russia chooses not to negotiate and thus continue the war. In that case, the EU gets nothing while Russia receives a payoff of 90. If the EU had refused to cooperate, it would have earned a yield of 30, having a cooperation cost of 30. The EU agrees to end the violence and open the door to diplomacy, which justifies its *payoff* of 20. On the other hand, Russia cooperation cost is 90 since it is it gives up earning. Regarding the previously mentioned scenario, both players must value mutual disarmament more than unilateral armament, given that mutual disarmament can bring higher *payoffs*. The cooperation cost should be reduced to incentivize Russia to go for the benefit maximization scenario. The only way of doing it is by demonstrating that the negotiating strategy is better for both parties. To that matter, there are several possibilities. First, the EU would have to show that negotiating is the best scenario, thus, committing to a credible reward, reducing the cooperation cost for Russia. For example, making a concision regarding energy supplies. Second, disarmament bonds could be used (Willner-Giwerc, 2018); the players would commit through money agreeing to disarm. If executed, it would receive an interest in addition to the initial investment. Otherwise, the investment is lost. Third and complementary to the solutions proposed, the role of the mediator country would play a relevant paper in reducing the cooperation cost. Turkish mediation may be endeavouring to bring positions closer to the Chinese. Still, the subject lies out of the scope of this paper.

Table 2

Payoffs to Russia and the European Union in Simultaneous-Move Game with disarmament bonds.

European Union	Russian Federation	
	Negotiating	Not Negotiating
Negotiating	100+i, 100+i	0+i, 90-p
Not Negotiating	30-p, 0+i	20-p, 20-p

Note. Own source.

5.3. Game Theory Conclusions

Game Theory has been conducted with two main actors: the EU and Russia. Even if NATO has quietly been imposed as a significant player, the EU has also proven crucial by sending jointly military aid and imposing economic sanctions, taking leadership responsibility. The scenarios presented do not pretend to be exhaustive, and it must be considered that experts have drawn many other possible war-ending outcomes: European war, Putin's retrieval, and long-term battle, among others (see interviews with experts; Landale, 2022). The drawn scenarios are interpreted as follows.

First, *smart power* could have been more helpful if applied before the war, as the *paradox of deterrence* demonstrates. The EU, especially Germany, has, for years, been constructing an energy dependence on Russia foremost. Therefore, the EU has been at the expense of the Kremlin, giving Russia capacities to condition the Occidental economies and politics. If *deterrence* had been applied in 2014, this would not have happened. Now, it is too late for this strategy to be successful. The EU had great strength and some authority but little legitimacy, it decided not to dictate the rules in an early stage. Only a Ukrainian strong-armed response would be the only way out through *hard power* that would end the conflict, bringing Putin's regime down. Also, Putin's regime could fall under its own weight, with a revolution of the oligarchs, since they may be able to exert some pressure if they see that the EU can affect their way of life through the sanctions, but this is outside the scope of this study. Overall, without implementing deterrence, the war is a lost game for both players before dawn, as both actors will end up worse off than they started.

Second, the Negotiation Scenario is the most favourable for both players, so it is foreseen that it would be the end-up scenario of the war, even if the paper leaves research lines open to determine the time and the means to that end. To increase the likelihood of this scenario, some *incentives* are needed to reduce the cooperation costs so that the N-N strategy is easily achieved. This proves that relying on *smart power*, which accounts for giving *carrots* from time to time, is more valuable than solely using *sticks*. Thus, *hard power* does not provide space for the N scenarios. Also, relying on *soft power* would have erased the EU from the game's scope since it would not be playing an essential role.

All in all, the primary purpose of conducting Game Theory is to exemplify the *smart power* role of the EU, and foremost, to claim that the current political scenario has changed, and it will not return to the *status quo ante*. After the Russian attack, we have seen the Ukrainian country as an *exemplum docet*; and the East-West divide within the EU has been weakened. In conclusion, Putin wanted to weaken NATO, the EU, and Ukraine. It has served the opposite purpose: it has strengthened NATO, revived Ukraine, and the EU, and brought them closer together.

6. Conclusion and discussion

The sole hypothesis presented will be unpacked and carefully analysed, which permits drawing diverse conclusions regarding the different aspects that compose the definition of *successful global smart power*, or SGSP (own source, 2022).

When it comes to the matter of *globality*, the EU cannot be considered a global actor since whether it is successful or not depends on the region towards which it is seeking to address its power, especially concerning its Development Policy and Humanitarian Action, but also regarding its CTP and CFSP. The EU can influence depending on the degree of intensity in trade agreements or the interest it has in the aid it can offer. Therefore, we conclude that the EU is an *international* power, given that it can influence two or more countries in the global sphere, but still, some countries do not fall under its scope of action. The EU lacks effectiveness in those regions where it cannot offer the prospect of membership and positive incentives or where its norms and values are not shared, even in neighbouring areas: Israel-Palestine, for example, the EU build the airport in Gaza, which was bombed right after. The EU's international influence leaves much to be desired.

Regarding its *success*, in areas with no entire cession of competencies, the EU finds it difficult to act as a *successful* international power; it is heavily conditioned by the interests of EU member states. On the one side, the EU is highly successful in its *Communautaire* policies towards some of the world's countries. It can export its governance framework to potential candidate countries, countries dependent on the EU's trade services, and other neighbours through the highly effective politics of conditionality and economic incentives. However, in not fully *Communautaire* policy issues, the EU is not that successful. Even if it can take the lead on different policies, such as the agricultural one, it cannot assure that other countries will follow its path. This is very different from other major powers because the EU is not a state, it is a *sui generis* actor, and thus, its power is fragmented. EU has been built through the back door, without a previous model or design, following the so-called "functionalist method", first constructing a Common Market and a Common Currency, without a clear vision of the EU values, which came naturally afterwards, and which showed the path for a common culture. This was the strategy of the founding fathers of the EU. The result is a deficit of legitimacy, in which every actor does what will benefit its own interest, of what Brexit is the most evident proof. Another example would be that, recently, Spain and Portugal have recently agreed with Brussels to cap gas prices to downplay the negative consequences of the war in Ukraine, contributing to the *cherry picking*. This European Union *à la carte* is becoming more dangerous each time since the risk of losing its essence is higher.

Concerning trade power, the EU is effective *in* trade and *through* trade, given that it can shape the international economic environment and possess the capabilities to successfully battle with its major trade rivals such as China and the US. Moreover, it is highly successful in setting the global agenda in soft policies like environmental protection or good governance policies. The EU knows how to influence trade, regulation, and competition policy, thus making the euro the most important global currency. However, the eurozone needs to be more independent so that it is not dependent on American

exchange rate regimes. Regarding its foreign and security policy, the EU has been seeking to spread its values through soft means of power for a long time. However, these tools have always been too only reactive. They lack a thought on a strategic basis, as seen with the economic sanctions in the Ukrainian war context, which leads to *ineffectiveness* when it comes to avoiding the war. One of the main reasons for its ineffectiveness relies on Brussels's lack of capacity when it comes to imposing its foreign policy among the MS since the foreign policies of the 27 coexist in the same framework. The *veto* right can stop all those policies non-accordant with national interests, which are very different and distant given the other strategic national interests and historical scenarios. The question remains whether the EU is prepared to make a turnaround, both mentally and economically, fully assuming its security, or, on the contrary, continue with a low-cost confederal EU using mainly soft power tools to impose its presence, the safety of which is wholly the responsibility of the USA. Given the different actions taken during March 2022 and before analysed under Game Theory, we could see that the first option is winning the race; the EU is now accelerating the slow building of its so-called "strategic autonomy".

The EU's necessity to position itself in the international scenario has been more demanding, given the political crisis and tensions that have arisen, affecting its citizens, economy, and indirectly its welfare. The context put it perfectly to analyse the role of the EU in the changing world of geopolitics, which has allowed the Union to start developing an independent path when it comes to CFSP, beginning with the sending of lethal weapons to Ukraine with a community budget. The EU had always said "no to war," even when there was already a war. Thus, it has been solely relying on *soft power* for years. In the face of Ukrainian resistance, the mentality of Europeans has changed since if the mentality had been "we are going to surrender," Putin would continue to invade. Both Europeans and Russians have been starting to evaluate their strategies by their consequences, not the actions *per se*, which has drawn the lines of a strategic game. Also, it is to acknowledge what this war means for European security and resilience in general. First, Europeans will rethink their energy dependence since it could involuntarily finance other wars. The invasion of Ukraine gives new impetus to the energy and ecological transition. Second, the war in Ukraine is the triggering conflict of an ideological battle. The Russian Federation fears the EU for what it stands for in defence of liberal democracy, its values, and its Rule of Law. Disinformation, support for far-right movements and separatism ideologies will remain a weapon for Putin to destabilize the European continent, no matter how much Russia Today, Sputnik and other propaganda tools are banned from fighting foreign interferences. Rather than between communism and capitalism, the battle currently rising the liberal democratic system against the autocratic system.

Europe's main challenge is not the risk of war between European nations nor the establishment of democracy; it is a challenge to conquer itself. The EU, still recovering from the last enlargement, is trying to make great strides in defining itself. Will there ever be demonstrations of all Europeans under the same twelve-star banner, collectively pursuing the same goals while considering their different points of view? When one of the 27-MS suffers from economic problems, or internal scissions, the EU is used as a scapegoat. And thus, the problems become not a source of the country itself, but *because of*

the EU. Without considering all the good that the EU brings, the countries blame the Union, seeking help in other seas. However, the EU has come a long way because of the historical moment that the whole continent is living. A clear example is the adoption of the proposal, drafted by Parliament's Constitutional Affairs Committee, by the plenary of the European Parliament on 3 May, aiming to implement the transnational lists, thus, moving towards a federal Union, and leaving behind the confederal one. As an added parallel issue, the EU has on its shoulders the challenge of not allowing itself to be conquered by the new global order driven by *great* powers. That is to say, the EU needs to accommodate itself to an emerging world that is, to some extent, a product of its action. Which will come first, its internal organization or the strengthening of its position on the international stage?

However, another element must be added to the existent dichotomy is the lack of shared awareness of the abovementioned risks. The Europeans are immersed in their Erasmus program, its common currency, and learning new neighbourhood languages, in sum, in its welfare state. The world is very different from what we Europeans think it is; we are in a bubble of idealism, populist movements and growing Euroscepticism, and have closed our eyes to a reality we thought we were immune to. A discourse of history predominates in society, one of the European cultures understood as a constant growth and evolution, resilience, and an increasingly better quality of life, while believing that today's crisis is only fleeting, such as 2008. The paradox is that it is hard to put the EU's robust economy at the service of a political project due to the lack of unitary governance, as the economic crisis, the refugee crisis, the energy crises with Russia, or the COVID-19 pandemic have shown. Now is the turn for the EU to defend its position in these crises, being aware of them and knowing that it has much to lose if it does not overcome them. The biggest hurdle is that the EU must jump over or dodge the limitations without losing its composure, without compromising its shell and its internal architecture.

The EU is a method of international articulation through trade based on shared sovereignty, which cannot conform to being an effective world moderator. As a post-modern actor, the Union cannot be content to act as if it was uniquely modern. Indeed, it has arguably brought prosperity and freedom to the new world, probably without intending it. Hence its primary concern all these previous years regarding its role in power: barely respected, and not at all feared. A clear example is the situation of Brexit, which forced the EU to take a step forward; it either did so or was left behind because world power shifted to Asia or America. From these years of taking superficial *Communautaire* decisions, the need to implement geostrategic autonomy is born. The European Union has quickly learned to speak the language of *smart power*, thinking strategically and no longer reactively, as this leaves little room for *manoeuvre*. We are witnessing an increasing international relations complexity. The key to finding a niche in this new order lies in relying on the efficiency of the EU's internal coordination, given its nature as a unique actor. In conclusion, Henry Kissinger's telephone paradox was misleading. Thus, diversity can be, and must be, one of the significant strengths of the EU's external action since it allows the Union to move forward in concentric circles. Demonstrated through the jointly response to the Ukrainian crisis in 2022, the MS-27 are now more aware than ever of their strength *united in diversity*.

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Table 3*GDP of world countries in PPP*

Ranking	Country or Territory	GDP PPP (million dollars)
1	China	29.375.296
2	United States	24.796.076
—	European Union	22.233.076
3	India	11.353.043
4	Japan	5.973.708
5	Germany	5.203.655
6	Russia	4.704.577
7	Indonesia	3.842.965
8	Brazil	3.585.985
9	France	3.547.962
10	United Kingdom	3.535.084
11	Turkey	3.050.037
12	Italy	2.888.694
13	México	2.869.542
14	South Korea	2.657.046
15	Canada	2.185.028
16	Spain	2.168.787

Note. List according to the International Monetary Fund (2022, October 2021 estimate).

Table 4*Military expenditure by country*

Ranking	Country Name	Current USD
—	World	1,92885E+12
1	United States	7,78232E+11
2	China	2,52304E+11
—	European Union	2,32813E+11
3	South Asia	90.099.505.442
4	India	72.887.446.604
5	Russian Federation	61.712.537.169
6	United Kingdom	59.238.462.250
7	Saudi Arabia	57.519.424.000
8	Germany	52.764.761.199
9	France	52.747.064.858
10	Japan	49.148.557.003
11	Korea, Rep.	45.735.392.596
12	Italy	28.921.342.756
13	Australia	27.536.235.375
14	Canada	22.754.847.129
15	Israel	21.704.453.488

Note. The World Bank Data (2020).

Table 5

Leading exporters and importers in world trade in commercial services (excluding intra-EU trade), 2020

Ranking	Country Name	Share
—	European Union extra-trade Exports	24,7
1	United States of America	27,2
2	United Kingdom	8,5
—	China	7,0
3	India	5,1
4	Singapore	4,7
5	Japan	3,9
6	Switzerland	2,8
7	Korea, Republic of	2,2
8	Canada	2,1
9	Hong Kong, China	1,6
10	United Arab Emirates	1,5
11	Israel	1,3
12	Australia	1,2
13	Russian Federation	1,2
14	Chinese Taipei	1,0
15	Norway	0,9

Note. World Trade Statistical Review, 2021. World Trade Organization.

8. Appendices

Appendix A

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Appendix B

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Appendix C

Abbreviations and Symbols

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations	MFN Most-Favoured Nation
ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries	MS Member States N Negotiating
COVID-19 Coronavirus Disease	NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy	NGO Non-Governmental Organization
CTP Common Trade Policy	NN Not Negotiating
DPHA Development Policy and Humanitarian Action	ODA Official Development Assistance
EEAS European External Action Service	OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
EU European Union	RTA Regional Trade Agreement
FTA Free Trade Agreement	SAA Stabilisation and Association Agreement
GDP Gross Domestic Product	SGSP Successful Global Smart Power
GDPR General Data Protection Regulation	TEC Treaty Establishing the European Community
IMF International Monetary Fund	TSD Trade and Sustainable Development Chapter
LDC Least-Developed Country	UN United Nations
MAD Mutual Assured Destruction	US United States of America
MERCOSUR Southern Common Market	WTO World Trade Organization

Appendix D

Interview with Ana Coelho

Note. Ana Coelho is the Director of the Brussels' Delegation at ACCIO-Catalonia Trade and Investment in Government of Catalonia. Also, she has been a Trainee, Lecturer and Project Manager for the European Commission for 8 years, directly working on the negotiations for the 2004 enlargement.

Note II. This interview was conducted in Catalan but was translated to English for the purpose of the Thesis, it does not claim to be an exhaustive translation. It should be noted that the translation may differ from reality given the nuances of language.

Date: 14th February 2022 at 10:00 Central European Time (CET).

Place: Virtual interview.

Question 1. What do you think that is the most powerful tool from which the European Union disposes nowadays?

I think that the only thing that the European Union decides are the technical rules to facilitate the circulation of goods. The European Union, as an entity, has two exclusive competences, which it does not share with the states, and they are applied by the commission: In the first place, the trade policy. This is, the negotiation of international trade agreements, for example, the European Union with Korea, the European Union with Canada, etcetera. The Trade Relations Commissioner (Valdis Dombrovskis, from Latvia) is the one that negotiates, and thanks to whom the union acts as a single voice. He had previously have played a role as minister of his country. In the second place, the rules of competence, which must be established based on the internal market. That's why the commission fines enterprises such as Microsoft, or Apple... because normally companies group together and make quarters, for example BWM or Seat, and they forget that there are competition rules. The European Union sends investigators directly to the company who are asked to look at all the information related to the automotive industry. The person who oversees the accomplishment of the rules of competence of the internal market is Margaret Vestager. When she moves around the world, they listen to her, she is a Danish lady who was prime minister of Denmark. Apart of the trade policy and the rules of competence, all the other domains of the Union are shared.

Question 2. Which role do you consider that the institutional triangle plays when applying the different from which the union disposes?

I consider of paramount importance not to sweep the institutions, since we have a treaty which defines the role of each of the institution. European Commission and European Union, for example, are not the same. According to the treaty, there are three institutions that play this role:

In the first place, the European Parliament, which, under my point of view, has a limited role when it comes to the decision-making policy. In the second place we have the European Commission, which is composed by the 27 ministers from each country. Under my point of view, it does not take any binding decision. In some cases, some commissioners were not accepted, Nathalie Loiseau, for example, since the MEPs did not accept her. Thierry Breton was accepted by the MEPs instead. In the third place, we have the Council of the European Union, which brings together the ministers of the Member States and takes decisions at a more sectoral level. Charles Michel is the president.

Finally, we have the European Council, where the heads of state meet. They are the ones who play the role of the power of the European Union, the power of the European Union is in the hands of 27 Heads of State. They are the ones who decide, and the ones who can influence. They are the ones with political power. Currently, France has the rotating presidency of the European Council. Now it is France for 6 months, and then it will be the Czech Republic. Macron talks to Putin because he holds the presidency of the European Council. Under my point of view, Charles Michel should also speak with Putin because he is the representative of the EU Council.

Question 3. Which do you think is the effectiveness of the National powers within the European Union, considering that not every country takes the same benefit from the Union, and which do you think are the main benefits of a country being part of the first post-modern state?

A country like Estonia will take more profit from the Union than Germany. Russia will not invade the Baltics because they are part of the European Union. There is a problem of nationalism, because often the Member States react in a very nationalistic way, and that is a big problem, especially in large countries. There is an important ideological difference here. We could create a more federal Europe, which is what we are building. The more federal, the more Europe. The euro has federated economies more. This could be the starting point of an economic policy (convergence rules). There is no European economic policy, but there is what is called the convergence rules: rules that the European Commission established with the different states because they consider that they are the minimum that the states must comply with to enter the euro zone (3% of the GDP). Inside the union we have the Eurogroup, which, under my point of view has no transparency, and no relationship with the European Parliament, they decide themselves. It is composed by Ministers of Finance and Economy of the different Member States, and the president of the European Central Bank (the latter has very little power, she does what the members of the Eurogroup tell her to do). The European Union is not an economic power, it is some EU member countries that are economic powers. People think that the European

Commission and the ECB make decisions, but the ones who make the decisions are those of the Eurogroup. However, currently, I consider that Europe is a Europe of nations: different languages, different ways of working... I believe this is the problem, that is therefore the reason why we are not listened to in the world. Paolo Gentiloni is the EU Commissioner for Economic Affairs. I believe that the EU Commissioner for Economic Affairs should be the Minister of Economy, and not Paolo Gentiloni since he only coordinates 27 economic policies. Every 6 months, *Digigrow* and *Digibudget* hold the European Summit. They evaluate the economic policies of each state. Anyway, every 6 months, each member state sends the evaluation to the Commission and gives the approval or not. This is very positive. However, there are countries such as Hungary and Poland that do not want the Commission to do so. It is only an evaluation, but they do not decide anything. In conclusion, I believe that Paolo Gentiloni does not decide anything, and that there is no European economic policy.

Question 4. When it comes to the foreign policy, how do you consider that the European Union is moving in that matter, do you think that its moves are strategically efficient, or that the Union has margin of improvement, in which sense?

Currently, we have the European External Action Service (EEAS), which is an entity part of the EU. It is another institution. The person in charge is the High Representative of the European Union: Josep Borrell. He is vice-president of the EU, but I truly believe that he is not listened to. The EEAS is a service, not an institution. It is completely at the service of the Member States, but EEAS does not play a role, because Josep Borrell is not a European Union ambassador. He does not come from a country like Germany, France... I consider they appointed him because they know he is a role that has no power or value. I consider that Josep Borrell gives the impression that he has power, but he doesn't. He is only representative. Lady Aston was before Borrell, and she was British. Before her we had Francesca Mogherini... those women were better than him.

Question 5. Which role do you think that the European Union plays nowadays concretely in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, do you think that the European Union is being listened to? What should the Union do to gain influence in this context, which tools of soft power could be used?

I believe that the destiny of Ukraine is in the hands of Russia. Ukraine used to be Russia, but a part of the Ukrainian territory is pro-Russian and there will be a civil war. In this context, the EU will not be able to stop it. The fate of Ukraine is in Vladimir Putin's hands. I believe that there will be two wars, First, one war against the Russian invaders, and the other one will be a civil war, since there are Ukrainian citizens that are pro-Russian, and others are pro-Ukrainian. Donbass is the Russophile zone; they don't want anything from the European Union or the NATO. The invasion of Russia will start from this part because they know that there will be no resistance here. If they want to go to Kiev, they will know that the people are more prepared. Another conflict zone is Crimea. Ukrainians in Crimea consider

themselves Russians. What Putin wants is to have a weak Ukraine because he does not want it to join the European Union or the NATO. The only way to have a weak state is to cut off parts of its territory. Regarding the European Union tools, the Union affirms there will be sanctions, but they are totally ineffective. But Putin doesn't care because he doesn't care if Europeans don't want to buy Russian products. On the other hand, we Europeans are worried. I truly believe that if we acted with a single vision and if we compress energy under the name of the European Commission, we would be more listened. For example, we do not have energy for the European Union, it is a drama, because the price of energy varies from one country to another. Furthermore, this will influence inversions. Two years ago, a directive was created to prevent the investment of entities from China and Russia. The most concrete example is Huawei. France has not renewed its contract with Huawei.

Question 6. According to you, and if I may personify the figure of the Union, what do you think the European Union wants to be when it grows up? ¿Do you think that this ambition of the Union corresponds effectively to the role that will allow it to gain more influence in the long term? Where do you think we should focus our forces as a Union to maintain the benefits that the EU currently possesses?

I believe that the European Union must federalize all policies, since it has only a coordinating role. However, it does not have an exclusive role. The economic issue is an inconsistency with what is happening. In the Euro Zone we have a single currency, but we do not have a single economic policy. Under my point of view, it is very fragile, it can collapse from one moment to another. We have some coordination, but we do not have a single direction. I believe that this organization has no future, therefore need a legal basis. The functioning of the Eurogroup is totally non-operational. This would give economic power to the European Union. I believe that the Europe of 27 should be finished, and that we should go back to the European Economic Area and there have the states that want a Federal Europe: France, Spain, Benelux... and with the others create an ideology of free trade. There that are the states that do not want to federate their policies: Poland and Hungary. I got to know the EU of the 12, it worked much better than the EU of the 27. It was there where the Single Market was established. We must put an end to the current EU, we must propose a new treaty that is a constitution of the EU, to be voted by the European citizens. We must create a parliament that is truly a Parliament, that citizens can vote through the different Member States, they should be able to vote by transnational lists through the different countries. There is a great success in Europe: Erasmus. It is one of the most important successes of the European Commission. Unfortunately, it has favoured children from the elite. I believe that we should create an Erasmus for technical degrees and expand the offer. Also, a creation by Ursula Von der Leyen of a new European Commission where a new treaty proposal is being worked on, where only the states that want to be part of the federal Europe will be present. I believe that the EU will self-destruct because the citizens of the countries themselves will vote more and more to the extreme right and will leave the European Union. Nationalism and the extreme right are the main threats to a European

Union of the future. Others will say that there are many policies that are being negotiated at the level of nations, and it is important to maintain each one's identity... and they will argue that this is being done well. Jo Cox, which I personally knew very well said, "we have much more in common, than things that separate us". And she was right: to be European is to look for everything we have in common; Europeans have much more in common than things that separate us. She was assassinated in the United Kingdom because she was an activist against Brexit. She worked for Oxfam, and she was a militant of social protectionism. In conclusion, I believe that a federal Europe should be favoured so that people can collaborate and create a true European identity.

Appendix E

Interview with Andrés Ortega Klein

Note. Mr. Andrés Ortega Klein is a senior research associate at the Elcano Royal Institute. He is an independent consultant and director of the Observatory of Ideas. He has been on two occasions director of the Department of Analysis and Studies of the Cabinet of the Presidency of the Government, and advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He has a career in journalism as a correspondent in London and Brussels and columnist and editorialist for El País. He holds a degree in Political Science from the UCM and a master's degree in International Relations from the London School of Economics. He is a member of the Board of the European Council on Foreign Affairs and a trustee of the Fundación Ortega-Marañón.

Note II. This interview was conducted in Spanish but was translated to English for the purpose of the Thesis, it does not claim to be an exhaustive translation. It should be noted that the translation may differ from reality given the nuances of language.

Date: 9th March 2022 at 10:30 Central European Time (CET).

Place: Virtual interview.

Question 1. Was Robert Kagan (2003) right about the US being on Mars and the EU on Venus, and to what extent should Europe have diversified hard power? We know that the EU has started to break the taboo on sending weapons, what influence do you think this has on its power?

We sometimes make the mistake of thinking that the European Union is a military power when it is not. The military power in Europe is called NATO, and they are called Member States. And within these Member States, particularly France. The United Kingdom has it and it is important, even though it is no longer in the European Union, but it is important for Europe. I think that what has changed with the new Commission and now with the economic crisis resulting from the war in Ukraine is the idea of a geopolitical Europe, which is a Europe that wants to play the power game and has the tools to do so. I believe that in the current crisis we see that the European Union has tools, for example, in terms of important sanctions, and it is applying them. However, it also has dependencies, for example, what we are seeing with gas and oil, especially with gas. It also has the capacity to help the Ukrainians with arms deliveries coordinated among the Europeans, coordinated through NATO. But it does not have a military capability as such. In other words, in theory it does, but in practice it does not. I believe that what the current crisis has done is to reinforce and reawaken NATO in military and political terms, and the European Union has been left in second place. It is often said that the European Union is making progress through crises. Sometimes this is true, sometimes it is not. It is said that the 2008 crisis caused Europe to regress in the world, and I believe that the pandemic crisis improved Europe's reaction. I

believe that the current crisis with Ukraine has led to a rebirth of the geopolitical European Union, which is not the military European Union.

Question 2. If so, can the war in Ukraine be a turning point? How should we evolve and equip Europe with hard power at a time like this? We recently heard Josep Borrell talk about the Union's hard power. Europe has clear and forceful power, although it has not always used it aggressively. How do you think things are changing?

Yes, of course it is a turning point, because it has made the Europeans act quite quickly and in a very united way first, even though there are different economic interests towards Russia. For example, we import almost no gas, but the Hungarians get almost 100% of their gas from Russia. Despite that, I think there is progress in terms of the desire to reduce dependence on Russia. I think there is also a reaction from companies, apart from the government, which are not only European, but there are many European companies that are doing what Thomas L. Friedman called "a cancellation of Russia". That is, withdrawing, at least temporarily, from Russia, whether it is Zara, an Anglo-British-French chain, or other companies that are, let's say, taking private sanctions against Russia, and not so much public sanctions, as Western countries have done. I'm not sure that Europe can have a hard power now, because, as I say, everyone looks to NATO, which is a military organisation that is very well established, and has military capacity, because it has military bodies that work, troop allocations and means that work. I believe that the idea of a military Europe, although it should begin with the very French idea, but it is also of interest to Spaniards, of a Europe of the military industry. In the sense that what the United States of America wants is for us to spend more on defence, or what it wanted before this crisis, to buy American military resources, that is, to strengthen American industry. I believe that the European Union is moving towards promoting a European military industry rather than European military capabilities. It is true that the High Representative came to say after the hasty exit from Afghanistan that we needed an intervention force of five thousand men and women. Well, I think that this would be too little in the current crisis if there were a Russian attack on Western Europe, whereas NATO is more prepared. I believe that we are moving towards a Europe of economic power, that economic power is also hard power, not only military power... but also white power. But I think the soft power of the European Union is being questioned in the world. I think that many people want to come and live here in the European Union, but the example of the European Union is not spreading in the rest of the world: there are no examples of countries that want to join as the European Union joined, perhaps because they also have another history behind them.

Question 3. What is your assessment of the measures taken so far and can we say that Europe is making progress in hard power?

These are tough measures that involve, above all, financial sanctions that are partial, they involve attacking the private property of a certain number of Russian oligarchs. There is also an

important factor, which is that the Russian Central Bank does not have access to part of the foreign currency it had in Western Central Banks, which is half of what it had, which was held abroad. I think these are important sanctions, perhaps unprecedented in history.

What I have doubts about is how this war will end, which I don't know, and what it will take to lift these sanctions. What I do believe is that whatever happens, we are heading towards a new cold war in Europe, which will mean that the European Union will have to contribute more to its own defence, it will have to spend much more. In this sense, we have seen a first change in Germany, where they have decided to spend much more on defence to reach the famous 2%. That in turn is an important step. But we have also seen that in the last few years since the 2008 crisis, military spending in the European Union has gone down. In the United States of America, for example, it increased from 656 billion to 788 billion dollars between 2008 and 2020. While European military spending, and here I count the European Union plus the United Kingdom, fell from just over 300 billion to 292 billion, so entering commitments made by member states to spend on military technology and equipment. However, as I have said, this could change if this crisis goes further and if, as I believe, we end up in a new cold war, which will be different because the geopolitics are different.

Within all of this, I believe that this also leads to reinforcing the idea of European autonomy or sovereignty in various fields, as we already had in the economic field and in the field of technology, where the Next Generation Funds are partly aimed at this, and in unity. Tomorrow and the day after, there will be a meeting of the European Council chaired by France where this idea of autonomy in these fields, including energy, will be raised.

Question 4. Do you believe that the EU's hard power goes through NATO? Is hard power possible without Washington's involvement? Until now Ukraine criticised Germany because, firstly, it did not send arms because of its dependence on gas and secondly, because of close trade ties. Relations with Russia are very high, and interests make it difficult for the EU to move towards serious sanctions. Germany made a U-turn this past weekend and deepened economic sanctions, agreed to sell arms, and Scholz's speech ended by saying that Germany needs to increase defence spending to 2 per cent of GDP. This is a turning point. Another turning point is Switzerland, which was neutral even in the Second World War, and has now taken a stand. Europe has turned a corner, led by Germany, what are the next steps?

I believe that the hard power of the European Union goes through NATO. We see it for example in a case that has nothing to do with Russia, only indirectly, come on. That is the French military withdrawal from Mali, to retreat and go to other countries in the area in its fight against Islamism and local radical Islamist terrorism. The French withdrawal indicates a European weakness in the area, which will also affect Spain, where we are also present. This indicates that in terms of hard power the European Union is not only not making progress but is going backwards in some areas. We will see if the crisis with Ukraine goes much further if there is a European reaction to take up again this idea of a

European Union with hard power. I think there will be debate about it, but there is no general agreement on this. There are countries that were against participating in the European defence policy, for example Denmark, which has now decided to hold a referendum to see if it will join this dimension of the European Union. Then there are other EU countries such as Sweden or Finland that are considering whether to join NATO, despite their status as a core country, which they retained when they joined the EU, although it is a neutrality that is, shall we say, oriented, not a radical neutrality.

Question 5. Have you been surprised by the recent steps Europe has taken, and how can it be strengthened to channel Europe's power in the world?

Europe always says it wants to export democracy, but now Europe's problem is that democracy in European countries has problems: with the rise of populism, with the weakening of the rule of law in some countries such as Hungary and Poland, and I believe that in order to have more credibility abroad, it needs to strengthen its democracy within. The second, I believe, is to strengthen itself politically.

If Europe is weak economically, and by economics I include several things, including technological mastery. Europe needs to strengthen itself economically and politically so that it is not so dependent on the United States, or in terms of chips on Taiwan and South Korea, the Republic of Korea. In economic terms, relative to the US, the economic crisis of 2008-2012 set the EU back from the US. The American economy grew much faster than the European economy. It remains to be seen what happens with the current crisis derived on the one hand from the pandemic, from which we are emerging, but less quickly than the United States, and on the other hand the economic crisis derived from the war in Ukraine, which may affect Europeans more than the United States, and here we may once again lose ground that is necessary for Europe's influence in the world, even to finance programmes such as the Indo-Pacific or the European response to the silk road in China's Belt and Road Initiative.

Question 6. What possible solutions do you see to the conflict we are currently experiencing? Do you see a clear way out of it? In what way?

That's a very difficult question if I knew... I'm thinking about it, but I don't have a conclusion yet. I think that Russia is not trying to occupy the whole of Ukraine. It is trying to ensure that part of Ukraine, that Crimea and the Donbas remain within Russia. To take away the entire outlet to the Black Sea, which would give it a lot of power in the Black Sea area not only vis-à-vis the United States but also vis-à-vis countries like Turkey, with the outlet to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

I believe that Russia does not want an occupation of Ukraine but wants to see an independent Ukraine or two independent Ukraine, but not in NATO, not in the European Union. Russia fears NATO and wants to reduce the borders it has with NATO, which would be greatly enlarged if Ukraine were occupied. And it also fears the EU for what it means in terms of boosting democracy. I believe that what

Russia wants is only an apparent and controlled democracy, that is, an autocracy that lasts. Putin has said several times that Western democracy in Europe does not work for the Russians, nor for the Ukrainians. So, I don't know what the way out of this is, I still don't see the possibility of a ceasefire. Experts say that a campaign like this, especially with a lot of mud because the thaw has been brought forward, can last 7 to 8 weeks. But the conflict can also last for years. What I don't know is also what Russia is willing to do with Ukraine and in Ukraine in exchange for some lifting of sanctions, which is in its interest. But in answer to your question, I really don't know, and I don't think anyone outside Russia knows.

Question 7. To what extent does the loss of the UK weaken the EU?

It weakens it because it loses economically. First, it is a country that is leaving. The cost that Brexit is having for the British is reinforcing the idea that many countries that are thinking of leaving no longer want to leave. The fact of having a country that is leaving I think is a moral damage, or reputational damage to the European Union. Then, in economic terms, it is a good pinch for the European Union, which thus loses weight. And above all, in military terms, the United Kingdom and France were the two real military powers in the EU. Both are members of the United Nations Security Council; both have military weapons... The Brexit exit has made a serious dent both in terms of hard and soft power in the European Union.

Question 8. Beyond the loss of strategic depth, can it be a spur to progress in the face of London's traditional handbrake on issues such as euro integration or greater foreign policy coordination?

Yes, the little progress that has been made in terms of Common Foreign and Security and Defence Policy has been achieved since Brexit. The United Kingdom always held back because it considered that this was holding NATO back and was also acting somewhat on behalf of the United States of America. In this sense, I believe that the UK's exit has strengthened the idea of a more autonomous, more geopolitical, more military Europe... little by little. And, of course, a Europe in which the Euro is already prevalent in almost all countries, and a Europe that wants to open up to the East, because perhaps Europe's greatest strength in stabilising its environment is enlargement. And I believe that with Brexit and the problems we have had with Poland, Hungary, Romania and other countries, there has been a certain weariness and a certain fatigue with enlargement, but now the issue of enlargement is being raised again with the question of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia... Which may open to enlargement. It will probably take years because it is a very complex issue, and we will see if Russia is willing to give up anything on this, at least as far as the European Union is concerned, not NATO.

Question 9. In your opinion, and if I may personify the figure of the Union, what do you think the European Union wants to be when it grows up?

The European Union is bigger. It must move forward, but if my grandparents had thought, or even when the EU was created, that we were going to get where we are now, they would have thought it would take a miracle. The EU has come a long way: it has a common market, a relatively common foreign policy (albeit too much based on unanimity), it has a common currency, it has common values, and a capacity to influence international regulation for example in digital matters, what is called the Brussels effect.

Jacques Delors said that the EU was an NPO. In other words, the EU should not be seen as a state, not even a federation, but as a new political form where nation states will continue to exist, losing importance. But the important thing is that it is a form of shared sovereignty, where everyone participates in everything. I think what the EU wants is to become more digitally autonomous, to start with, because that is what gives it strength in our times. Then, politically, economically, and eventually militarily, although, as I say, there I have certain doubts. I have doubts about whether it will make progress in military terms or not, but what is certain is that it is making progress in geopolitical terms, and it will continue to make progress.

And what the European Union wants to be... I think that whenever anyone has tried to define what the European Union wants to be, they have always failed. Europe moves forward without a point of arrival, but rather it moves forward by creating processes, by creating what Schuman called "de facto Solidarity", little by little. Between the year 50 and 2022, much progress has been made. What progress will be made in the next 50 years; we will see. Europe needs to become a more global power, with more global influence, and that means having special relations with China, which do not necessarily coincide with those of the US, having a strategy in the Indo-Pacific, and above all having a strategy towards the East, towards Russia, although this is difficult to design now. And, to have a strategy towards its southern neighbourhood, be it the Maghreb or sub-Saharan Africa, which is a continent with an important future and from which we receive a lot of immigration. I believe that this is the geopolitical panorama that is being designed for the EU. As for the political form, as I said, I believe it is an Unidentified Political Object, which is being created little by little and which does not respond to previous criteria, but rather to the resolution of problems one by one and in a constant manner. A bit like Einstein said, "life is like a bicycle, in order not to fall off you have to keep moving forward". Well, the same with the European Union, in order not to fall off it must keep moving forward, and if you don't pedal it ends up falling off.

Question 10. When I was talking about the opportunity now opening up of the possible expansion of the war in Ukraine, which has been made to Georgia, Moldova, or Ukraine itself, are we not running the risk of running the same risk with Turkey, that is, of making an invitation

knowing that deep down we cannot, do not want to or are not interested in this expansion, and then generating greater frustration that could turn against us?

Well, the invitation has not gone out, it has been suggested that it is going to be studied. I believe that these countries are not ready, even some of the countries that are now in the European Union, I believe that they were not politically and economically ready to join the European Union. It is a bit hasty to talk about these countries joining the European Union, especially because sometimes having buffers in this area can be useful in future relations with another Russia, and perhaps the European Union does not want to have borders, or does not want to have too many borders with Russia... But rather to have intermediate states that allow for better geopolitical management of the situation.

Question 11. Surely this is what Putin is looking for, isn't it? That is, to have that defensive galanties that remains at that moment, which is what the Russian soul aspires to, right?

To speak of Putin, he has written and spoken several times about the reality that Ukraine and at least part of Russia are one people. It's a very Russian vision... we'll see where it goes in implementation. I don't rule out that there will be a partition of Ukraine in the future, and one part will remain in Russian hands, if not in the Russian Federation, then in Russia, and the other part will serve as a buffer to serve the West, Western Europe.

Appendix F

Interview with Xavier Mas de Xaxàs

Note. Xavier Mas de Xaxàs Faus (Barcelona, 1964) is a journalist with a degree in Contemporary History. He was a correspondent for La Vanguardia in Washington (1996-2002) and is currently a local information reporter. He is the author of "La sonrisa americana. Una reflexión sobre el imperio estadounidense" (Mondadori) and "Mentiras. Viaje de un periodista a la desinformación" (Destino). He has co-directed the documentary "Nieves Arrazola", as well as the videographic project "La cadira de Carme". He has created the Wikidiario.info portal for the training of journalists.

Note II. This interview was conducted in Catalan but was translated to English for the purpose of the Thesis, it does not claim to be an exhaustive translation. It should be noted that the translation may differ from reality given the nuances of language.

Date: 14th March 2022 at 11:30 Central European Time (CET).

Place: La Vanguardia. Av. Diagonal 477, 7th floor, Barcelona.

Question 1. We are currently witnessing a change of roles in today's power play. A few months ago, the trade war between China and the United States seemed to occupy all the front pages of newspapers — now it seems that the protagonist is Russia. What do you think makes us look or listen more to some countries than others?

Because of Russia's current military threat to Europe and the United States, it prioritizes everything. When there is more geostrategic tension that is more to settle areas of influence or economic or power capabilities, tensions are one, but when a war breaks out on top of that, war prioritizes everything. There is nothing more violent, nothing more transcendental than a war, and that makes priorities change. And those priorities are now in Europe because Russia has provoked a war that is forcing Europe to rethink the security system that we have had in Europe since the end of World War II, which is a global security system that also affects agencies. multinationals such as the UN. That is, this Cold War, which ended in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall, led to the belief that history was over, that capitalism had won over communism, and that democracies had imposed on totalitarianisms and that collective progress and globalization would lead to peace, because I will make the countries that had been competing for territory and hegemony, now trade. And it is this trade and progress, economic growth, would guarantee peace. Now we see that this has not been enough, and we need to rethink everything. That is why the priority is now Europe again and again where it was in the middle of the twentieth century.

Question 2. The EU is said to have a power strategy based on soft power. Do you think that this power communicates properly? What message do you think you are sending to the world?

Yes, the European Union receives it, but it is not insistent enough, because the European Union itself, throughout its history, has suffered many contradictions and, above all, has suffered a syndrome typical of adolescence, in the sense that it has not been able to take on their own destiny. And it's not just his fault. The European Union is the most interesting project in humanity and the most important of all. Like nation-states that have competed for centuries, they have decided to unite. First, by crushing economic and trade barriers. Second, trying for political coordination that leads to political integration. This is a fabulous, extraordinary project. But Europe is often said to be an idea. And this idea is so appealing that millions and millions of people around the world want to come to Europe to live, to have a new life and a new opportunity. This idea of the European Union is built, as it cannot be otherwise, by consensus: everyone must be convinced that this is the best way forward. However, this consensus has not always been possible. There are countries that still have a very sovereigntist view of themselves. I mean they have a vision that they consider to be better, and they can better serve their people and their people if they have absolute control over their borders, their economy, their foreign policy. Then it is not right for them to cede sovereignty to an international body. And that explains Brexit, for example. Brexit was a total hoax, but well, the origin of Brexit was this feeling on the part of the British population that they were better off alone. And then they built a big lie to convince a part of British society that they had to leave the European Union.

Well, having said that, the European Union, in the wake of Brexit, also in the wake of the pandemic and now the war in Ukraine, has shown courage and action that it has never shown in its history. Brexit thought that it would break up Europe, that it would divide its partners, and that it could find a better solution to this divorce, that it could get a better contract. It was not so. The 27 closed ranks, and the negotiation was carried out from Brussels, and what Brussels said is what ended up being signed. The pandemic was the first step in a Joint European Health Policy. The European Union bought the vaccines together. Of course, there were problems in the beginning, because it was a challenge I had never faced before. But I think he overcame it and finally the countries were able to buy the vaccines together at a reasonable price, there was no marketing of the vaccines, as there was at the beginning with the masks. So, this was solved, and a coherent policy was made that gives way to this EU health integration. And then the war in Ukraine has advanced security more than anything since the EU became the EU. That is, it has advanced more in 15 days than in 60 years. This is what the European Union sees and was already seeing when Donald Trump was in the White House, which must take on its own destiny and cannot rely on the US forever. This US that saved it from Nazism and Stalinism, this US that won the Cold War with NATO and guaranteed security in Europe, because now it has other priorities. Once the United States overcomes this crisis, the United States will still face China's challenge: a struggle for political hegemony in the 21st century. And it stands to reason that US interest

is more in the Pacific than in Europe. But first it must solve Europe because the US without the EU is nothing either. They are very lame. They need the support of Europe in some way. The transatlantic axis has built the world we know, and if that axis is broken, the United States will have to take on even greater responsibility, and it's crazy to do it alone. Then they need the EU. But at the same time, the EU needs to grow and mature. So far no one was able to send in the perfect solution, which is not strange. NATO enlargement to Eastern Europe has been quite a project of the Americans. Many Europeans did not want the strengthening of NATO, this strengthening by Washington that European countries spend 2% of their GDP on defence, this was a will of the Americans that Europeans did not see necessary. Now they see it as necessary. But before that they did not see the need to increase their defence spending to strengthen NATO, which is a US-led alliance.

Now, as they said last week in Versailles, they will increase this spending by up to 2%, but to build their own security structure, which will be coordinated with NATO. It is unknown at this time what he will do after leaving the post. And this is a big step forward - this Europe of ideas has shown that it needs a Europe of strength. Putin, the Kremlin, has shown that strength is still decisive. Until the problem of Russia is resolved, and it has not been resolved since 89, it has not been resolved because... That is, until it is resolved, and Russia truly becomes a rule of law, approved by the rest of European countries, the threat of force will be on the table, and then you must protect yourself. You must protect yourself strongly, with a defensive force that prevents a foreign army such as the Russian, as it invades another country, to acquire what it does not have. And this is a strategy of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries because I think it is not acceptable in the twenty-first century. And it is not acceptable because it violates the number one principle of the 21st century, which is globalization. A globalization that we are now rethinking, a globalization that has also benefited many people around the world.

Question 3. And speaking of this force, which you are now commenting on, "Europe must be strongly protected," what do you consider to be the tools available to the Union to protect itself strongly?

The main tool, of course, is military technology. It has its own military technology that needs to be further developed. It must compete with the Americans with this, which is why competition between companies. And then the other tool is politics. Politics must serve, this political unity, which is becoming stronger, must serve to build the will to build this new security structure. I mean, I think these are the two tools.

Question 4. Are sanctions on Russia implying a change of role over the power of Europe? Do you think the world finds out?

We are witnessing a shift towards the European Union of ideas, the European Soft Power Union, the European Union which believed that through culture and social exchange between people within the context of programs like Erasmus we would already have a strengthened and solidary Europe... we are moving from this Europe to a Europe that, in addition to all this, will be a Europe of strength. A Europe with its own defence. So, the reaction of the European arms countries, through the EU and in favour of Ukraine, proves it. The EU must take a step forward, Europe does not want to be neutral, the EU wants to get involved in the war in Ukraine as far as possible, to get as involved as possible without leading to a nuclear war that would lead to a nuclear confrontation between Russia and the EU. And he will do everything to this point. In this context, sanctions are a tool of war, they are a tool that wants to stop the invading army, which is the Russian, and Vladimir Putin. And sanctions cannot be understood outside of war because they have been imposed in a context of war.

Question 5. Do you think that the sanctions would have had a different effect on Russia if they had been implemented before the entry of Russian troops?

I believe that more than that, the big mistake of Europe and the US before the conflict was not to punish Russia harder, which it could have done... the big mistake of the EU is not being able, knowing or wanting to establish a dialogue to restore confidence between Moscow, Washington, and Brussels. That was the big mistake. The force, in this case also the economic sanctions, I think they will achieve in the long run if all goes well... will cause such a strong crisis in Russia that perhaps power in the Kremlin will falter, and Putin's power will fall... we do not know. We are speculating. What is certain is that the opportunity for dialogue was lost, and that comes a long way, that it comes from when NATO expanded into the Warsaw Pact countries, but that no dialogue has been established. A system in which Russia was comfortable could not be established, and this led to the consolidation of power in the Kremlin. That is, Russia abandoned the path of democracy and became more authoritarian. Then, as Russia became an autocracy, this dialogue became more and more difficult, until in the end it was almost impossible. It has been a collective and progressive failure to see the mistake. Had the sanctions been imposed in recent months, they might have only accelerated the Kremlin's decision to invade Ukraine.

Question 6. And now that we are talking about the European Union, what are the consequences of the outbreak of this conflict on the EU?

As I said, this conflict will strengthen the European Union because it will have more political security and more unity within security policies. This will create not only more cohesion and more unity, but also political initiative in general. Like this asylum policy, which has been so difficult to implement. Now I'm talking about 2015, for example, when 1.5 million Syrians came and the countries of Eastern Europe were opposed to taking on their share of refugees because they were Muslims, and they were Christians and they thought they would harm to society... this so exclusive and so nationalist

approach, now that the same countries see that they have Ukrainian immigration knocking on their doorstep, because they will be millions of refugees, so of course we will have to distribute the quotas of refugees. Europe will take a step forward in its asylum policy, which is fundamental to Ukrainian society but also to the ongoing crisis in the Mediterranean. and this is a very important step because Europe by population, the European population is aging little by little and Europe needs millions of refugees, millions of new citizens if we are to take on this role of international power. Because there are five hundred million people, the largest market in the world should have this political weight that it does not have now. However, I believe that what the war in Ukraine will do is strengthen these economic and security policy tools.

Question 7. We know that gas prices are on the rise, and we have even heard the High Representative of the Union call on European citizens to use heating less. Who is to blame, where should we look? Is it all the fault of the war in Ukraine?

Yes, yes, yes. Much is to blame for the war in Ukraine. Obviously, the war in Ukraine will limit the price of gas. Russia has been playing with the price of gas for months. Gas has also been a political and war tool for them. They have been, let's say, conditioning the supply of gas to Europe to a series of political conditions that Europe has not wanted to give, and this has made prices more expensive. The war has made it all the more difficult. Obviously, prices go up whenever there is a conflict because the market is destabilizing. It also seems clear that oil companies, which are the ones that just supply gas to the gas stations when we put gas, are taking advantage. And they're making a comeback that, as President of the United States Joe Biden has said, I mean, they're taking advantage of the crisis to raise prices a lot more than they should.

Gas, after all, is also electricity. In other words, the crisis in Ukraine is leading to an increase in electricity tariffs. The electricity market is now in a state of disrepair. It is a market that is very sensitive to any geostrategic alterations, with which Europe suffers greatly: its factories, which need electricity to operate, produce at such expensive prices that inflation soars. That is why it is urgent to end the conflict in Ukraine, restore market stability and establish an agreement with Russia, which seems very difficult now. It seems that everything has to go through a military victory on the ground, a defeat of Putin, or a withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine by force, but that, if it happens (and it would be very important that it happens very soon) it still won't solve your problem, because you'll still have to negotiate with Putin, and if Putin is defeated in Ukraine and hasn't gotten what he wanted... even if it's cosmetically to save face, he won't have any will to negotiate with the West. With that, the problem will continue, the economic problem. This crisis after the pandemic crisis will be the crisis of the war in Ukraine.

Question 8. Do you think that Europe can do anything about this crisis that we are experiencing and this apparent collective hysteria?

Let's see, the first thing Europe needs to do is stand firm. No step back, no concession. Ukraine seems to be the first step in a more ambitious Russian territorial expansion policy, which also wants to take over Poland, Hungary, the Baltic countries - the former sphere of the Warsaw Pact, with which Europe now does not have to take a step back. But no step forward is a danger or an argument to the Kremlin to provoke a third world war. It is a very fine line, very delicate to follow. I think that sanctions are a good strategy, and so is the weapons that are being given to the Ukrainians, and that is what needs to continue. And the message to the people must be calm. it's a challenge that can't be solved from yesterday to tomorrow, it's a generational challenge. So this message about the European community needs to be reinforced about the idea that the conflict will be long but also about the idea that European governments will protect society, protect their employers, get alternative energy supply routes, get lowering the price of gas, fuel, electricity... and this is a priority for Europe right now, because it is the main consequence of the war in Ukraine that its citizens are suffering.

Question 9. Speaking now of the possible solutions to the conflict, why is the EU so eager for countries such as Turkey, Moldova, Georgia, or Ukraine itself? What does it mean to be within the Union because it is so desired?

The European Union is the most ambitious project humanity has ever undertaken. These countries have very weak democracies, democracies under construction. The European Union would accelerate its progress, accelerate its security, its transition to strong democracies, with very strong institutions. However, this would be an unaffordable price for the European Union, and it would not be good for either the EU or these countries. It is fantastic that these countries want to join the EU and imitate the established democracies of Europe and take on their institutions, their justice, their education, their health, and their welfare state. It's great, and the EU should encourage it to continue to do so. The EU must accompany the transition of these countries, of these regimes that move away from totalitarian regimes, and promote centralized economies. It must accompany them with this transition, as it is already doing. You must train your judges, cops, politicians. It needs to establish anti-corruption strategies, for example. And as these countries move towards more modern change, these countries will have progress that they do not have now, and then they will be able to join the EU with all the guarantees without being a burden for the EU. That is, contributing to the well-being and collective benefit. I think these countries need to do their homework and find a way for Russia to let them do it, which is very important. That Russia is not afraid that these countries in the European Union could be a threat to them, and that is very difficult right now, but it is something that needs to be achieved.

Question 10. What do you think are the possible ways out of the war that is currently taking place in Ukraine? Which do you think is most likely, and which would benefit the Union the most?

No one knows what will happen. In the same way that no one in common sense predicted that Putin would invade Ukraine, because it was impossible to think what benefit Russia would derive from this invasion, because it was going to destroy the very country with which it wanted to establish a link, or restore, or rebuild. Just as no one could have predicted the invasion, no one can now predict how it will end. And here are several scenarios on the table. One is the military scene. Victory of the Ukrainians, therefore of NATO and defeat of Russia, and giving up their power. Second, victory for the Ukrainians, with Putin saving his face, eh, and he can see this defeat as a victory and stay in power. Third, the victory of Russia, eh, and a period of great uncertainty in Europe because a victory in Ukraine would give so much strength to Russia that it seems logical after invading Ukraine it seems logical that it would not take long to destabilize the Baltic republics and get the countries of the old Warsaw Pact. With that, NATO and the EU would have a very serious problem. These are the three possible ways out. Which one will prevail? Well, no one knows. I hope Ukraine wins and Putin loses power, but the other two scenarios are just as likely.

Very uncertain about the need to be very clear that Europe cannot lose Ukraine, because if the EU loses Ukraine, it loses a very important part of itself. There are a lot of people who say that Ukraine is not Europe, because it is not the EU, and that is a serious mistake. But Ukraine is also a historical part of Russia - it is very difficult to consolidate right now. Sometimes it seems that Ukraine is part of Western Europe, sometimes it is part of Russia. I believe that Ukraine should do both at the same time. And that would be the great success of this collective Europe, which would also include Russia. This success also included Russia. This success would show that Russia is part of Europe, and that there is a common space that runs from the Urals to the Atlantic. But for that, Ukraine needs to reclaim this bridge space: this space to be in both places at the same time, to be Russia but also to be the EU. And to achieve that, you have to win the war. Ukraine would not need to be a member of the EU to enjoy the benefits of the EU economy. You can close all kinds of non-EU trade agreements, such as Norway, Finland, or Switzerland. You can establish partnerships that make you feel part of the EU, and at the same time understand that Russia also needs this security zone and these guarantees that these countries will not be EU.

Question 11. Very interesting. We hope so and that Ukraine will win the war. What is your vision of Europe, within Europe?

Europeans see the EU much better than their politicians. Its politicians have often weakened the interests of European countries in their own interest: Poland or Hungary. Because they have pursued their own political agenda that went against EU values. But the population I think wants more integration. The population does not want aggressive integration in the sense that it has removed many competencies that should be the responsibility of countries and regions (because they are more effective and remain in a low state of administration: those that are easier to fulfil when you are closer to the

people). Perhaps here the EU has sinned of too much technicality and too much bureaucracy. Not everything can be regulated, and states must be left to regulate what they believe is effective for their own people, and here the EU must correct.

However, it is very clear that Europeans want more EU because the EU protects itself from the dangers outside Europe and guarantees them a very complicated state of life outside Europe. then what is freedom, social welfare, education... all this, outside of Europe, is something else. I believe that this, most Europeans who have grown up in this integrated democracy, want to maintain.

Europeans want more Europe, and a safer Europe, don't they?

More Europe and a safer Europe, and at the same time less invasive in those aspects that they consider important for themselves. This does not mean that Viktor Orbán can impose a homophobic agenda against the LGTBI community, because this goes against the values of the EU, where we are all equal. But that does mean that Hungary can establish an agrarian policy more in line with its own, right? because otherwise we sometimes impose production quotas, or even things that do not end with the territory. And that may be a problem and it has been a problem many times. I don't know, they tell you that you have a quota to produce milk and you can't produce more, because that's what the French do with the milk they produce. This needs to be coordinated in another way now that we have seen that we need to produce closer to home those products that are most essential to our need. Therefore, this production, which was previously more centralized in Brussels, should be returned to the countries so that they can be sovereign in the issue of food, for example.

Question 12. In what direction do you think we should focus our forces as the European Union to move in the right direction, and what do you think this direction is?

I believe that the EU should become the USA of Europe. I think there is no alternative. The EU should become what we now call a confederation of countries. A multinational, multinational state... or whatever you want. There must be an EU President. We must be able to choose the EP that is really a parliament of European parties, that is not a representation of the various sovereign parties. And we must go here, we have to go to this federal EP of Europe. And then the national parliaments are national parliaments, but the EP is above it, with a government (which is now the Commission) and that they are, and not the states in charge. Today in the EU the Council rules, the council is the representation of the states. The government should be asked for a Commission, backed by an EP with even more powers. That's the decent thing to do, and it should end there. When and how? When it is not known, how. And above all it is a matter of will. I believe that these three crises: Brexit, the pandemic and now Ukraine can accelerate this transition, this path, this great adventure, this transition. since we have a common economic policy, we must also maintain a common government policy. Maybe not all of Europe will be able to move at the same speed because it will not. but for example, the countries that now have the euro, these countries must be able to take that step forward. In a pandemic, we have issued debt for the

first time to pay for the crisis and to pay for the transition to social and green energy. We are assuming solidarity for the first time, financial solidarity. We have made a common jar where everyone puts what they can and takes out what they need. This should be the first step, not the last. We must go with a very strong cohesion, Europe will have to de-tax the economy of the countries a lot. We must make many countries in this direction and with a firm commitment, which we do not have now.

Question 13. Do you think that the EU is making the efforts to move in this direction?

So far no one was able to send in the perfect solution, which is not strange. So far, we have countries that compete fiscally with each other, reducing corporate tax, for example, or being a kind of tax haven. Then, of course, this must end, and these countries have to see that they can't get wealth out of the rest of the country, why are they hosting relocated companies because they pay more taxes. This is an example of things that should have been done and not done and that maybe now with this crisis that we have, it needs to be done.

Question 14. Finally, and if you allow me to personify the figure of the EU, I would like to know what you think the European Union wants to be when growing up.

The EU certainly wants to be the United States of Europe, with a president who can take over. We need a George Washington to form the EU. A George Washington of the 21st century, that is, he cannot be a general like George Washington, but he must be a person who, first, is a country whatever it is, but who has political power, to impose the common good. and to convince the rest that this integration is necessary, and then that it has an immense transversality. Whether it is a government of the citizenry, not a government of a certain ideology, there can be no political interests, nationalisms, neither right nor left... and there must be the pragmatism of making it a reality with structures real, eh. We talked earlier about a security structure, a financial structure, a government structure that would be the federal parliament - that is, real institutions. Some are already there, like the TSJ, for example. The one who is now punishing non-compliant countries should perhaps have more powers. In other words, we lack this figure that can unite the EU above the political and national dimension that this demands of us.

Appendix G

Interview with Manuel Szapiro

Note I. Manuel Szapiro is Director of the European Commission Representation in Barcelona. For more than 20 years, he has worked in the institutions of the European Union, particularly in the fields of policy making, diplomacy and finance. Prior to his appointment, he was Deputy Head of Cabinet to the Vice-President of the European Commission, Maroš Šefčovič. Mr. Szapiro is also a visiting professor at the College of Europe in Bruges and was previously a political analyst at the European Commission Office in Barcelona.

Note II. For the purpose of this study, Mr. Szapiro expressed his desire not to record the interview. Therefore, an abstract of the different points discussed during the virtual exchange can be found here below in a summarized version. The questions have been literally transcribed from reality.

Date: 15th March 2022 at 12:00 Central European Time (CET).

Place: Virtual interview.

Question 1. How do you think that the European Union can convince the world that it is the best example to follow in regards of the soft power that it is currently using?

In general, the question of the *soft power* resolution of crisis has been a hard question. The *soft power* is something that is widely being used in the world, and we are not the only ones in the EU using soft power. As a matter of fact, our great powers are also trying to get to *soft power* real. The question right now is whether the *soft power* is efficient in dealing with non-conflict, which is what we are facing in Ukraine. I am not sure it is efficient, but it is very much necessary, and we can see from the Kremlin as the Russian economy is affected by the sanctions, and the support that is giving thought the support and the humanitarian assistance that we are giving. It must be complemented by other means: the Financing and Delivery Instrument, in complementarity with defence like in military organizations, such as NATO, and so other MS with nuclear power. So, there is a nexus between the *soft* and the *hard power*, which is only being used when we are in a very critical context, such as the one that we are currently living.

Question 2. What do you think are the main challenges that the EU faces as an external actor, looking at the world?

The biggest challenge is to put an end to the war, so the war is over. And the next one is the reinforcement of our resilience and our strategic economy, and the rebuilding once hopefully the war is over. With outstanding all the transnational challenges that we are living because of the invasion of the Ukraine, that is a final challenge to our recovery of the economy.

Question 3. Regarding the context of the Ukrainian crisis that we are currently facing, do you think that the strategy that the European Union is taking is effective enough to have an influence on the territory?

I have a different start point in your assumption. When you are in a war, which is taking place on the European territory, I am not sure the main objective is by the different actors to gain influence. I think the main objective is to collectively put an end to the war, for that, the EU is needed for something, and other actors are needed for other. This is what is politics right now, to a certain extent, mainly by Germany and France. It is not a matter of the EU wanting to gain influence, that doesn't matter, in this case. Rather, who can help putting an end to the war? We have an issue at a state that is more important that who is going to gain influence. The result is the one we had in the end of the last two World Wars, and which to we are leading to. The important thing here is not now to get to gain influence or not, but only whether it is effective to stop the war. And we are seeing it is effective in the sense that the Russian economy is right now on a weak support. It is effective in the sense that it is putting the Russian economy in a situation where war is everyday more difficult to sustain.

Question 4. How would you deal the relationship that the European Union has with the Ukrainian country? Do you think that it is feasible for Ukraine to entering the EU?

I am not directly dealing with the enlargement. On this I can only tell you what the officially position is, and you already know. Basically, the symbol of belonging to the European family and asking for membership is important. It is a process which is an investment, and it takes time, because it requires to have measures on inflation and other reforms. It is not something that can happen overnight.

Question 5. I would like to know if you think that the EU is going on the right path to succeed? Are we going into the right direction as a Union?

On my personal standing, I think that the pandemic has leaded us to more interventionism to protect the welfare state. And I am sure that right now we are in the process of learning the lessons from it. Also, I think that we would be in a very different place today if we hadn't had this internal interventionism before the Ukraine war outbroke. Therefore, we need ground for more active protection, by not only the EU but also the government. And protection can take many forms: it can be economic, social, health... this is probably the way forward and the way that we are taking.

Appendix H

Interview with Pol Morillas

Note. Pol Morillas is the Director of CIDOB (Barcelona Centre for International Affairs). He is also a member of the Observatory of European Foreign Policy (IBEI). He has been Head of the Euro-Mediterranean Policy Area at the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed), coordinator of the Political and Security Committee of the Council of the European Union and advisor on External Action at the European Parliament. He has published numerous research articles in academic journals, think tanks and opinion articles on global dynamics, European integration, European foreign policy, and Euro-Mediterranean relations, among others. His latest book is Strategy-Making in the EU. From Foreign and Security Policy to External Action in 2019 and he has been co-director of the documentary 'Bouncing Back: world politics after the pandemic' (2021), which proposes a reflection on the dynamics of conflict and opportunities for international cooperation in the post-Covid-19 world.

Note II. This interview was conducted in Catalan but was translated to English for the purpose of the Thesis, it does not claim to be an exhaustive translation. It should be noted that the translation may differ from reality given the nuances of language.

Date: 22nd March 2022 at 12:00 Central European Time (CET).

Place: CIDOB (Barcelona Centre for International Affairs). C/Elisabets, 12, Barcelona.

Question 1. The interview has three distinct parts, first the European Union, then we will talk about the conflict, and finally a little about the new world order that is being drawn. First of all, I would like to know what tools the EU thinks it has to gain this influence in the global sphere. If you think it's soft power.

But not only in the case of Ukraine, but in general, the EU's external action tools? The first thing to consider is what kind of international actor the EU is, and therefore in this sense it is a different international actor than any other, that is, it is not a super state that has, as the United States, for example, has all the tools of a conventional state and therefore all the tools of diplomacy, from military power, economic power, sanctioning power, cultural power, the power of values, the power of technology, of all the elements that make up power today, and therefore the EU has some of these and some others do not have them as such, but have their member states. This means that there are areas of international power in which the EU is particularly relevant and areas of international power in which it is not so relevant. In what ways is the EU relevant as such? that is, together. Well, in all those whose competencies the EU has. For example: all that is foreign trade, because it is obviously a competence that the member states have ceded to the EU, internally with the single market and externally with the common commercial policy, and therefore in this area is especially strong. What does this allow you to do? Well, for example, to exercise great regulatory power, because it means that all those standards that

it sets at the regulatory level inwards for its single market, it exports them outwards. That is, any international actor who wants to establish a close trade relationship with the EU, which is basically almost everyone, has to adapt to EU rules and regulations, and hence the regulatory power. And here it is very strong, very strong because it has the capabilities to exercise that power, with the existence of this unique market and so on. Other areas where it is strong? For example, in development policy or in humanitarian action, where it also has shared competences with the Member States, but it has very strong competences of its own. And here we could go and review all the areas in which the EU has competences and can therefore exercise, in a united and coherent way, its power. Where does it have no impact? In those areas, or in which it shares its prerogatives with the Member States, or the Member States have them above all themselves. For example, foreign policy, defense policy, security policy, all those areas that are intergovernmental areas within the EU, that is, that are adopted in the framework of the EU Council and in the framework of the European Council, the member states have not ceded sovereignty. At most, they have given in to the ability to coordinate foreign policy. International foreign policy is then coordinated between the 27 to create the European position, but it is not a European position that is hierarchically superior to the position of the member states, that is, the member states still have their own security and security policy. defense, and its foreign policy. They have not ceded the powers. Therefore, in those areas or where there is no full transfer of powers, it is more difficult for the EU to exercise international power. Therefore, it depends a lot on the ability you have in skills to say whether or not it is a power.

And this is different as I told you, for example, in the United States, or as I told you in China, or as any other great international power told you, because those powers are states, and therefore as such have all the powers to exercise their power. So many times, this is because the EU is not powerful, but its power is fragmented. It is fragmented into areas where you have the capacity, the tools, the advocacy capacity, and the areas where you do not have as much because the member states of the union have more. And this is what the EU does as a sui generis international power, it is different from any other power, but on the other hand, sorry, it goes far beyond any other international organization, that is, the EU has many more powers than any, I know, the African Union, or ASEAN, or any other regional organization, and also many more times than international institutions. I mean; therefore, it is not a state, but it is not an international organization either, it is something in between, and in some areas with more power and in some others with less.

Question 2. Perfect. I would like to focus on this last part, you mentioned the Foreign and Security Policy, I would like to know because now may be the time when we are seeing that this is changing, or that it is perhaps adopting a different code, what do you think? What are the strengths and weaknesses of this security policy?

Well, let's see, security and defense policy are being strengthened, and foreign policy in general because international challenges are increasing, shall we say, right? There are very few international

crises that do not clearly have an impact on the domestic policy of the EU and its member states. Of the latest crises we've seen whether it's because of the pandemic, or because of Ukraine, or because of security, terrorism or, say, instability in countries like Syria and Libya, all these elements are not international crises happening far away and therefore we look at them and exercise the capacity for diplomatic pressure, but they really have an impact on the politics of the member states of the union and on the citizens, they have a clear impact. And so, as international crises increasingly determine the lives of citizens and the different political spheres in which citizens move, the EU sees international crises as becoming more relevant, so it needs to position itself more and more to act. So, there is an element that has to do with this change of international order, of rethinking the threats that come from the international order, and therefore there is an awareness that this is the case. And that makes foreign policy increasingly relevant, and if considered in both Brussels and the Member States, a policy where the EU needs to be strengthened. Why? because never before, and not yet, as we said before, have the Member States decided to give up this national policy, but rather have decided to coordinate their national foreign policies with those of the other Member States, and this this is precisely where the weakness of EU foreign policy comes from. In other words, it is not a foreign policy that overlaps with that of the states but coexists with that of the states, and this means that, together with the system of decision-making in foreign policy, also of security and defense, the capacity to impose Brussels on the states does not exist. Why? Because decisions are basically taken within the framework of the Foreign Affairs Council, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, or within the framework of the European Council, Heads of State and Government, unanimously. In other words, there is a veto power on the part of any country that considers that what Brussels is proposing, or that is proposing, say, the European External Action Service or other Member States, is an attack on national sovereignty, and therefore if they feel that it is not in line with their priorities, they can block it. And so, the EU may not make decisions. And this has happened a lot of times in recent times. It has dealt with issues such as the relationship with China, where some countries have sought to override human rights considerations, lack of public freedoms in China and others, and other countries with much stronger trade ties. they have wanted to be less critical of China. It has happened to the Middle East, where, for example, Hungary has blocked council conclusions for a position that is, say, closer to the Trump administration at the time, and therefore believed that Israel could not be criticized for its actions. It has happened with issues of relations with the Balkans, where there are a number of EU countries, including Spain, which do not recognize Kosovo and therefore this also has an impact on the EU's foreign policy towards the Balkans, due to this non-recognition. That is, it goes into a thousand areas. And so, it is always considered that the European foreign policy that overcomes the blockades is a European policy of the lowest common denominator.

That is, what all states are willing to agree on, and what goes a little beyond the national red lines, is always faced with the possibility of blocking. In recent times, man, it has improved, and especially in the wake of the Ukrainian war, we've seen steps forward that we didn't think we'd ever

see, right? That is, the joint shipment of lethal weapons to Ukraine, and not only that, by the member states, but with a community budget. That was unthinkable. Countries that until now were very reluctant to use the armed forces abroad, such as Germany, have taken this step forward. It is being discussed whether the economic consequences of the crisis in Ukraine should be addressed together. For example, rising energy prices and so on, if a common fund is created for Europeans to cope. All these are very important steps forward, but what has not changed is the decision-making system, the institutional system. And often here is the weakness that comes from here, from this institutional decision-making system that still puts member states ahead of the EU. And why? Because the member states have not given up sovereignty on this issue. And not only that, but we often have different strategic priorities. And different stories, right? There are some countries that are very Atlanticist and therefore believe that you should always be on the side of the United States. There are countries that have more concern for the south, for Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Syria. There are countries that worry about Russia. There are countries that have a much more fluid relationship with China, for trade reasons, for reasons ... right? I mean, there are all strategic realities where, strategic cultures that can be said, very different. There are countries that prefer more neutrality in foreign policy matters. Of course, there are countries like France that say no, that Europe should be a superpower in all areas as well. All these different points of view do not converge on a single policy, because the member states retain power over their foreign policies. And that is why, sometimes, because European foreign policy is decaffeinated, it is ... it is below the ambitions, the expectations we have and that explains its weakness. Now, strength? when the 27 act together, then obviously the positioning is ... considered, because all 27 member states take the same position, as we are now seeing with Ukraine.

Question 3. Well, you have already drawn the lines of the conflict with Ukraine. I would also like to ask you about this particular conflict. Let's imagine that it is a game, that it is a game of chess, who would these two players be in this game of chess? Who would be sitting on each side of the counter?

Well, it depends on how you look at the chessboard. If you look at them in terms ... you can look at a lot of different plans, if you look at them in terms of states, it's clear that what's here is a state, an aggressor power that is Russia, and that is the Kremlin, not Russian citizenship, but it is the Kremlin that has taken a determination that is largely based on a conception that the other, let's say the opponent, Ukraine as such, does not exist as a state. That is, there are summits, if you read Putin's Kremlin speeches what he tells you is that the creation of the state of Ukraine is artificial, and what needs to be rebuilt the great Russia, and the great Russia includes Ukraine and there has been created a state that is not very real, right? And so, in terms of state sovereignty, you could understand that they are two states, but one of them denies the existence of the other, right? And that is why their will to invade the country, and the war we are seeing at the moment, come largely from this conception of inequality between the

two states. There is one that is power, that has the right to act and invade the other, and there is another that is invaded, and therefore we are not on an equal footing.

If you look at it in terms of international law, if you look at it in terms of international system, what is clearly questioned by the actions of the Kremlin, is respect for the basic rules of coexistence in the international system, which are territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the states. And so much of the Kremlin's attitude is not only a war against Ukraine, but also, without a UN Security Council resolution, and without justification for the use of violence, is highly regulated according to the letter for the right to self-defence, or for the mandate of the security council, this does not exist to have a violation of international law and the international order of which we have endowed the 45 so far. Therefore, in terms of international law, in terms of international order, it is a game that is played between the rules of this order and those who want to skip the rules of this order. And so here is another reading as well.

Finally, you can also do a reading, surely what I am telling you is not exhaustive, but in a global way. There are several powers that have so far been predominant in the international order, Western powers, the United States, Europe, ... and Ukraine that wants to get closer to these predominant international powers, right? I want to get closer to it either with EU membership, with greater collaboration or with a NATO umbrella, I mean there is a debate, I don't know if that's the case or not, but in any case, these types of actors on one side of the board, and on the other hand the revisionist international powers of this international order. And of this predominance of the West in the international order. And here you have Russia, obviously, in the first instance as a disruptor of this order, but you also have China, which considers that the EU and the United States, the Western powers in general, have gone too far in their predominance of order, and that this order should be reviewed. And that others have used it to their ... at will when they wanted. In other words, they are also very critical of the interventions in Iraq, with the interventions in Afghanistan, in the intervention in Libya, Latin America during the Monroe Doctrine, that is, for a long time this predominance and use of the 'international order by the traditional powers, is questioned and criticized by the new powers, by China. So, all these countertops coexist with each other, say. And I think the pieces move according to the counter you draw, that is, whether you say an international counter, an international law and institutions board, or a Russia-Ukraine bilateral counter, right?

Question 4. If we talk ... in these three desks you draw, we may have a common actor who would be the Kremlin, personified in different ways. Do you think that you are acting in a rational way, and that your position corresponds to a strategic position, or that you are acting in an irrational way and are therefore fully credible?

Here I highly recommend that you retrieve Timothy Snyder's book, *The Road to Unfreedom*, which basically talks about what he calls the politics of uninhabitability. The policy of uninhabitability means that, according to Western order and conceptions of the international order, it was inevitable that

the greater the economic contacts, the greater the insertion of all countries in the international liberal order, that is, the greater the participation in global value chains, greater participation in institutions such as the ECM, say economic, energy, and close trade ties, that all this insertion of all powers in the order, would inevitably be linked to progress in our understanding of this international order, based on the defense of the rule of law, international legality, international organizations, multilateralism, democracy. And that, this policy of uninhabitability, for a long time, has haunted us in the face of demands from other international powers that did not follow this translation of economic insertion into political progress. And this has blinded us, to understand, the attitude, or positioning of these other regimes. China, Russia clearly, Turkey growing, India with its less democratic and more personal drift of power, and so one might think that what we believe to be inevitable, other powers had other ways of understanding. And above all, what is not logical is that we think that all these other ways of conceiving the international order and of conceiving the relations between powers, are irrational. Why? Because they go beyond our established normative mental framework, but in their eyes, our established framework could be perfectly accused of being irrational as well. And so now we are at a time when all this international order is being reviewed, and the structure of those who have been setting the rules because they were the predominant actors is being reviewed. We set the rules, we set the standard in international action because the West was the first in the international order. We had more ability to set the rules of the game, and the others didn't ... they didn't cough at us ... or if they coughed at us, but the force of the West was still imposed because it was preponderant. All that has changed. The current order is multipolar, you have many other very important powers that have the right and will to condition this order.

So, to think that his action is irrational is to be a little ... let's say ... lazy, right? In understanding this alternative order, they have put on the table. It is therefore not a question of rationality / irrationality, but a matter of changing the conception of order. And then depending on whether you put forward as a conception of order, whether market economy and democracy on the one hand, or on the part of China, state sovereignty not interference, and occupy the place that belongs to each of the actors, because depending on your mental guides, you will understand one attitude or the other as rational or irrational. But calling the other irrational because it doesn't converge with our way of understanding it, well ... it's dangerous and at the same time it's complacent, isn't it? Because it means you have no intention of improving the order that you haven't done well, right? I think that's what's being put on the table right now.

Question 5. We talked about this first player, who would be the Kremlin, Russia, Putin. If we are talking about the other side of the EU, do you think that the sanctions that have been imposed or that this strategy that we have adopted by the EU, is an effective strategy?

Man, it is a more medium- and long-term strategy that is not a military intervention and a will to invade a country. In other words, you are calculating that the sanctions will influence the Russian

economy, and therefore, and very much personified in which areas of power, right? and that you will therefore weaken its capacity for action and do harm as a result, as I told you, of a desire to override the Kremlin's interest in international stability and the rules of international order, right? But of course, you're playing with different plans. One plan is the immediate aftermath of the war, and the consequences on the ground, especially in humanitarian matters, another plan is the sanctions that you impose to change the attitude of the aggressor power. Oh, you have no guarantee that these sanctions will work to condition the decisions made. Two, if they do, they may not do so immediately to stop the war, but they may do so in a short time. And finally, the headline made you read this article.

Now, for me this is not the debate. The debate is, what do you do in the face of an intervention like the one in Russia? And here you have two options: either you decide to be part of the war and therefore, at NATO level, you decide to establish an air exclusion zone, for example, or you decide, beyond sending weapons to Ukraine, eh? you decide to get directly involved, but then we are talking about a war with Russia, nuclear power, and therefore with unpredictable consequences for international stability and for our existence, we are talking about a third world war, with this is what should never be decided and will never be decided. On the other hand, try to play with other types of instruments to condition the evolution of this war, but then you know that you are on the brink of inequality. And then you understand this war as a Russia / Ukraine war and not an international war, and then you act on the Russia / Ukraine war. But of course, I think you have your hands a little tied here because you don't want to enter the first stage, for logical reasons, I mean ... of course.

Now, your ability to condition depends a lot on what one of the parties you support with sending weapons but not fighting for it, can do in terms of resistance and in terms of ability to confront this aggression. And that's what we're seeing now. We are seeing resistance from Ukraine, Russia's difficulty in advancing its goals, now ... when will it end? Well ... I don't know.

Question 6. I also wanted to comment on the Paradox of Deterrence. In this sense, do you think that sanctions, if they had been imposed before the outbreak of the conflict, would have had this effect? that is, they could have avoided it ...?

Yes, but it is not deterrence. They would have worked if you hadn't become so dependent on Russia. That is, the politics of the Merkel years followed this logic that I told you earlier. The more we trade and incorporate Russia into the international order, and the more economic and trade ties we have with it, the more capacity we have to influence its decisions. And this translated into a policy of strengthening economic and trade ties with Russia, especially promoted by Germany. And to the point of almost absolute energy dependence on Russia. But an energy dependence that is only one of the components of the economic relationship, perhaps the strongest obviously, but only one of all the different ... say, range of economic and trade relations that we would have liked to establish. Because the idea was to bring Russia into order. Remember that for a while the G7 was the G8 by invitation of the G7 to Russia, although, in economic terms, Russia would not deserve to be in the G7 or the G8,

right? Because you don't have an economy ... well ... an economy like the Spanish one, let's say. Or the Italian, let's say. It is therefore an economy that is not one of the main in the world. But hey, there was a will to get closer. Of course, this desire for rapprochement was based on a belief, and that would normalize the attitude of the Kremlin. This has not happened. Then it's not so much the deterrence policy, because if you look at the deterrence policy it has worked to some extent. That is, Russia has not come into confrontation with NATO, it has not, for example, gone to attack Poland yet, for the time being, and hopefully that will not be the case. It has not gone ... that is, NATO deterrence has worked, because it has prevented an aggression from Russia. Russia has sought out Ukraine, which is not a member of NATO. Either he has gone, or he will go to look for Vltava, or he has gone to act in Georgia, or he has gone to act in the countries that he considers his area of vital interest, but they are not members of NATO. The paradox of deterrence has worked. What has not worked is that precisely because we have built so much dependence on Russia, especially energy, then, of course, we have put a lot of effort into the Kremlin's attitudes. And this is what we could analyse, if we have not really made a mistake in giving him so many letters, say, or so much capacity to condition our economies and our politics, in Russia, and that is what we should ask ourselves. I think deterrence has worked.

Question 7. I would like to know how you think the conflict will end. And it may be a bit of a question, but what do you think the possibilities are?

I can give you scenarios. I can't give you answers on how the conflict will end, because at the beginning I didn't know or see it coming, I thought it wouldn't happen with the magnitude we are seeing. And I think there are scenarios here, there are three main scenarios.

One scenario is the prolongation of time, that is, the resistance of Ukraine is high, and Russia's inability to crush militarily is low, and therefore this leads to a prolonged conflict, and therefore a disastrous scenario, which is that of a physically destroyed Ukraine, but also with a very high population exodus, with totally devastated institutions and incapable of governing the country, a country increasingly fractured because you have fully controlled territories of Russia, and totally poor territories for the effects of war. I mean, that's the scenario, I think it's likely the way we are now. Because Russia has not just advanced or taken Kiev, so to speak, let alone Lviv or the western part of Ukraine, and therefore this is failing, but at the same time, its presence, and its destruction in many parts. of the country is obvious, like Odessa, and so on ... and therefore this brings you to a state where the conflict lasts.

Another scenario is that which would be given by the physical or moral defeat of either party, and then let's say that the Ukrainians stop resisting, and therefore consider it worthwhile to negotiate, or that the Russians, I say the Russians I say the Kremlin, eh? or that the Kremlin sees that its strength is not enough, and therefore wants to negotiate as well. Then we come to a stage of negotiation, and this negotiation then ... because it should be seen that it is done with the guarantees that Ukraine is not

part of NATO, that it is done with the annexed territories, that it is done. Well, all this we enter a second scenario which is the stage of the negotiation. And these two are likely scenarios.

And the third scenario is that of defeat, that is, that one of the two confronted loses their goals. Or why Ukraine stops resisting, and therefore has to surrender to Russian occupation, a possible scenario, right? or because Russia fails to achieve its military goals and withdraws. To me, I think that's the least likely thing to do today. What will happen? I do not know.

Question 8. Speaking of a fourth possible scenario, do you think a Mutual Assured Destruction scenario would be a conflict?

No, because then here we go into the logic of World War II. I don't think Russia has wanted to come in so far, which is facing a confrontation with NATO, and so I think ... man, there could be accidents, eh? The other day they bombed twelve kilometres from the border with Poland. There may be accidents, and therefore an assault on a NATO member, but then we are entering into a confrontation between NATO and Russia, and here we are entering into a potentially confrontation with the use of nuclear weapons. I want to think that to this end, no one has any interest in getting there, for what it would mean. But hey, we've talked about it. And it has been said. And the danger that Russia does not start with Ukraine and that it wants to go further, especially the countries that are part of NATO and the EU, has been put on the table. That brings us to an international war scene, doesn't it? I don't think anyone has the will or the incentive to go in that direction. Now, I don't know. I do not know either.

Question 9. We don't really know. We hope so. If we focus now on the aftermath of the conflict, how do you think this game board will end? In other words, what does the EU think it means for European resilience and security?

Well, for the EU, let's play two things: consolidating the unprecedented progress being made since the pandemic with the crisis in Ukraine, and maybe even Brexit, which have been steps forward in integration. , and therefore the consolidation of these steps forward, gradually and not absolutely changing the architecture one hundred percent, but little by little taking steps, as is ... well, now with Ukraine we have seen, with the use of the peace facility, for purposes of war environment, the discussion of armaments, the discussion that began to have in Versailles on this common fund for the economic consequences of the war, which is in the image and likeness of the which was made in the pandemic by the Next Generation. I mean, all these are advances in European integration and therefore, on the one hand, the EU can gradually consolidate steps towards greater integration in areas that were thought very ... let's say very little ... that not they are mature enough to take these steps. Wider debt on a larger scale was with this Next Generation, as it would be with this recovery fund, EU countries traditionally neutral with respect to NATO such as Sweden and Finland, which demand the umbrella in terms of security, activation, or willingness to put into practice 42.7, which is the mutual defence clause within the EU treaty. Well, there are some very important steps that are being taken. One such scenario is the

consolidation of this. The other scenario is the longer look, in a more historical perspective, which is also European integration, which, despite these small steps from before, there are very strong strategic divisions between the EU member states, which make that relations with Russia, for example, are extremely complex, because Germany always wants to have a privileged economic relationship, because France wants to mediate and get closer to Putin and therefore dialogue and so on, because Hungary has already said it would block depending on what decisions At the level of the EU Council, which has to do with a major confrontation with Russia, such as a new package of sanctions to cut off Russian gas in Europe, Hungary has already said it would oppose it. Therefore, it is possible that when the intensity of the conflict decreases, the old divisions between Europeans with respect to Russia will resurface. And the two scenarios are ... these two paths will probably coexist, eh?

Question 10. And if we talk about Russia now and start drawing this new world order that we are seeing, what do you think would be the consequences for Russia? In other words, will Russia be able to increase this legitimacy within the world sphere?

Well, I think that Russia is very different from China. That is, China does want stability in this order and conditioning and participating in this order, but with the right dose of power. This China is not a breaker of order but wants to increase its share of power within that order, and therefore its foreign policy is neither condemned nor supported by aggression. It upholds the principles of territorial integrity and non-interference and the sovereignty of states. Therefore, in this sense it is a power that preserves order. Russia is very different. Russia, from what we said at the beginning, has broken many of these principles of order, and therefore China sees with some reluctance, some respect, this position of Russia. And therefore, they agree on the need to revise the international order that they consider obsolete, and that they consider that it must adapt to a new international reality, which is its preponderance, but they have very different ways of modifying this order. Destructive belligerent Russia, China more preserving and more exploiting or conditioning of this order, right? And so, to a large extent I think it's false when we say that here is a new cold war, because the positions within these two blocs, the authoritarian bloc if you will, and the bloc of Western democracies on the other hand, if you start looking at the details within these two blocks, the positions are very different. As they were with the United States during Trump, who was also not clearly alienated from the EU. If you look at the other side of this confrontation between old and new powers.

Question 11. It is curious because I had a question that referred precisely to this point of the Cold War, because many comparisons have been heard lately and many people equate the two conflicts.

I think they are not comparable for, one for that I am telling you now, but also for another issue, and is that the Cold War were two economic systems, political, relationship with neighbours, almost impervious one with the other. The connections between these two systems, that is, were two almost

autarkic systems with respect to each other. Sure, I don't know ... have you seen the Netflix movie about the spy of an American undercover spy? The only contacts that were almost at the level of great superpowers were the spies crossed between the two sides. But their economies operated in parallel, their backyards say, and the impact on other states operated in parallel, political systems were absolutely divergent, cultural production and the production of values were absolutely different. That is, they lived almost behind each other. Not now. China and the United States are absolutely integrated, at the technological level, at the level of global value chains, at the level of imports and exports, at the level of citizen contacts. Chinese students and American universities, at the level of shared cultural elements at the level of China Towns in New York and of Westernism at most in China, the system of Chinese fortunes is comparable to that of American fortunes. I mean, there are great interconnections. So these interconnections of interdependence between the great powers make me think that we can't talk about a new cold war, drawing a parallel with the old cold war, if you will.

Question 12. Following the line I mentioned earlier, from China and Russia, do you think that Moscow and Beijing are now aligned?

Well, I insist, they are aligned, say, because they consider that the international order of post-World War II and throughout the Cold War, has been started in, and, moreover, used for the benefit of one of the parties. And they consider that the West has benefited from this order much more than they have, and that they have been relegated to a second level, or a second order, with respect to the Western powers. And so, bottom line is that we're really looking forward to it. Sure, how is this new order generated? That's what we don't know. That is, right now we are at a time when the institutions, the rules, the values of the post-World War II order are being questioned. But we are not at the moment when the new institutions, new values and new norms of the future international order are created. And so, we are at this juncture between the previous ones, many countries do not consider them sufficiently legitimate or inclusive of the international reality, but there is also no alternative order in which these new powers are represented. The big question of the moment is, what are we going to do? Will we reform the existing order to make it more inclusive, participatory, and legitimate in the eyes of the new powers? And so, we are in a process of international revision and reorganization, or are we in a moment of disruption of this international order and creation of a new one? Of course, in this impasse in which we are, it is a time when there are conflicts like the one in Ukraine that exist, because it is on the part of Russia that wants to revise this order in the most radical way possible, and it violates the principles of this existing international order. But of course, this gives us a perspective on the creation of an order based on spheres of influence, and on the non-existence of states, but on the ability to use force for territorial invasion. This is something we saw in World War II, and World War I. Nor is it a very appetizing order for which sectors, China first.

Therefore, we are in this moment of transformation of order. Now, we have no idea what the new order will look like. And in this moment of stalemate, we have a greater international conflict, we

are seeing it. We are seeing it in Ukraine, and we would see it in Taiwan if it happened, or ... Sure, what will they tell you? No, this conflict in the international order has been going on for many years. You invaded Afghanistan, you invaded Iraq, you acted in Libya, above or, say, in excess of the mandate of the UN Security Council. Therefore, these violations of the order, in the eyes of China, in the eyes of India, in the eyes of Russia, in the eyes of Turkey, the West, have already been committed before. Therefore, I believe that we must also consider these visions that tell us, no, it is that you have also done and undone as you wanted. The issue is whether Russia or China, China not so much, but Russia above all, justifies the current action based on what the West has done wrong, man, colloquially lost in the river. Because then we are entering a period of total instability, right? Of course, this is something we should want to avoid. The question is, how do we do it? Reform the existing order? Creating a new one? And how would this be created again? Well, here we are, and we're not getting out of here, huh? At the same time, we have very important warning signs that there are a number of global common goods that we need to preserve. Climate crises, pandemics, disruptions to international trade and the normal work of securities, cyber-attacks, and transnational threats. There are a number of global transnational elements that affect us all, believe one order or believe the other, and so how do we respond? I do not know.

Question 13. And within this impasse, what role do you think the EU plays?

The EU has to decide whether it wants to be the only power to regulate and condition the rules of the game, write the rules of the game for others to adapt, or also equip itself with the necessary capabilities to condition this order. And capabilities mean real power. Do you want to be a technological powerhouse, yes or no? If it wants to be, or just want to be a technological regulator at the technological level? If you want to be a technological power, you have to have top-level companies, you have to have innovation, you have to have technological capital. If you only want to regulate, then only regulatory power. I believe that the EU is in this directive and right now the whole discourse on European sovereignty is aimed at equipping itself with the capacity to condition this order. But hey, this is a desideratum, still. The same in foreign policy, in defence, ... do you want or not to depend on the United States? Do you want to equip yourself with self-defence?

Question 14. The next question is, do you think that the EU is followed by the United States, or do we have room for manoeuvre?

Well, I think what Ukraine is showing us is that the debates about European sovereignty, strategic autonomy, and all that, are not conceptual debates anymore, but are based on a very clear reality, and that is whether the United States and Europe wants to condition or slow down the action of these revisionist powers that we said before, they must have complementary weapons. And so, the debate is based after Ukraine, much more on the complementarity between the EU and NATO than the replacement of the EU by NATO, sorry, NATO by the EU. We are not talking about giving Europe an

army, but we should be talking about how the European contribution to security and defence complements NATO, and therefore how between NATO and the EU they are a power that can counteract the other powers. That already does. If she was involved in the war in Ukraine, NATO's military superiority was obviously extraordinary compared to Russia's. But we have already said that we did not want to put it, for logical reasons. So, what we are talking about is not rivalry between the EU and NATO, we are talking about complementarities, above all. Now, getting it is not easy, because there are countries that are traditionally reluctant to NATO, such as France, there are countries that are one hundred percent successive to NATO, such as the countries of Central and Eastern Europe., the Baltics. We Europeans also have very different ways of conceiving the EU-NATO relationship between us.

Question 15. And to end the last question, it may be a bit abstract, but I will do it as I have it written: who do you think wants the EU to be big?

What does he want to be or what will he be forced to be? I think the question is this. In other words, if we have to talk about the abstract of what the EU wants to be, we will probably be entering into a debate, say ... philosophical, normative, ideological ..., where there will be many positions, and where there will be that the United States of Europe will want, and there will be those that will want the preservation of the nation-states within Europe. And this is a debate that we may have been building around for many years of European construction. Or if we have a European demo in which European identities will weigh more heavily than national identities. I think all these are very interesting debates, but little taken. That's why I tell you, they'll force you to be. Well, I think Ukraine is forcing an action like the one the EU is taking right now. And why? Because all the international conditions will push it here. What is said of geopolitical Europe may be created out of necessity, not out of design, not out of idea, not out of political will alone, but out of an urgent need for this transformation of the international order. And of the action of the other powers regarding ... of course, when you are the protagonist, you can spend a lot of time debating the sex of the angels, because you know that, uh, your security is guaranteed by the United States, and two, you are an economic power like no other.

When your security, the United States has been telling you for a long time that you must take care of it, and there are other powers, such as Russia invading or trying to invade Ukraine, the debate becomes much more physical. much more noticeable. And at the same time, when you see those international threats condition you like any other, as with the pandemic, you must act. That is, action arises out of a response to needs, and that is what I think we need to ask ourselves, whether Europe will be able to react powerfully, solidly, to these international crises. And perhaps this is when what Europe wants to will be built, not because we have agreed among ourselves, but because of the strength of things. And I think that has changed a lot, that is, the international crises are already being felt daily, on the electricity bill all citizens are already seeing the effects of the war in Ukraine, or the disruption depending on when Evergrande gets stuck in the Suez Canal. I mean, you see the international

determinants of local domestic politics, let's just say whatever you want. This I think will increase. Wow let's not get out of one crisis let's get into another. We thought that after the pandemic we would have a moment of relaxation ... well no. We are already with Ukraine. And that means, very turbulent times in this sense, which force the institutions, where they do not have preconceived ideas, or where they do not have sufficiently solid and created and articulated institutions, to react. And that's what we're seeing now. What will last, we'll see.

Question 16. I take this opportunity to ask you one last question that comes to mind, do you think that this action / reaction is a positive thing, do you think that we can take advantage of it and take a chance?

This always happens, politics reacts to things. I mean ... and that doesn't have to go very far. In our city, the things that work are not touched, and when they don't work, they start to be touched, and action is taken. Politics is always reactive, necessarily. Especially when we spend a lot of time with very complex debates, and when the concerns of the citizens go in another direction. That is, when you need politics to give you an answer to what worries you, that's when politics moves. And I think that's what's happening now, too. Because today, all the European countries that had opposed an issue, which Spain had been advocating for a long time, such as leaving the system of fixing energy prices on the basis of the highest energy and that this condition the price of the electricity bill, this decoupling that has been demanded for a long time, there were many countries that did not see it clearly. Well now it is being debated. When? When you have the price of light for the clouds. So, this forces you to react. And politics is reactivating. Politics is also ideology, politics is also the construction of the framework, it is also a debate, it is also participation, politics is a lot, but it is also a reaction. And now we are seeing a policy that has to react to these external pressures that come its way. And it's natural. Thank you for this, otherwise we would be orphaned by instruments.

Appendix I

Speech of Salvador Illa in the Barcelona Gaudí Regional Selection Conference of the European Youth Parliament Spain

Note I. Salvador Illa is the Leader of the Opposition and Former Minister of Health from the Catalan Socialist Party.

Note II. I was a Head Organizer of the Barcelona “Gaudí” Regional Selection Conference of the European Youth Parliament Spain which occurred in Barcelona from Thursday 24th of February to Sunday 27th February. We invited Salvador Illa to the Opening Ceremony in the framework of the General Assembly that happened on Sunday 27th February from 9:00am to 10:30am in Cosmo Caixa, in Barcelona, and we asked him to talk about the challenges and opportunities that the current European Union faces.

The European Union is the only place on earth that combines different things. No other place on earth combines these three things. Firstly, is economic growth. Here, in Europe, we have economic growth. We produce goods and services, and we generate wealth for our citizens in a market economy system, not in another system such as in North Korea or in Cuba. Here we generate economic growth. This happens also in China, in Asia, this happens also in the United States, so this is not the difference between Europe and China or the States. Second thing, we have economic systems based on freedom. Here we have democracies, people elect their governments, they improve our political system, this may improve better standards of transparency. Political systems based on freedom, this is not the case in China, or other Asian States. However, it is the case in the United States. The third thing is the welfare state. The wealth we produce we have decided to redistribute it among our citizens in a welfare state. This provides us free health systems, free education systems and policy retirements in case it is necessary. This is not the case in States, this is not the case in South America, this is not the case in Africa, nor in China. There, people need to save money for the education of the children.

The only place in the world that combines economic growth, political democracies and the welfare state is Europe, and this is a huge thing. We should value this. For example, let's take the pandemic. Together, we were capable to face the pandemic, and vaccinate million citizens, they were capable to elect between different types of vaccines. Another important part of the pandemic was the European Generation Funds. A European response in a very difficult moment. We should value this because it relies on what we have achieved in Europe. This is a historical matter of discussion and illustrate of what we have achieved together from the aftermath of the World War two. And, sometimes, we focus too much on critics, on stressing what it doesn't work, and I think that sometimes we don't value what we have, and we start unnecessary discussions. I think that we should not take for granted that all we have achieved will last forever, we should defend what we have. One of the most prominent Catalan figures today is a man born in *Lleida*, in *la Pobla de Segur*: Josep Borrell. Is currently the High Representative of the European Commission. He delivers at the request of the European Council a

global policy, a strategy of what Europe needs of the following years. He pointed to some big issues, he wants some big needs confronting Europe, that may put in risk what we have attained. First one was technology, we are losing technology battle against the United States and against China. We should prepare of the next round of technological advance. Here we have good technological people, here we have good engineers, here we have good companies, it is just a matter of coordinating the forces and preparing for the next technology war. Another issue that Josep Borrell needs to address is demography. We are an old society, four hundred and forty million people. We need immigration, and everybody knows that immigration provokes in our current society. So, we need to address this. People thought mobile phones see how well we live here, and they want to come, some this is some things that we should address. Another issue that we need to address is the strategical turnover: how we want to defend ourselves from Cibber attacks, from people who don't share our values, from other fields. So, how will we really involve ourselves in promoting wealth, our way of life, our democracy. What amount of money of our public budget are we going to put on our strategical moves?

These past weeks, we have seen how Russia has invaded Ukraine. Russia doesn't share the values that we have in Europe and has decided to invade a sovereign state which is Ukraine. This is a big reminder of that we should be ready to defend of values, stay together. Also, this signals our risks. Each country should be proud of the language, of the country... and this is compatible of being together with other nations. We should promote federalism over nationalism since nationalism if it does not address in the proper way could also be a risk for Europe. So, we have attained in Europe big things: economic growth, political freedom, welfare state. But it is not for sure that we can take it for granted, and we should be prepared to keep this and to defend.

Let me finish, there was a thinker, in the fifth century before Christ who lived in the best place of democracy and who is said to be the father of the history, whose name is Thucydides, and who is known for many books he had written, one of them I like the most: History of the Peloponnese war. It describes the war between Sparta and Athens, in the classical Greece. And, in this book, Thucydides gives a definition of democracy which is not the best known, and he attributes this definition to one of the rules of the classical Greece which is Pericles. He defines democracy as a political system that recognizes that not everybody is able to run a country, or a city. Not everybody, but everybody has the capacity of evaluating the one who runs the country. So, this the best definition of democracy that I know.

All in all, you, being here, attending this Regional Session, for me is a sign that you all show an interest of being part of this democracy, and for being part of the change. And therefore, I would like to congratulate you for being here today.

Appendix J

Notes taken during the Seminar organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union, and Cooperation, with the collaboration of Casa Asia and CIDOB and the support of La Caixa

Foundation: “Europa y España ante el Infopacífico”.

Note I. On 18 March, at 10:30 a.m., Palau Macaya was the venue for the round table "Europe and the new strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific", organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union, and Cooperation, with the collaboration of Casa Asia and CIDOB and the support of the La Caixa Foundation, which aim was to address the major strategic issues in the region.

Note II. The Seminar was conducted in Spanish, but it was translated to English for the purpose of this Thesis, it does not claim to be an exhaustive translation. It should be noted that the translation may differ from reality given the nuances of language.

Appendix J1

Introductory Speech of José Manuel Albares

Note I. José Manuel Albares is a Spanish diplomat and Minister of Foreign Affairs, European Union, and Cooperation of the Government of Spain from July 12, 2021.

In the 21st century no actor can aspire to be a global player without being present in the Indo-Pacific. The EU aspires to be present in the Indo-Pacific. The Strategic Compass is a key document that sets out the EU's voice in every region of the world. It will be approved at the NATO summit in Madrid in June. In this region, China's presence as a global actor makes the Indo-Pacific an area susceptible to the emergence of new balances. In the context of this adaptation, the EU and NATO must redefine their opportunities because they must have reliable partners in this part of the world, and links and instruments must be defined. We share objectives, but also values and principles, which is fundamental. In addition, we share challenges: demographics, transition, security challenges, of course. In a world in which geopolitics increasingly intersects with geo-economics, the Indo-Pacific is a key partner. These are the most intense links. The EU should and can strengthen its trade policy that leads to development and prosperity for both regions. The richness of the relationship means that the EU's strategy for this region should be open and inclusive towards the region. Open to any country that wants to work with us. ASEAN has built a partnership that contributes to peace in the region, partners play a key role. Japan has a vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific, as a guarantor of an international order of predictable rules. Korea has FTAs with the EU. As far as China is concerned, the EU designed in 2019 a vision that speaks of a country that is a partner, a competitor, and a rival. There is room to foster collaboration. China is not only a source of growing opportunity, but also of challenges. It is a power with a presence in strategic areas for the EU. The EU-China summit on 1 April is an opportunity to further define and defend the key strategy. In this EU-Ukraine aggression, it is important for China to

play the role of a great power in order to restore peace. Afghanistan and Myanmar are also crises in which China can play a stabilising role.

Value of the EU as a global actor to have its own external action in the Indo-Pacific. It is part of the EU's strategic autonomy. We in the MS have to decide for ourselves what we have to represent, how we want to relate to each region of the world. Once this is done, we must decide by what means. The road to the EU Council Presidency in the second half of next year will be a deep reflection on how we want to relate to the different regions. Global challenges are everywhere on the planet. We must end the war together and recover from the pandemic. We cannot do it alone.

Appendix J2

Round table Notes.

Note I. The welcoming remarks were given by Antonio Vila. The participants of the round table were the followings: Andrew Small, David van Wee, Gabriele Visentin, and the moderator was Áurea Moltó.

Note I. Antonio Vila is the General Director of the Fundació La Caixa.

Note II. Áurea Moltó is the Director of the magazine Política Exterior.

Note III. James Appathurai is the Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy, NATO.

Note IV. Gabriele Visentin is the Ambassador-at-Large for the Indo-Pacific Special Mission of the European Union.

Note V. Andrew Small is the Senior Research Fellow on Transatlantic Affairs in the Asia Program of the German Marshall Fund (GMF),

Antonio Vila: This war is none other than Europe's third civil war. The first was the European war from 1914 to 1919. The second from 1939 to 1945, and this is the third. The first two, which some call "The Second Thirty Years' War" was a suicide for Europe. If you will allow me to say what this war is in ordinary terms, it is the final nail in the coffin. Russia, after this war, can in no way aspire to a leading role in the World Organisation. And Europe, which has tried with economic sanctions, etc., and it remains to be seen whether this, contrary to general opinion, is absolutely sufficient, will be reduced to a possibly ancillary relationship with the USA, unless the spirit that gave life to the European project is truly recovered, which is none other than that of federalisation, which must entail a unitary foreign policy and a unitary intervention force.

Gabriele Visentin: What is happening at the borders of the EU is totally unacceptable. The measure of the EU has been strong. What happens in Ukraine bears loud and affects every other region in the world.

There are important consequences for the whole of the world. As the EU is a geopolitical power, we must project ourselves in every theatre of the world. On the Indo Pacific strategy is our policy as well, which explains the fact that the Indo Pacific strategy of the EU is the result of the reflection thought by the EU MS: France, Germany, and Netherlands. They rethinks the strategy in the Indo Pacific, and this came to the table. The strategy we all refer is a communication that was published in September.

The EU is looking at the Indo Pacific with new eyes and considering it as essentially. The attention of the EU is on the Indo Pacific. The EU is a recent actor in the region. How important the free access to the Indo Pacific is. Within 10 years, around 10 million people will exit poverty in the Indo Pacific. Our action there is not only economic or defence oriented but is also environment and climate change oriented. In the communication of high commission and Mr. PESCO we have a chapter that talks about defence, and cooperation with NATO. The EU does not have an army, navy neither an air force. In Indo Pacific strategy we have a very important chapter on defence, and we highlight the importance of the strategic strategy for the region. Coordinated maritime presence in the Indian ocean – people can decide to share the data collected and this is already agreed for the Mediterranean, but for the time being it is only present in the Indian Ocean. The presence of the defence and the security chapter gives strength: cooperate whenever possible, but to protect whenever necessary. The Ukrainian war has completely redefined the EU geopolitical role: sanctions, purchase, and delivery of weapons... it is the first time ever that this happens. China's role is paramount. The Chinese role should be seen as an opportunity. The EU engagement is three-partied: partner (COP26 is an example), competitor, rival. EU has not hesitated to sanction. We should ask China to extend its role and it can be instrumented. The major partners in the region followed on imposing sanctions: Australia... Singapore also, and it was the first time that it did not take a neutral role. New Zealand also followed on imposing sanctions. So, the answer for the region is that we evaluated this as positive. India: abstention. This was not a surprise. It was not welcomed, but India's weapons system relies 90% on Russian's supplies. India is part of quote, which will facilitate our further engagement with India. This will boost further engagement with cooperation with India. USA: we have established consultations. The second round will be placed in Brussels at the end of April. Not just comparing notes but also taking further paths on cooperation. And the paths we are taking on the path of connectivity.

James Appathurai: Spanish is playing a key role in NATO right now, and the questions that we are discussing here today will be widely debated in NATO in the summit in Madrid this summer. What has been our policy and why? What has changed? In the pre-Ukraine crisis, the underlined strategic assumptions were that until 3 years ago NATO had 0 strategic policy for this zone. The message was: we are not going there, and they are not coming here. But the development has changed the stage. China activities were affecting our security. NATO needed to have 3 strategic assumptions:

1. China's influence with regards to Europe Atlantic area was quite limited. Because it did not suppose a military adversary, but of course there were concerns, considering that China is not present in any military...
2. China's relationship with Russia had limits and was on a case-by-case basis. We saw the trends and the development. There were limit to Chinese and Russian political cooperation.
3. Growing but manageable Chinese influence in strategic competition: setting on standard son international. What are standards when it comes to Internet freedom? What are the technical standards on which our technologies will be based, which will give advantage to China and Chinese companies? And, of course, all the values which relate to that. And China is fighting those fights in international bodies, and with its allies. We came to recognize that have to become more organized as democratic countries, including with our Asian Pacific partners, to ensure that our values and standards on which the technologies are based, we need to be organized in order to defend those in all the international bodies.

So, our policy until with regards to China were *Challenges and Opportunities*. When it comes to the challenges: investment in blue water navies, growing investment in basis overseas using belt and road, so military development is spread. When it comes to the opportunities: NATO has a narrow ambit and narrow parameters, but we do believe that climate is an interesting area. NATO will announce a new dimension on environment policy. And last, arms control. We believe that China needs to also participate to arms control, which is to our control and their control. Strategic Concept. Those are my own visions because we haven't discussed this yet.

1. China is now actively enabling a deep biggest military crisis since WW2. It is enabling by amplifying Russian lies, and it is reported to have been asked by Russia to provide military support... so there are real concerns thre.so this is not now an indirect security threat. It is an enable of a war in limit. China and Russia have said that there are no limits to their partnerships. And this is huge because Russia is the biggest threat to world.
2. China and Russia are the two major autocracies in the world, and they are now having a partnership. This is huge. China is going to back Russia, and the other way around. They will align on their perspective on the West, and we can see this starting to happen. But looking at the costs of this new approach: China market is substantially down, this is because companies start to question the reliability of investment in China, they also see the west re-shoring because it can overline. So, we need to make sure to outline the challenges for China to outtake this decision, which of course is up to them.
3. We have the democracies of the world: UE, USA, NATO. NATO will be glad to partnership with into pacific in this way.

Appendix K

Borrell i Fontelles, J. (2022, March 2nd). Speech in the European Parliament by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy [Conference presentation], Brussels, Belgium.

Dear Members of the European Parliament,

I will try to share with you my reflections on the meaning of the tragic events we are living through and the tentative lessons we can draw from them, especially for the Common Security and Defence Policy, which I have the honour to try to develop and which remains an intergovernmental policy. A policy that remains in the hands of the Member States, but which cannot be effectively implemented without the strong cooperation of the Commission's competences. I believe that this is the moment when geopolitical Europe is being born.

This is the birth certificate of geopolitical Europe. The moment when we become aware of the challenge we are facing. The moment when Europe must face up to its responsibilities. The moment when we realize that, for the first time since the end of World War II, one country is invading another and that country has nuclear weapons, which increases its capacity to intimidate. It makes me sick to think of the historical analogy with the events of the beginning of World War II. But it is the return of tragedy, which Europe is facing today. The return of tragedy, far from frightening us, should galvanize us.

First, it dispels the idea that the European project had lost its momentum because the horizon of the war had faded. Unfortunately, this is not the case. It reminds us of that evil, tragedy and war never fade away. And it is about the relationship with war, with the use of force, with violence, which we have been discussing for years, whether Europe can counter it. That is why in recent years we have talked more than in the past about defence issues and have started to establish joint military programs. That is why the European Parliament itself has voted to create this European Defence Fund, and the Member States have created this European Peace Fund which we are now mobilizing to provide arms to Ukraine.

The European Council, in the coming weeks, will adopt the Strategic Compass. And with Russia's invasion of Ukraine, we must broaden our thinking, adjust our means, and anticipate our responses. Because one of the lessons we have had to learn with the invasion of Ukraine is that, more than ever, Europe must think strategically about itself, its environment, and the world. It is no longer a luxury; it is a necessity. Europe must broaden its thinking on security issues, and the European Parliament has played an important role in this regard. We must reflect on the instrument of coercion, retaliation, and counterattack against reckless adversaries, because the only thing to understand is that to make peace you must be two, but to make war it is enough to be one. This is exactly what Putin is telling us. And that is why we must greatly increase our deterrence capability. We must increase our deterrence capability to avoid war. And it's clear that our deterrence has not been strong enough to stop Putin's aggression. And since this aggression began, we have reacted in recent days in a way that Putin

did not expect. And we are showing him that we will never sacrifice our freedom, and the freedom of others, on the altar of our well-being and prosperity.

As Speaker of this Parliament in 2007, I had the opportunity to tell Putin, face to face, after the murder of a journalist, Anna Politkovskaya: "We will not trade human rights for your gas." And this is the time to repeat it to him, and to act accordingly. We are not going to share; we are not going to abandon the defence of human rights and freedom because we are dependent on Russia. And we must start working quickly, as the Commission has proposed, to cancel this dependence.

Last Saturday, after having had another Foreign Affairs Council and attending the debate in the Council of the European Union, I was talking to you, President Michel, and you said to me, "¿Are we doing everything we can? Is there more we can do? Is it enough? ¿Are we so powerless?" And you said to me, "Think, do, act. We need to put pressure on member states to take decisions on SWIFT and get Russia out of the financial system. Think about how we can arm Ukraine. Not country by country, one after the other in an uncoordinated way." And he encouraged me to go back and talk to the member states, and within a few hours we agreed to use this European Peace Fund to provide financial assistance and coordinate the

I would like to remind you that the European Peace Fund is not part of the budget you are voting on. It is another budget. It is an intergovernmental fund, managed by the Member States. Because we claim that we, the European Union, are a peacekeeping force and that we cannot provide weapons to anybody else. Yes, we can. Yes, we have. In the next budget, think about it. When you vote your next budget, use the budgetary capacity of this institution to put the means to deal with the next crisis and the next Russian aggression.

We are also working internationally to build a coalition to condemn Russia at the United Nations. Russia did not get a single vote in favour [in the Security Council]. Everyone was in favour of the resolution and there were some abstentions that are very significant.

There have been countries, traditionally allies of Russia, that have not voted in favour of it, they abstained. And now we must build an international coalition so that at the next UN General Assembly the whole world condemns the aggressor. No one can look the other way.

When a powerful aggressor unjustifiably attacks a much weaker neighbour, no one can invoke the peaceful resolution of conflicts. No one can put the assaulted and the aggressor on the same footing. And we will remember those who at this solemn moment are not at our side.

Yes, we have used our coercive capacity, the capacity to impose, not necessarily using weapons. When I say that Europe must be a hard power, people think only of military power. No, hard power is exercised in many other ways. The capacity to condition, the coercive capacity, the capacity to impose other behaviour on others is not only done with weapons. It is done as the Commission has proposed in an extraordinarily effective way, thank you Mrs. President [Ursula von der Leyen], and as you have promoted in the debates of the European Council, thank you, Mr. President [Charles Michel]. Taking measures like this, which look like paper, which certainly do not mobilize missiles, but which

have a far-reaching effect on the solvency of a country and prevent Russia from going to spend the money we pay for its gas to fuel the war.

This, I think, ladies and gentlemen, is the most important lesson we must draw from these tragic circumstances. We can no longer trust that appealing to the rule of law and developing trade relations will turn the world into a peaceful place where everyone will evolve towards representative democracy. The forces of evil, the forces that strive to continue using physical violence as a way of resolving conflicts, are still alive and in the face of them we must demonstrate a much more powerful, much more consistent, and much more united capacity for action than we have been able to do so far. We have done a lot and we have undoubtedly amazed the world and surprised Putin with a rapid and united reaction capacity. We must continue this path.

And this act, this parliamentary moment where you, with your applause, want to encourage the European institutions to continue the path we have learned, may be the moment when Europeans understand that the world in which they live is a dangerous world and to face it they need to strengthen their Union.

The pandemic opened the door to innovative action. The pandemic has pushed us down the path of becoming more united in the face of viruses. This tragic moment must push us to unite more to confront those human actions that also threaten the life, security, and prosperity of all.

Thank you very much.

Appendix L

Rationality in Game Theory

Cline's Model (1980) is used as a manner of addressing power in order to draw assumption about the rationality of the Putin troops' attack in March 2022 to the Ukrainian nation. Even if the Cline's method of constructing a power index has been discussed to be arbitrary and subjective, neither scientific nor precise (Chang, 2004; Jablonsky, 1997), it helps us to get the following conclusions.

The mathematical formula to address power proposed by Cline is $Pp = (C + E + M) \times (S + W)$, where: Pp = Perceived power, C = Critical mass: population and territory, E = Economic capability, M = Military capability, S = Strategic purpose, and W = Will pursue national strategy. It is important to note that in the formula, Pp is a product of tangible and intangible assets, which demonstrates the added utility that the country's military strategy, and the purpose of national leaders will give to the *perceived power* result. Therefore, states using the *military capability* (M) without *strategic purpose* (S) or, which is the same, *rationality* would have null perceived power. However, this is not the case, as the popular opinion showed during the Russian regimes' attack to Ukrainian territory and confirmed in the interviews conducted for the aim of this paper.

This phenomenon can be explained by *Minimax theorem* (see Figure H1). The Russian leader considered that when entering the Ukrainian territory, the risks that could arise from the inner country military, and the sanctions imposed by Western countries, were negligible, and the gains high. Also, his lecture of the Ukrainian country's *perceived power* neglected elements such as military capabilities and misevaluated the *country's will to pursue national strategy* (W). What is more, he considered that the European Union and the United States had no intention to respond military to the conflict, which made his risk perception decline. Therefore, the leader's analysis of the situation, contrary to be placed at the *Maximax* quadrant, came to rest at the *Maximin* approach.


All in all, we consider that the strategic purpose of the Russians' troops differs from others in the risk perception. For the purpose of this paper, the Russian troops attack is considered perfectly rational and, therefore, enables us to develop Game Theory.

Figure L1
Minimax theorem by Von Neumann, J. (1928)

		Risk	
		High (MAX)	Low (MIN)
Gain	High (MAX)	1 MAXIMAX	2 MAXIMIN
	Low (MIN)	3 MINIMAX	4 MINIMIN

Appendix M

SWOT Spectrum. Tools of Soft Power and Hard Power in the EU, 2022 reality



(Zemen, F., 2015)

Note 1. Legend. In black, the tools corresponding to *soft power* mechanisms. In blue, the tools corresponding to *hard power* mechanisms.

Table M1
Legend of SWOT Spectrum Items


-
- 1 Able to export its governance framework and administrative agenda to potential candidate countries through the highly effective politics of conditionality and economic incentives. (Panebianco & Rossi, 2004)
 - 2 Powerful negotiation with one single voice in trade. (Conceição & Meuner, 2014)
 - 3 World's major trade power capable using trade as a political mechanism (Bradford, 2021).
 - 4 Diplomatic and democratic way to resolve conflict. (European Union, 2022).
 - 5 *Imposing economic sanctions. (European Commission, 2022)*
 - 6 Ambitious agenda of free trade agreements in the pipeline, bilaterally, regionally, and internationally in the WTO scope (European Commission, 2022).
 - 7 *Influential in monetary policy by handling the strong common currency. (European Union, 2019).*
 - 8 *Strategic autonomy for the control of rising-importance-regions, such as the Indo Pacific (see Appendix J).*
 - 9 Maintain the tools of power that are intrinsic of the Union (Own Source, 2022).
 - 10 Lack of enlargement effectiveness towards regions where it cannot offer the prospect of membership. (Real Instituto Elcano, 2009).
 - 11 Weak voice since Mr. PESC lacks awareness internationally (see Appendix D).
 - 12 Paradox of the phone: Complex multi-level structure and its wide variety of relevant decision-makers. (Peterson & Smith, 2008).
 - 13 Capability-expectations-gap (Hill, 1993; del Cerro, 2018).
 - 14 *Special nature of CFSP concerning unanimity (McCormick, 2007).*
 - 15 Raise of major players competition, the USA and China (Own source, 2021).
 - 16 Rise of Eurosceptic and populists' political parties and anti-Europeans movement (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2020), which might be an inconvenience when speaking with one single voice and gaining influence in a global sphere as seen a fragmented Union.
 - 17 *CFSP has been only used reactively (see Appendix H).*
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Note II. Own source.

Appendix N


Game Theory Extensive-Form Games

Figure N1
Payoffs to Russia and European Union in Sequential-Move Game



Note. Own source.


Figure N2
Payoffs to Russia and European Union in Sequential-Move Game with Threat



Note. Own source.

Note II. The EU negative utility when it comes to the economic sanctions acquaints for the negative consequences that can revert to the European Union. Mainly, EU's oil and gas dependence from Russia, which it is assumed to cause energy shortage due to the unilateral Russian decision to shut off supply of the Nord Stream II and therefore, acquaint for a significant increase in energy prices in the EU.

Figure N3
Payoffs to Russia and European Union in Brinkmanship Scenario



Note. Own source.

Note II. Russia's movements are also dependent on Ukraine resistance and its capacity to confront the aggression, given that it is the country fighting the war. However, given the direct military equipment sent by the EU and the sanctions imposed, it is assumed that the Union can direct influence the war outcome.