

The European Union and Lethal Autonomous Weapons

Systems:

United in Diversity?

Esther Barbé¹ and Diego Badell²

Since 2012, a coalition of NGOs, under the name Campaign to Stop Killer Robots³ (CSKR) has been advocating for a hard law instrument banning Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). These weapons are systems that can decide to kill and act on the decision to kill without communicating with or requiring further instruction from humans. They are also known as human-out-of-the loop systems⁴. In terms of military research, it represents a milestone in the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and robotics by completely removing human control from the targeting process; it is this human control which comprises the fundamental norm on civilian immunity embodied in

¹ Esther Barbé wishes to acknowledge the Observatory of European Foreign Policy-SGR, funded by the Agency for Management of University Research Grants (AGAUR) of the Catalan Government (Grant agreement: 2017-SGR-693).

² Diego Badell thanks the Spanish Ministry of Economy, Industry, and Competitiveness for funding (FPI, Grant number: BES-2017-079692).

³ Launched in 2012, the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots comprises a steering committee comprising NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Mines Action Canada, International Committee for Robot Arms Control, WILPF, Article 36, PAX, Association for Aid and Relief Japan, Novel Women's Initiative, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, and Seguridad Humana en Latinoamérica y el Caribe. It is coordinated by Mary Wareham from Human Rights Watch.

⁴ So far, autonomy of weapon systems is limited to keeping a human in the loop (semi-autonomous), or a human on the loop (supervised autonomous). In human-in-the-loop systems, the machine waits for a human operator to take action before carrying on. Similarly, in human-on-the-loop systems, a human operator supervises the machine's behaviour and, if necessary, intervenes to stop it (Scharre 2018, p.60-2).

International Humanitarian Law (IHL) conventions. In this vein, the United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Execution, Christof Heyns officially stressed at the Human Rights Council (HRC) in 2013 the need to address such autonomous systems. Acknowledging the risks that LAWS might pose to international security, a year later the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (UNCCW) initiated deliberations on the matter.

This chapter analyses how the EU and its Member States deal with deliberation on LAWS held at the UN level, and the political advancements at the intra-EU level. We argue that at the UN level, Member States and the EU delegation in Geneva are holding deliberations mostly focused on the organizing principle of human control. At the UN level, contestation has led Germany and France together with the EU delegation to work on a soft law instrument aiming to solve the disagreement over the standards of appropriateness of human control. At the intra-EU level, disagreements are palpable among Member States and EU institutions in relation to the articulation of human control. This varies from the status quo supported by the United Kingdom (UK) clashing with European Parliament and Austrian support for a full prohibition of LAWS to secure human control, to the soft law instrument endorsed by Germany, France and the EU delegation.

This chapter applies a norm contestation framework (Wiener, 2014) in the early stage of the norm life-cycle, the emergent stage (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). In this stage, contestation takes the form of ideational contestation, which acts as a causal mechanism facilitating norm emergence (Wiener, 2014). The chapter, therefore, will focus on the process of norm emergence when actors produce assessments of the norm based on their identity and ideational factors (Ben-Josef Hirsch, 2014, p. 813). This case study focuses on two levels, the UN level and the EU level, between 2013 (when LAWS were addressed for the first time at the UN level) and 2019⁵. That is why our research

⁵ In 2019, the Group of Governmental Experts on LAWS scheduled two meetings, in March (25th-29th) and August (20th-21st). This cut-off day of this research was 26th April 2019.

question is two-fold: *How does contestation enhance deliberations on LAWS? Does contestation affect EU legitimacy as an actor in global governance?* To answer these questions, we collected data from primary sources (i.e. official documents and public statements)⁶, but as full transcripts of the debate are not available, we also resorted to session records⁷ provided by external actors.

The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: the next section outlines the process of contestation at the UN level. A third section studies the internal political debate within the EU vis-à-vis LAWS. The fourth section addresses the outcome of norm contestation regarding EU legitimacy as a global actor. Finally, the conclusion discusses the findings of this chapter and the avenues of LAWS.

Deliberating the emerging norm on LAWS

The HRC was the first forum to deal with LAWS. In an interactive dialogue⁸ held in 2013 at the HRC, the UN Special Rapporteur, Christof Heyns, presented a report assessing the

⁶ Official documents comprise the countries' and delegation's Working Papers for meetings as well as national strategies if released. Public statements refers to country, European Union and NGO opening statements and closing statements during the 2013 HRC meeting, the 2016-2015 Informal LAWS meetings, and the 2017-2019 UNCCW LAWS meetings.

⁷ The Reaching Critical Will is the disarmament programme of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom providing the session records from the debates at the UN on LAWS (Available at <http://reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/CCW>). In similar vein, the NGO PAX provides the European countries' views on LAWS (Available at <https://www.paxforpeace.nl/our-work/programmes/killer-robots>).

⁸ Interactive dialogue (ID) is one of the three main formats of debate in the HRC (General debate, Interactive dialogue, and Panels). The ID permits the exchange of views as well as questions and answers with special procedures (i.e. Special Rapporteurs, independent experts, or a working group established by the HRC). Before the session is held, the special procedure submits a report to be the object of discussion.

impact of drones, putting special emphasis on LAWS. The Heyns Report considered the deployment of autonomous weapons to 'entail not merely an upgrade of the kinds of weapons used, but also a change in the identity of those who use them. With the contemplation of lethal autonomous robotics, the distinction between weapons and warriors risks becoming blurred, as the former would take autonomous decisions about their own use' (Human Rights Council, 2013, p. 5-6). To recall the importance of keeping humans in the targeting cycle, the Heyns Report emphasized that while 'robots are especially effective at dealing with quantitative issues, they have limited abilities to make the qualitative assessments that are often called for when dealing with human life' (Human Rights Council, 2013, p. 10-1).

The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots (CSKR), seized the Heyns Report as an opportunity to set the issue on the agenda, and commenced advocating for a new norm banning the use of LAWS. It has been argued that without the path established by previous ban treaties and the experience campaigners had gained in humanitarian arms control and the networks they had established, the CSKR would not have been able to set the issue on the agenda (Petrova, 2018, p.652). In that sense, the CSKR arguments were similar to the ones used by the landmine campaign: the need for human control, and to keep decisions over life and death within human responsibility. Where they do differ from previous campaigns is in the way contestation is exercised. Although the norm contestation framework considers that norm entrepreneurs such as social movements and grassroots actors are prone to exert contention as the dominant mode of contestation (Wiener, 2014, p.2), the CSKR did not use this as a strategy in national campaigns until 2019. The CSKR mostly focused on persuading those delegations that might recognize the importance of the normative challenge in front of them.

Liberal-internationalism (Crocker, 2015) understands the diffusion of arms control norms (Müller, Fey, & Rauch, 2013) to be linear, where opposing actors will end up supporting the new norm. In our case study, the spread of arms control norms are far from being linear: LAWS are conceptualised as 'works in progress' bearing a considerable potential for contestation (Krook & True, 2010). During the 2013 HRC

interactive dialogue, France, together with the support of the EU delegation in Geneva, suggested moving the debate from the HRC to the UN disarmament forum, the UNCCW. Following Bueger (2017), this may count as an exercise of contention as France and the EU delegation rejected that LAWS should be dealt with in the human rights forum. The decision was made based on the complexity of the issue, both legally and technically (European Union, 2013). Reframing the debate in terms of security was an unusual move as previously the human rights framing has predominated in arms control negotiations. As the UNCCW follows a consensus decision-making process, deliberations are likely to end up in a deadlock situation. Nonetheless, the EU has longstanding experience in building up consensus at this forum and could bring together different preferences and cultural validations in order to converge towards a 'constitutive horizon' upon which to act (Wiener, 2014).

The UNCCW High Contracting Parties formalized the change of forum, as they agreed in 2014 on a four-day informal meeting of experts. The UNCCW is a regime created to be a flexible framework where specific norms can be added to the original treaty through a series of protocols, each of which addresses a particular subfield of a larger area of the regime (Gehring, 1994; Krasner, 1982; Müller, 2013). That is to say, the UNCCW takes interests into consideration, as countries can easily block negotiations if they are not and facilitates the shaping or expanding of norms as Protocols can be added over the years. Recognizing the particularity of the UNCCW to be a unique forum, the EU delegation felt this approach was more suitable as the forum could respond in 'a flexible way to future developments in the field of weapons technology' (European Union, 2015).

Moreover, the existence within the UNCCW of institutional instruments such as procedural mechanisms and the absence of hierarchy may encourage effective deliberations (Risse, 2000). Taking into account the successful contention exerted by France to move the issue to the multilateral forum of arms control, the country was appointed chair in the 2014 informal meeting. The debate was productive as different epistemic communities (e.g. military personnel, international law experts, academics,

researchers in robotics) shared their views regarding the risks, benefits and challenges posed by LAWS, which in turn provided national delegations with food for thought. In parallel, the CSKR side events paved the way to increase the number of countries joining the call to ban LAWS, growing to five like-minded countries by the end of the meeting⁹.

The initial debate revealed two elements that would constantly be present throughout the meetings: to what extent LAWS would be able to comply with international law, and what is the necessary degree of human control. No state has openly declared an interest in developing LAWS, and several countries have expressed concerns regarding the use of autonomous weapons inside and outside armed conflict. There was an awareness that resorting to LAWS could erode existing security norms as it would lower the threshold of the use of force.

The 2015 and 2016 UNCCW informal meetings chaired by Germany put a very strong focus on the protection of civilians, outlining the importance of the fundamental norm of civilian immunity. Delegations addressed the issue by assessing to what extent LAWS were able to comply with international law, as well as to what degree human control was required. All delegations declared that LAWS should comply with IHL as they referred to the traditional organizing principles of civilian immunity, such as the principle of distinction between civilians and combatants (codified in articles 48, 51.2 and 52.3 of the Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions), the proportionality of the attack (codified in articles 51.5, and 57 of the Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions), and the principle of precaution against the effect of attacks (codified in articles 58(c) of the Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions).

By that time, the scientific community in an open letter from AI and robotics researchers stated that technology had reached a point where the deployment of such systems was

⁹ In 2013, Pakistan was the first country to join the call for a norm banning LAWS. It was later joined by Ecuador, Egypt, the Holy See, and Cuba.

feasible and recommended a preventive ban to avoid having weapons beyond 'meaningful human control' (Future of Life Institute, 2015). In a similar vein, the norm enforcer of the fundamental norm on civilian immunity, the ICRC, sees human control as a key organizing principle to assure compliance with IHL (ICRC, 2016). So far, human control has been taken as an implicit organizing principle in the Convention on Cluster Munitions that prevents the stockpiling of cluster bombs, or in the Ottawa Treaty banning antipersonnel landmine (Human Rights Watch, 2016).

In that sense, national delegations started to devote their efforts to defining (meaningful) human control rather than defining autonomy (Kostopoulos, 2019). Yet, the two military powers France and the US cast their doubts regarding this framework. France considered the term "meaningful" to lack the precision and technical accuracy to guarantee that humans remain in the full life-cycle of any weapons system (Government of France, 2016). Likewise, the US delegation preferred to stick to their own notion of human control defined as the 'appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force' (U.S. Department of Defense, 2017, p. 2). To overcome this situation, Germany in its chairing report appeased advocates and critics of human control by referring to it as the 'appropriate human judgment and involvement' (United Nations, 2016b).

Along these lines, national delegations started to see the human-machine relationship as a reference point in the debate. The human-machine relationship was referenced with different concepts such as meaningful human control, human judgment, or human involvement, which in turn bears the potential of clashing meanings-in-use and policy change. In other words, human control was evolving through deliberations as a new organizing principle. One may argue that the fact that the organizing principle embodies a plurality of meanings and more than one interpretation prepares the ground for intersubjective disagreement (Jose, 2018, p. 28). But human control needs to be codified as an ambiguous organizing principle to retain the norm's flexibility as well as to allow its meaning to evolve with and to adapt to different weapon systems (Rosert, 2017). Furthermore, the definition of "autonomy" shares with "human control" the fact that it

is not a fixed point but a continuum of degrees. Autonomous weapons are not by default autonomous, but systems moving along this spectrum from a teleoperated system to a supervised system, and subsequently to an unsupervised system (Scharre, 2018). At this point of the debate, the emergence of a new organizing principle is conceptualised as the analytical space where normativity translating fundamental norms into standardized procedures becomes negotiable (Wiener, 2014, p. 37-9), which is essential to analyse how human control may shape or define existent normativity.

Moreover, deliberations seemed to have substantially advanced as in November 2016 the UNCCW High Contracting Parties adopted by consensus the establishment of a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE). The final informal meeting report considered that deliberations on emerging technologies in the area of LAWS, and more precisely human control, was one of the top priorities for the UNCCW (United Nations, 2016). Establishing an open-ended GGE is a customary practice of the UNCCW to address pressing issues, which means that the GGE is formalized once the object of discussion is deemed to be of particular importance for the UNCCW. Chaired by India, the GGE was called to 'explore and agree on possible recommendations on options related to emerging technologies in the area of LAWS, in the context and objectives and purposes of the Convention' (United Nations, 2016, p. 1), where the GGE is expected to build up the emerging organizing principle of human control.

On the GGE general debate, countries continued to focus on the importance of human control where they addressed the 'characteristics related to the human element in the use of force and its interface with machines as necessary for addressing accountability and responsibility' (United Nations 2018, p. 27). They further highlighted that 'humans must at all times remain accountable in accordance with applicable international law for decisions on the use of force' (United Nations 2018, p. 28). The GGE in both 2018 and 2019 showed how the fundamental norm of civilian immunity became less central than the organizing principle of human control. This move is consistent with the fact that validity claims of some norms change through the process of policymaking. The norm of human control was starting to move up the scale from being considered an organizing

principle to becoming a norm with wide-ranging moral impact (Wiener, 2017), as the meaning given to human control could provide a new set of standards of appropriateness for the arms control regime.

In turn, the 2018 report aimed to establish emerging commonalities with regard to LAWS. The document pointed out the existence of three groups of states weighting the emerging norm differently (United Nations 2018, p. 27). This is important, since divergent interpretations of the norm may (re)enact the normative structure, which in turn paves the way to a process of contestation (Wiener, 2009, p.176). As the next section will show, this results in norm contestation not over the validity or applicability of human control, but over the relative weight or position given to the norm on human control (Mills & Bloomfield, 2018; Smetana & Onderco, 2019). In other words, national delegations within the UNCCW are contesting the norm in accordance with the institutional procedures of the forum, which suggests that contestation is rather soft as it is encouraging effective deliberations. In this sense, the forum might address human control in three different standardized procedures and regulations: resorting to existing IHL, seeking a hard law instrument in the form of a treaty banning LAWS, or advancing through a soft law instrument (see Table 1).

TABLE 1 AROUND HERE

On the one hand, Australia, Israel, the US, the UK, South Korea, and the Russian Federation consider that existing IHL is sufficient to deal with LAWS. They argue that a moratorium or ban is too premature, or even unfounded and counterproductive. They claim that human control is secured in article 36 of Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions as it disposes that states are asked to verify whether LAWS would be prohibited by the Protocol or by any other rule of international law. In this vein, the Russian Federation affirmed that if deliberations take the form of a more formal debate planning to negotiate either hard law or soft law regulating human control in the targeting cycle, the country will withdraw from this same negotiation.

Table 1. Overview of the contestation on human control

	Status quo group	Like-minded countries	France and Germany coalition
Fundamental norm	Civilian immunity	Civilian immunity	Civilian immunity
Organizing principle	Principle of distinction, principle of proportionality, principle of precaution, principle of human control: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • US/UK: principle of human judgement in the targeting cycle 	Principle of distinction, principle of proportionality, principle of precaution, principle of human control: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meaningful human control in the killing stage 	Principle of distinction, principle of proportionality, principle of precaution, principle of human control: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • France: principle of responsible human command • Germany: principle of effective human control
Standardized procedures	Inaction (art 36. Protocol I Geneva Convention)	Hard law (banning treaty)	Soft law (enhancing art. 36. Protocol I Geneva Convention)

Source: own elaboration

On the other hand, the UN General Secretary, António Guterres – an engineer by training – officially included in his disarmament agenda the need to address LAWS. He declared these weapons to be defying the existent normative framework, this being ‘IHL and conventions’(United Nations Secretary-General, 2018c, 2018a). In this vein, he embraced the call for a norm banning LAWS (United Nations Secretary-General, 2018b). The coalition led by Austria, Brazil, and Chile welcomed this call, sustaining the principle of meaningful human control. To date, the coalition has gathered 28 like-minded countries¹⁰ willing to open negotiations on an international legally-binding agreement that guarantees human control by banning weapon systems that lack human control in the targeting process. Aware of the challenges lying ahead, the CSKR publicly stated that if the GGE is not able to produce a reasonable outcome, they will move the debate outside the UN standard arms control forum. In actual fact, like-minded countries successfully negotiated a final report which called the UNCCW ‘a’ forum, implying that the issue could also be addressed in other forums (United Nations, 2017, p. 8).

The polarization of the debate around these two clashing groups suggested that a deadlock situation would be likely. To avoid this, a third group of states under the auspices of France and Germany resorted to soft law to propose a political declaration in order to work on a lowest common denominator outcome (Abbot & Snidal, 2000). The EU delegation aligned itself with the Franco-German political declaration, where the document is seen at the UNCCW as a third way between those wanting a banning treaty and those supporting the status quo.

¹⁰ Pakistan, Ecuador, Egypt, the Holy See, Cuba, Ghana, Bolivia, State of Palestine, Zimbabwe, Algeria, Costa Rica, Mexico, Chile, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Argentina, Venezuela, Guatemala, Brazil, Iraq, Uganda, Austria, China, Djibouti, Colombia, El Salvador, and Morocco.

China is not seeking to ban LAWS development or production, only their use. President Xi Jinping in his speech at the 19th Congress of China’s Communist Party announced his intention to modernize the People’s Liberation Army in the realms of space, cyber, and artificial intelligence. Regarding the latter, he plans the creation of an equivalent to the US Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency.

In brief, the political declaration is a political non-binding measure recalling that international law and more concretely IHL is fully applicable to the case of LAWS, and emphasizing the importance of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. The document has also tried to come up with a working definition whereby LAWS are defined as fully autonomous lethal weapon systems, where human control is framed as an ambiguous organizing principle: the exercise of sufficient control. Related to standardized procedure, the group foresees a pragmatic deployment of the article 36 normative components where it seeks to ensure the transparency and accountability through national weapons reviews. Moreover, once the political declaration is adopted, the instrument might consider more sophisticated soft law measures such as a politically-binding measure in the form of a code of conduct as well as establishing a committee of experts within the UNCCW to inform of the technological developments related to LAWS (Political Declaration, 2017). All in all, the political declaration is seen 'as the third way' and has gained the support of 28 countries¹¹, among which we count both delegations preferring the status quo and delegations willing to ban autonomous weapons.

Contesting the norm on human control: a European insight

Since the EU is an international organization, contestation is likely to occur in the mode of deliberation (Wiener, 2014), where actors within the EU could discursively reconstruct the relative position of human control in the norm scale (Wiener, 2017). As a matter of fact, the EU deliberation on human control represents a space to establish the normative quality of human control as it is addressed 'through policymaking [...] or political processes' (Wiener, 2014, p. 37). Moreover, the debate on human control finds itself in the constituting stage, thus justification is likely to occur. In the following lines, we consider that justification may not only come from epistemic communities (Wiener,

¹¹ In 2018, 27 delegations at the UNCCW endorsed the political declaration: France, Germany, Belgium, Spain, Switzerland, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands Poland, Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Bulgaria, Sweden, Australia, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Morocco, Chile, Mozambique, Mexico, New Zealand, Austria, Slovenia, and the UK.

2014, p. 29), but can also be exerted by Member States and EU institutions alluding to various principles and norms to justify the relative weight or position given to human control (Bueger, 2017, p. 130). Indeed, Member States are divided between those endorsing the coalition to ban these weapons and those leading the political declaration. Similarly, at the EU level, institutional views on LAWS present clashing positions on how human control should be addressed, where the European Parliament is at the core of the debate.

To shed light on this political process, it is worth mapping out Member States' as well as institutions' positions regarding human control and their articulation into standards of appropriateness. Member States when adopting their respective position regarding the organizing principle on human control are not driven by factors such as the country's strategic culture or the presence/absence of a strong military industry. Rather, they are driven by the low barriers of entry to AI development, and the greater capacity that Member States will have to compete in the development of AI than they did in the creation of the complex military platforms (Horowitz, 2018).

On the one hand, France, together with the EU delegation, rejected that the debate on LAWS should be resolved in the forum of human rights, the HRC. During these negotiations, the French delegation in their statements proved to be willing to preserve the existent normative framework through some limited actions rather than more fundamental changes. Throughout the debate, France claimed that given the early stage of this technology, the making of a clear judgment about weapons compliance with international law is impossible, and thus opposes a preventive ban or moratorium (Government of France, 2015, 2016). Despite the fact that France considers that LAWS need to comply with IHL, the country started to work on securing a sufficient level of human control. During deliberation at the UNCCW, France has contested the wide-moral reach of human control, arguing that a military approach should prevail as they framed the principle of responsible human command (Government of France, 2018). France sees the political declaration as a final step where LAWS are a feasible initiative in the long-term (Government of France, 2018). For instance, the Ministry of Defence is

currently working on a national regulation advancing the role of AI in the military, where autonomous systems are not ruled out as long as human control is assured (Government of France, 2019).

On the other hand, Germany agrees on the need for change but differs on the exact scope and content of the emerging norm. Throughout the debate Germany developed a position closely resonating with the group advocating for legally-binding agreement banning the use of weapon systems that lack human control in the targeting process. To give an illustration, Germany stated in 2015 that legal weapon reviews as required by Article 36 would lead to the result of LAWS being illegal (Government of Germany, 2015). In a similar vein, the country stated in the 2018 General Assembly (UNGA) that it is open to ban LAWS (Government of Germany, 2018) as well as framing in civilian terms the organizing principle of human control by referring to the 'principle of effective human control' (Government of Germany, 2019). Yet, the country looks forward to working with France 'to promote measures less than a ban, and less than a legally binding instrument or a legally binding treaty.' (Delcker, 2019 quoting Wareham).

Unlike France, Germany sees the political declaration as a 'major step' to achieve a legally-binding regulation safeguarding human control in the use of force (Government of Germany, 2019). Drawing from this approach, the country has advanced in its AI Strategy that the German military has no intention of acquiring or procuring LAWS. The reason that could explain why German wants a legally-binding regulation but are also leading the call for a non-binding declaration is two-fold. At the international level, the rapprochement between Germany and France is related to their renewed cooperation seeking to advance towards an 'effective and strong' CFSP (Treaty of Aachen, 2019, p.4). More concretely, the countries share the need to coordinate their positions closely within the UN bodies, where they aim to ensure that the EU adopts a 'uniform position' (Treaty of Aachen, 2019, p.7). At the internal level, the chairman of the Munich Security Conference Wolfgang Ischinger considers that the absence of a clear Germany foreign and security policy is due to the lack of coordination between the country's foreign, defence and European policy. As a result, the country prefers to muddle through the call

for a stronger EU while demanding that Germany must not be asked to pay for it, which results in a government offering 'different opinions depending on which part of the government or which ministry happens to be speaking' (Ischinger, 2019).

In a similar vein, Slovenia considers that the international community should safeguard human control in the use of force by adopting a new additional protocol (Government of Slovenia, 2018). Croatia shares that idea by claiming that 'international prohibition of weapon systems operating without meaningful human control should not be something unthinkable' (Government of Croatia, 2015b), further emphasizing that 'creating a future legally-binding agreement [...] should not be left completely out of sight' (Government of Croatia, 2015a). Meanwhile Ireland sees merit in a 'legally binding option, but the current lack of a common understanding of what is meant by LAWS means that we do not yet have an appropriate platform on which to build an effective negotiating process' (Government of Ireland, 2018), and considers a political declaration to have the potential to create the conditions and support the efforts going forward. The country has started to work closely with Belgium and Luxembourg in order to safeguard human control in the targeting cycle by working on a 'strong political and/or dedicated international legal instrument' (Governments of Belgium, Ireland, 2019). Previously to that action, the Parliament of Belgium requested the country to work on a legally-binding instrument banning the development and use of weapon systems which lack human control in the targeting process (Belgian Parliament, 2018). In the end, these countries proved that the emerging organizing principle on human control is becoming more central, and even moving up the scale by becoming a norm with wide-ranging moral impact. But they still diverge on the standards of appropriateness of the norm.

Nevertheless, Austria is the only like-minded Member State with the CSKR, and leads the coalition in the UNCCW to advance a legally-binding regulation contemplating the ban on the development and use of weapon systems that lack human control. The explanation for the Austrian behaviour lies in the fact that the country follows its self-projected identity of being a good international citizen where in most disarmament regimes their delegations have been a norm initiator, promoter and keeper (Becker-

Jakob, Hofmann, Müller, & Wunderlich, 2013; Dunne, 2008). The Austrian proposal differs from other Member States aiming to advance a legally-binding regulation setting obligation to safeguard human control in the use of force, since Austria is also willing to address the security concerns derived from proliferation and arms dynamics.

At the level of institutions, the European Parliament challenges the EU delegation in Geneva. Since negotiations started at the UNCCW, the European Parliament side-lined both the status quo and the political declaration. For instance, during the 2014 informal meeting on LAWS, the European Parliament addressed in a resolution the issue of autonomous weapons as part of a broader resolution on armed drones. On that occasion, the institution considered that IHL was not sufficient to regulate LAWS, and proclaimed the need to secure that humans remain in control all along the targeting process by affirming that a legally-binding agreement banning weapons that lack human control is needed. (European Parliament, 2014). Similarly, when the political declaration was gaining the support of the EU Member States and the EU delegation in Geneva, the European Parliament passed a resolution in line with articles 25 and 29 of the TEU to work within CFSP to adopt a common position. The resolution considered that the common position should ensure that meaningful human control is retained as an emerging organizing principle paving the way to standardized procedures regulating a legally-binding agreement banning weapon systems that lack human control in the targeting stage (European Parliament, 2018a), with a special focus on proliferation and arms dynamics.

Delving into the EU level, the European Commission plays a fundamental role addressing human control from the perspective of ethics, security and policies. In April 2018, the European Commission released the EU Plan on AI, where it raised awareness that the application of AI in weapon systems has the potential to fundamentally change armed conflicts. Focusing on the emerging norm on LAWS, the European Commission echoes the importance of complying with international law, including IHL. Likewise, the European Commission also shares the need to articulate human control as a new organizing principle. Along these lines, the European Commission argues that in the

human-machine relationship, humans should remain in control (European Commission 2018c, p. 8). When it comes to discuss how human control in the targeting process should be secured, the European Commission delegates this task into the areas of ethics and security. The ethics framework was retained by the European Commission in the format of a High-Level Group, while the nexus between security and technology was entrusted to the European External Action Service.

In the race for AI currently led by the US and China, the EU Plan intends to have a say in this realm by displaying the EU as a force for good (Barbé & Johansson-Nogués, 2008). For that reason a High-Level Group was established with the assignment to provide the AI ethics guidelines ‘with due regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU’ (European Commission 2018b, p. 15). The guidelines, released in early April 2019, considered that LAWS may lead to an ‘uncontrollable arms race’ creating ‘military contexts in which human control is almost entirely relinquished and risks of malfunction not addressed’ (European Commission 2018d, p. 12). It ultimately concluded that LAWS should be banned in line with Article 3 of the TEU, which states the Union’s aspiration to promote peace, and echoed the European Parliament 2018 resolution asking to work for a legally-binding instrument banning the development and use of weapon systems that lack human control in the targeting process. That is to say, the European Commission supports the quest for a treaty banning weapons lacking human control, and in turn the view of human control becoming a norm with wide-ranging moral impact shaping the standards of appropriateness.

Moving to the technology-security nexus, the HR/VP Mogherini has held various public discussions studying the matter. For instance, she brought the issue of LAWS to the European Parliament in September 2018, and chaired the November 2018 Annual European Defence Agency Conference dedicated to autonomous weapon systems. More to the point, she established a Global Tech Panel whose participants shared the need to provide inputs ensuring that the development of AI that can be used in weapons systems fully complies with international law and respects human dignity (EEAS, 2018). To date, it remains unknown what kind of policy recommendations the Global Tech

Panel advised, and whether the HR/VP could take them into account (Mogherini, 2018a, 2018b). As things stand, the EU delegation in Geneva adopted a single position embracing the political declaration where human control is considered a guiding principle to set the minimum standards to ensure that humans remain in the targeting cycle.

Lastly, the European Commission within the European Defence Fund (EDF) is open to fund actions in the field of AI and robotics. Opposing this action, the European Parliament seeks to prohibit the funding of LAWS. During the EDF interinstitutional negotiations (i.e. European Commission, the Council, and the European Parliament), the European Parliament introduced amendments ruling out actions that could commit serious violations of IHL such as LAWS (European Parliament, 2018b). It was stated that the EDF should not fund lethal autonomous weapons without human control of the critical functions of selecting and attacking individual targets. In February 2019, the European Commission, the Council and the European Parliament agreed on a policy that defines LAWS characteristics as non-eligible for funding (Brzozowski, 2019). To ensure that this first-ever legal instrument prevailed, the amendment was codified by referring to well-established and internalized norms of the sector of security governance that provides the standards of appropriateness. It is noteworthy that MEPs reached this compromise on LAWS even though it involved a loss of parliamentary scrutiny over the future developments of the EDF.

The EU and the side effects of contesting LAWS' human control

The European Security Strategy recognized that technological advancements in the field of weapons represents a risk that could end up in an uncontrollable arms race (European Union, 2003, p.4). The EU Global Strategy (EUGS) reiterated the enduring commitment to promote a rules-based global order with 'multilateralism as its key principle and the United Nations at its core' (EEAS, 2016, p. 8). To be more precise, the EUGS sees the

need to establish global rules in the field of AI and robotics to avoid the related security risks but also to take advantage of the economic benefits (EEAS, 2016, p. 43). This self-identification of the EU as an actor willing to expand norms regulating arms control and its aim to establish rules in the recent field of AI and robotics could be undermined by a new EU focus on its own security, based on the predisposition to support 'defence research and technologies and multinational cooperation, and full use of the European Defence Agency' (EEAS, 2016, p. 21).

Regardless of EU Member States and the EU delegation contributions to the shared understanding of the fundamental norms (civilian immunity), as well as the traditional organizing principles (principle of proportionality, principle of distinction, principle of precaution), when it comes to human control and standardized procedures, divergences still persist. As mentioned above, hierarchical contestation is dividing EU Member States and EU institutions with regard to the relative weight given to the norm on human control, and therefore to the articulation of the standards of appropriateness. The normative dilemma is whether it is better to regulate LAWS through an international legally-binding instrument or a politically non-binding instrument. However, the EU existent internal fissures in relation to the standardized procedures of the emerging norm is not something new. Previous negotiations on landmines and cluster munitions showed that contestation is the rule rather than the exception (Costa, 2009; Vlaskamp, 2010).

As deliberations at the UN addressing the emerging norm on LAWS are proving to be long and difficult, to find common ground, France and Germany have come up with the political declaration considered to be the best achievable compromise. The political declaration aiming to close the gap between fundamental norms and standardized procedures was welcomed at the UNCCW by 15 EU Member States¹² and the EU delegation. Despite the fact that contesting the norm banning LAWS might have

¹² Belgium, Spain, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Bulgaria, Sweden, Finland, Ireland, Austria, Slovenia and the UK have joined France and Germany in pursuing a political declaration on LAWS.

undermined the role of the EU to externalize internal values such as human rights into multilateral institutions (Manners, 2002, p.242-243), it has in the end strengthened the position of the EU as a global actor. Contestation presented in its soft format (Johansson-Nogues, Vlaskamp and Barbé, this volume) has allowed the EU to not only preserve the multilateral forum of the UNCCW where it has acted as a bridge-builder between norm advocates and norm avoiders, but also to advance in the adoption of a new norm.

Nevertheless, the existing divergence among Member States and institutions regarding human control leads us to consider that reaching a single position within the EU was achieved with difficulty. Aiming to put an end to internal fissures, the political declaration has provided the EU with internal cohesiveness on the emerging norm on LAWS (da Conceição-Heldt & Meunier, 2014, p.973). For instance, Austria, which is leading the group calling for a norm banning LAWS, has stressed the country's support for a political declaration in the 2018 UNCCW High Contracting Parties meeting. In a similar vein, the UK has also switched its normative preferences, moving from the status quo to endorsing the political declaration. More importantly, this pragmatic approach has transcended the limits of the EU, persuading actors on both sides of the normative spectrum – those aiming to ban LAWS and those opposing any new norm on LAWS. In effect, countries supporting a norm banning LAWS, such as their group leaders Brazil and Chile, and countries preferring the status quo like Australia are now opened to consider the political declaration on LAWS.

All in all, the EU has not undermined its external authority and credibility. In fact, the EU remains an influential actor able to include the interests and ideas of other countries in the leadership project as it has triggered followership (Barbé, 2012; Schirm, 2010). At the same time, contestation in the field of human control is witnessing the advent of a principled pragmatism in the EU external action. Along these lines, it can be considered that the EU is aware of the internal fissures and external contestation regarding LAWS and has accepted a new role based on the idea 'to be modest at times in what we believe we can achieve and what we cannot' (Tocci, 2016, p. 6) without losing sight of

international law and its underlying norms as the benchmark of what is acceptable for the EU and what is not (Tocci, 2017, p.65).

Lastly, the European Parliament has continued to portray its traditional role as a principled normative actor within the EU. This results from the European Parliament being the only directly-elected EU institution, which means that its duty is to defend European values, and the predisposition to assume more power within the institutional framework by playing a more active role in areas such as the protection of human rights (Barbé, 2004, p.55). Intending to shape the EU's foreign and security policy, the European Parliament has passed two declarations endorsing the need for a new norm banning LAWS as well as calling within the framework of the CFSP to work on a common position at the UN level. Internally, the European Parliament took a further step as it successfully contested the EU Member States' reluctance to take stronger views on LAWS during the EDF interinstitutional negotiations. The pressure exerted by MEPs has produced the first-ever agreement between the European Commission, European Parliament, and the 28 Member States to stigmatize LAWS by prohibiting (Borrie, Brehm, Cattaneo, & Atwood, 2009). This suggests that the intra-EU contestation might revitalize the EU's Foreign and Security Policy in a normative sense as the EDF agreement might shape Member States' positions, which could result in developing national regulations as well as supporting at the GGE a call to start negotiations on a legally-binding agreement.

Conclusions

The debate on LAWS and especially on human control will continue in the years lying ahead. If the UNCCW is unable to produce a satisfactory outcome, the Coalition to Stop Killer Robots has already announced that discussions might be held outside of this forum. Indeed, like-minded countries can push the debate on LAWS outside the UN by adopting the form of the Ottawa Convention, but it could also be voted at the UNGA as showed by the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. In any case, such an agreement would probably not include those states developing and testing LAWS, and therefore would not stop proliferation and arms dynamics.

A norm contestation framework has enabled us to map out the ideational debate in the emerging stage. On the one hand, there is a struggle between different groups of revisionists quarrelling about the direction or the degree of desirable change. On the other hand, there is debate between those willing to change and those who prefer the status quo (Müller & Wunderlich, 2018, p. 19). Along these lines, the contention exerted by France with the support of the EU delegation to move the debate to the UNCCW was crucial. The UNCCW institutional structure has led national delegations to adopt a strategy of soft contestation in the form of effective deliberations.

Although human control remains an ambiguous principle, EU Member States and the EU delegation helped to enshrine it as the new organizing principle of the emerging norm. At the same time, they also facilitated shared understandings regarding the fundamental norm and traditional organizing principles. That is why, to avoid a deadlock situation, 15 Member States¹³ and the EU delegation in Geneva pursued a soft law instrument to articulate the contested standardized procedures of the organizing principle of human control. This approach seeks to gradually develop the standardized procedures and is seen as a third way between those opposing any revision, and those aiming to ban this kind of weapon. Indeed, the political declaration is an example of how the EU is able to bring together different preferences and cultural validations in order to converge towards a constitutive horizon upon which to act (Wiener 2014, p.67). For instance, it encompasses the view of France, which sees the political declaration as a final step, together with Germany, which considers the political declaration only a 'major step' towards banning LAWS.

This gave room for the EU to reinvigorate their traditional ability to build consensus across the board, while further developing a new identity based on the understanding to be modest at times in what it can be achieved and what cannot be achieved. Resulting

¹³ France, Germany, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Bulgaria, Sweden, Finland, Ireland, Austria, Slovenia and the UK.

from this new role, the political declaration is a pragmatic option aiming to solve intra-EU fissures exerted by Member States and institutions alike. This has proved to be effective as the EU induced the acceptance of their norm's interpretation even in cases of intersubjective disagreement. Accounting for that fact, norm followers are emerging from both groups: both countries supporting a banning norm, and states willing to preserve the status quo. In other words, soft contestation at the UN-level has allowed the EU to fill a void in such a way as to bolster its legitimacy as an actor in global governance and protect the two fundamental foreign policy values of the promotion of multilateralism and the promotion of norms (Costa, Kissack, & Barbé, 2016).

Still, the European Parliament, intending to shape the EU's foreign and security policy, endorsed the need for a new norm banning LAWS and called within the framework of the CFSP to work on a common position at the UN level. At the internal level it has successfully inhibited the views of the Member States, and the EU delegation in Geneva. During interinstitutional negotiations on the EDF, the European Parliament was able to strike the first ever deal between the European Commission, the Council, and the European Parliament itself, whereby the funding of LAWS was prohibited. This suggests that the EDF agreement may shape in the medium-term the EU internal political dynamics as Member States could develop national regulations as well as supporting at the UNCCW a call to start negotiations on a legally-binding agreement, which in turn might revitalize the EU as a global actor in normative issues.

References

- Abbot, K. W., & Snidal, D. (2000). *Hard and Soft Law in International Governance*. *International Organization*, 54(3), 421-456.
- Barbé, E. (2004). The evolution of CFSP institutions: Where does democratic accountability stand? *International Spectator*, 39(2), 47-60.
- Barbé, E. (2012). La Unión Europea en las Instituciones de Gobernanza Global: Marco Analítico y Preguntas de Investigación. In E. Barbé (Ed.), *Cambio Mundial y Gobernanza Global* (pp. 11-28). Madrid: Tecnos.
- Barbé, E., & Johansson-Nogués, E. (2008). The EU as a modest 'force for good': the

- European Neighbourhood Policy. *International Affairs*, 84(1), 81–96.
- Becker-Jakob, U., Hofmann, G., Müller, H., & Wunderlich, C. (2013). Good International Citizens: Canada, Germany, and Sweden. In H. Müller & C. Wunderlich (Eds.), *Norms Dynamics in Multilateral Arms Control* (pp. 207–245). Athens: The University of Georgia Press.
- Belgian Parliament. (2018). *Proposition de Résolution visant à interdire l'utilisation, para la Défense belge, de robots tueurs et de drones armés*. Brussels: Defence Committee.
- Ben-Josef Hirsch, M. (2014). Ideational change and the emergence of the international norm of truth and reconciliation commissions. *European Journal of International Relations*, 20(3), 810–833.
- Borrie, J., Brehm, M., Cattaneo, S., & Atwood, D. (2009). Learn, adapt, succeed: potential lessons from the Ottawa and Oslo processes for other disarmament and arms controls challenges. *Disarmament Forum*, 19–25.
- Brzozowski, A. (2019, February 22). European Defence Fund agreed amid ethics concerns. *EURACTIVE*. Retrieved from <https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/news/european-defence-fund-agreed-amid-ethics-concerns/> (Last accessed 14/06/2019)
- Bueger, C. (2017). Practices, norms, and the theory of contestation. *Polity*, 49(1), 126–131.
- Costa, O. (2009). The unexpected EU leadership on landmines : the influence of the Ottawa Convention on the EU. *European Security*, 18(3), 245–261.
- Costa, O., Kissack, R., & Barbé, E. (2016). Accomodating or Entrenching? How the EU is Deadling with Changes in the Multilateral System. In E. Barbé, O. Costa, & R. Kissack (Eds.), *EU Policy Responses to a Shifting Multilateral System*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Crocker, C. A. (2015). The Strategic Dilemma of a World Adrift. *Survival*, 57(1), 7–30.
- da Conceição-Heldt, E., & Meunier, S. (2014). Speaking with a single voice: Internal cohesiveness and external effectiveness of the EU in global governance. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 21(7), 961–979.
- Delcker, J. (2019, March). France, Germany under fire for failing to back 'killer robots' ban. *Politico*, 1–4.

- Dunne, T. (2008). Good citizen Europe. *International Affairs*, 84(1), 13–28.
- EEAS. (2016). *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe*. Brussels.
- EEAS. (2018). International Security and Lethal Autonomous Weapons.
- European Commission. (2018a). *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Artificial Intelligence for Europe*. Brussels: European Commission.
- European Commission. (2018b). *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Coordinated Plan on Artificial Intelligence*. Brussels: European Commission.
- European Commission. (2018c). *The European Commission's High-Level Group on Artificial Intelligence: Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI (Draft)*. Brussels: European Commission.
- European Parliament. (2014). *European Parliament resolution on the use of armed drones (2014/2567(RSP))*. Brussels: European Parliament.
- European Parliament. (2018a). *European parliament resolution on autonomous weapon systems (2018/2752(RSP))*. Brussels: European Parliament.
- European Parliament. (2018b). *Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Defence Fund (COM(2018)0476– C8-0268/2018 – 2018/0254(COD))*. Brussels: European Parliament.
- European Union. (2003). *European Security Strategy: A secure Europe in a better world*. Brussels.
- European Union. (2013). *Interactive Dialogue with Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, and with the Special Rapporteur on Internally Displaced Persons*. Geneva: EU Permanent Delegation to the UN Office and other international organisations in Geneva.
- European Union. (2015). *European Union Statement by H.E. Mr Peter Sørensen, Ambassador, Permanent Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations and other international organisations in Geneva Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventio*. Geneva: EU Permanent Delegation

- to the UN Office and other international organisations in Geneva.
- Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. *International Organization*, 52(4), 887–917.
- Future of Life Institute. (2015). Autonomous Weapons: An Open Letter From AI & Robotics Researchers. Retrieved from <https://futureoflife.org/open-letter-autonomous-weapons> (Last accessed 14/06/2019)
- Gehring, T. (1994). *Dynamic international regimes: institutions for international environmental governance*. New York: Peter Lang.
- Government of Croatia. (2015a). Closing Statement of the Republic of Croatia. UNCCW Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems. Geneva: Croatia Permanent Delegation to the UN Office and other international organisations in Geneva.
- Government of Croatia. (2015b). *Opening Statement of the Republic of Croatia. UNCCW Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems*. Geneva: Croatia Permanent Delegation to the UN Office and other international organisations in Geneva.
- Government of France. (2015). *Convention sur Certaines Armes Classiques (CCAC) Reunion informelle d'experts sur les systèmes d'armes letaux autonomes (SALA) Intervention générale*. Geneva: France Permanent Delegation to the UN Office and other international organisations in Geneva.
- Government of France. (2016). *Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (UNCCW) Meeting of experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) Non Paper Characterization of a LAWS*. Geneva: France Permanent Delegation to the UN Office and other international organisations in Geneva.
- Government of France. (2018). *Human-Machine Interaction in the Development, Deployment and Use of Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems*. Geneva: France Permanent Delegation to the UN Office and other international organisations in Geneva.
- Government of France. (2019). *Discours de Florence Parly, ministre des Armées: Intelligence artificielle et défense*. Saclay: Government of France.
- Government of Germany. (2015). UNCCW Expert Meeting Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems Final Statement by Germany. Geneva: Germany Permanent Delegation to

- the UN Office and other international organisations in Geneva.
- Government of Germany. (2018). *Speech by the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Heiko Maas, Member of the German Bundestag at the general debate of the 73rd General Assembly of the United Nations*. New York.
- Government of Germany. (2019). *Speech by Federal Foreign Minister Heiko Maas at the Conference 2019 Capturing Technology. Rethinking Arms Control*. Berlin: German Federal Foreign Office.
- Government of Ireland. (2018). *Group of Governmental Experts Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Ireland's Intervention*. Geneva: Ireland Permanent Delegation to the UN Office and other international organisations in Geneva.
- Government of Slovenia. (2018). *Statement of Slovenia. GGE LAWS*. Geneva: Slovenia Permanent Delegation to the UN Office and other international organisations in Geneva.
- Governments of Belgium, Ireland, and L. (2019). *Food for Thought Paper. 4th Session of the GGE LAWS, Geneva, 25-29 March 2019*. Geneva: Governments of Belgium, Ireland, and Luxembourg.
- Horowitz, M. (2018). The Algorithms of August. *Foreign Policy*, 1–7. Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/12/will-the-united-states-lose-the-artificial-intelligence-arms-race/?utm_source=PostUp&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Editors_Picks_9/18/2018_-_FP_Guide&utm_keyword=Editor's_Picks_OC (Last accessed 14/06/2019)
- Human Rights Council. (2013). *Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns*. Geneva: Human Rights Council.
- Human Rights Watch. (2016). *Killer Robots and the Concept of Meaningful Human Control. Memorandum to Convention on Conventional Weapons (UNCCW) Delegates April 2016 Introduction, (April), 1–16*.
- ICRC. (2016). *Views of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on autonomous weapon system*. Geneva: UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.
- Jose, B. (2018). *Norm Contestation: Insights into Non-Conformity with Armed Conflict*

- Norms*. Basingstoke: Springer.
- Kostopoulos, L. (2019, April). *Developmental items for consideration as scientists, commanders and politicians explore AI opportunities for Defense*. Barcelona.
- Krasner, S. D. (1982). Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables. *International Organization*, 36(2), 185–205.
- Krook, M. L., & True, J. (2010). Rethinking the life cycles of international norms: The united nations and the global promotion of gender equality. *European Journal of International Relations*, 18(1), 103–127.
- Manners, I. (2002). Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40(2), 235–258.
- Mills, K., & Bloomfield, A. (2018). African resistance to the International Criminal Court: Halting the advance of the anti-impunity norm. *Review of International Studies*, 44(1), 101–127.
- Mogherini, F. (2018a). *High Representative Letter to Members of the Global Tech Panel (June 2018)*. Brussels: EEAS.
- Mogherini, F. (2018b). *High Representative Letter to Members of the Global Tech Panel (October 2018)*. Brussels: EEAS.
- Müller, H. (2013). Agency is Central. In H. Müller & C. Wunderlich (Eds.), *Norms Dynamics in Multilateral Arms Control* (pp. 337–366). Athens: The University of Georgia Press.
- Müller, H., Fey, M., & Rauch, C. (2013). Winds of Change: Exogenous Events and Trends as Norm Triggers (or Norm Killers). In H. Müller & C. Wunderlich (Eds.), *Norms Dynamics in Multilateral Arms Control* (pp. 141–159). Athens: The University of Georgia Press.
- Müller, H., & Wunderlich, C. (2018). Not lost in contestation: How norm entrepreneurs frame norm development in the nuclear nonproliferation regime. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 39(3), 341–366.
- Petrova, M. H. (2018). Weapons prohibitions through immanent critique: NGOs as emancipatory and (de)securitising actors in security governance. *Review of International Studies*, 44(4), 619–653.
- Political Declaration. (2017). *Examination of various dimensions of emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems, in the context of*

- the objectives and purposes of the Convention. Submitted by France and Germany.*
Geneva.
- Risse, T. (2000). "Let's Argue!": Communicative Action in World Politics. *International Organization*, 54(4), 1–39.
- Rosert, E. (2017). *How to Regulate Autonomous Weapons: Steps to Codify Meaningful Human Control as a Principle of International Humanitarian Law*. Frankfurt: PRIF Spotlight.
- Schirm, S. A. (2010). Leaders in need of followers: Emerging powers in global governance. *European Journal of International Relations*, 16(2), 197–221.
- Smetana, M., & Onderco, M. (2019). Bringing the outsiders in: an interactionist perspective on deviance and normative change in international politics. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 1–21.
- Tocci, N. (2016). Interview with Nathalie Tocci on the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy. *International Spectator*, 51(3), 1–8.
- Tocci, N. (2017). *Framing the EU Global Strategy: A Stronger Europe in a Fragile World*. *The RUSI Journal* (Vol. 162). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Treaty of Aachen. (2019). *Traité entre la République française et la République fédérale d'Allemagne sur la coopération et l'intégration franco-allemandes*.
- U.S. Department of Defense. (2017). DoD Directive 3000.09: Autonomy in Weapon Systems. *Department of Defence*, 1(3000), 1–15.
- United Nations. (2016a). *Advanced Version Recommendations to the 2016 Review Conference Submitted by the Chairperson of the Informal Meeting of Experts*. Geneva: UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.
- United Nations. (2016b). *Advanced Version Report of the 2016 Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) Submitted by the Chairperson of the Informal Meeting of Experts*. Geneva: UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.
- United Nations. (2017). *Report of the 2017 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS)*. Geneva: UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.
- United Nations. (2018). *Report of the 2018 session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems*

- (Vol. UNCCW/GGE.1/). Geneva: UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.
- United Nations Secretary-General. (2018a). *Remarks at the University of Geneva on the launch of the Disarmament Agenda*. Geneva: United Nations Secretary-General.
- United Nations Secretary-General. (2018b). *Remarks at "Web Summit."* Lisbon: Web Summit.
- United Nations Secretary-General. (2018c). *Remarks to the Conference on Disarmament*. Geneva: United Nations Secretary-General.
- Vlaskamp, M. (2010). *The Role of the European Union in the Processes to Ban Cluster Munitions* (Observatori de Política Exterior Europea: 84). Barcelona.
- Wiener, A. (2009). Enacting meaning-in-use: Qualitative research on norms and international relations. *Review of International Studies*, 35(1), 175–193.
- Wiener, A. (2014). *A Theory of Contestation*. Basingstoke: Springer.
- Wiener, A. (2017). A Reply to My Critics. *Polity*, 49(1), 165–184.